

Wittgenstein Reads Weininger

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- despair resulting from this structure of the self to the sexes, pronouncing "in despair to will to be oneself" as the predominantly male form, and "in despair not to will to be oneself" as the predominantly female form.
34. Nordmann makes the case for this interpretation of the remark: "The Sleepy Philosopher," 169.
35. "Ethical artistry is something I perform for others, or even only for myself, in order to demonstrate of what I am capable." *Denkwegungen*, 127.
36. See *Denkwegungen*, 153f., where Wittgenstein considers himself a slave rather than a free man because he is afraid of ridicule, and 177f., where he discusses his inability to follow his intuition and give away his new sweater, and the possibility that he may feel that he has to burn his writings.
37. Chamisso's text is discussed at some length by Otto Rank in his classical psychoanalytic study of 1914, *Der Doppelgänger. Eine psychoanalytische Studie*. Freud's article "The Uncanny" (see *Standard Edition*, vol. 17, 219–52) first appeared in 1919, and was republished in 1924. Wittgenstein's reference to the etymology of the name, the details of which form a long footnote in Rank (58), as well as his interpretation, suggest – though obviously cannot prove – that he knew the text(s).
38. Whether or not he becomes entangled in the type of meta-moves that Sass mentions when trying to distinguish between "ethical artistry" and "authentic decency" is difficult to decide. On the whole, the diaries seem to display hyper-alertness to states of consciousness – an intense focusing on his own mental states – rather than hyper-reflexivity and cascades of meta-reflections.
39. Wilhelm Anz, "Kierkegaard on Death and Dying," in Jonathan Rée and Jane Chamberlain, eds., *Kierkegaard: A Critical Reader*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1998, 39–52, p. 49.
40. This is one reason why the *Doppelgänger* causes fear. Weininger suggests another in his *Taschenbuch*, the *Doppelgänger* as a collection of all evil properties: "The *Doppelgänger* is the ensemble of all evil properties of the self. Any specific fear is only part of this fear, the fear of the *Doppelgänger*." Likewise, the criminal must murder all witnesses of his crimes: "They all are his *Doppelgänger*." *Geschehn und Charakter*, 611 and 625.
41. See Norman Malcolm: *Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View*, London: Routledge, 1993. See also Philip R. Shields, *Logic and Sin in the Writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993 (esp. "Writing to the Glory of God," 87–114). Wittgenstein, according to Shields, may have been looking "for a resting place, for thoughts that are at peace," but "remained troubled by the effects of our alienation, by the discrepancy between his religious vision and our own restless lives" (106).

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Weininger and Wittgenstein on "Animal Psychology"

David G. Stern

Introduction

In November 1916, when Wittgenstein was serving in the Austro-Hungarian army, his oldest sister, Hermine, wrote to him that "I have taken your Weininger with me and am very happy with this book; it replaces you for me, a little."¹ It is not clear which Weininger book Hermine was referring to, but in another letter to her brother, written in 1931, she playfully refers to *On Last Things*: "I believe Weininger maintained that milk is the only innocent food, because it destroys no seed. . . ."² The passage in question is part of the collection of aphorisms that makes up the second chapter of that book:

The vegetarians are just as wrong as their opponents. Anyone who does not wish to contribute to the killing of living things may only drink milk, for anyone who eats fruit or eggs still kills embryos. That is perhaps why milk is the healthiest food, because it is the most ethical.³

At first sight, one might take the point of Weininger's aphorism to be to make fun of those whose logical consistency drives them to take up positions that cannot, in practice, be maintained. However, his rejection of both sides in this dispute closely parallels his own substantive ethical outlook, which also sets an impossibly high standard by which to judge human action. For Weininger maintains that to live a virtuous life one must not only reject immorality but also conventional mores, devoting oneself wholeheartedly to a life of celibacy and extreme self-denial.

Furthermore, as in the case of Weininger's discussion of vegetarians and meat-eaters, the depiction of a higher ideal turns, to a remarkable extent, on a morbid fascination with the failings of the positions he opposes.

Weininger was certainly on Wittgenstein's mind in 1916 and 1931; Weininger's influence on the composition of the *Tractatus* can be dated to the second half of 1916, and it was in 1931 that Wittgenstein included Weininger on a short list of writers who had influenced him.⁴ In 1966, in his first conversation with Allan Janik, Georg Henrik von Wright drew Janik's attention to Wittgenstein's very serious interest in Weininger's *On Last Things*, and said that Wittgenstein spoke highly of the section entitled "Animal Psychology" late in his life.⁵ In that text, Weininger maintains that "each species of animal has a *single* character common to all its members, but which among humans is possessed only by a certain few."⁶ In other words, he maintains that a given species, or breed of dog, has certain essential traits, constituting a character that corresponds to a distinctive personality type among humans. Most of the discussion is devoted to the case for seeing dogs as exemplifying a set of character traits common to human criminals, with particular breeds of dog corresponding to different types of criminal. Toward the end, Weininger begins to sketch a typology of animal characteristics, maintaining that people with an inclination to immorality take on these animal physiognomies more and more as they get older:

The dog, as criminal, is related to the wolf (the wolf is a symbol of greed, but perhaps also of something else), and the wolf is surely criminal. The horse is a symbol of insanity, the donkey of stupidity. (The donkey is above all wilful, obstinate, and *self-satisfied* stupidity. It is the *caricature of piety*. Accordingly, this image, like piety, is also missing from the Jews. There is no Jewish donkey.)⁷

The goose, the dove, the hen, the parrot, the magpie, the crow, the duck — one finds them all represented, physiologically and characterologically, among human females. The males of these birds are henpecked husbands (with the exception of the rooster; parrot?)⁸

According to Peter Geach, Wittgenstein would classify his friends in Cambridge according to Weininger's specific classification of animal types; Barry Smith, who reports this story, also maintains that the chapter on animal psychology had a special importance for Wittgenstein.⁹

Lichtenberg: "Wherever We Look, We See Only Ourselves."

This paper looks at the role of the notion of "animal psychology" in Weininger and Wittgenstein, and the question of what we can learn from considering their attitudes to animals. I take as the point of departure for my discussion of Wittgenstein's interest in Weininger on "animal psychology" two passages from Lichtenberg's "waste books." There, he proposes that any observation or interpretation is ultimately a self-interpretation. These ideas play an important role in Weininger's metaphysics and "animal psychology"; following this Lichtenbergian leitmotif in Weininger and Wittgenstein will help us to see the connections between Wittgenstein's and Weininger's remarks about understanding animals. While both authors certainly read and appreciated Lichtenberg, I do not claim that he directly influenced them on this point.¹⁰ Rather, the passages that follow are intended as striking illustrations of a particular train of thought that repeatedly arises in post-Kantian philosophy, a train of thought to which Weininger and Wittgenstein both respond.

Certainly experiment and reflection enable us to introduce a significance into what is not legible, either to us or at all: thus we see faces or landscapes in the sand, though they are certainly not there. The introduction of symmetries belongs here too, silhouettes in inkblots, etc. Likewise the gradations we establish in the order of creatures: all this is *not in the things but in us*. In general we cannot remember too often that when we observe nature, and especially the ordering of nature, it is always ourselves alone we are observing.¹¹

In the preface to the second . . . edition of Kant's *Critique* . . . many singular things appear that I have often thought but never said. We discover no cause in things but notice only that which corresponds to something within ourselves. Wherever we look, we see only ourselves.¹²

The first remark from Lichtenberg sets out a central theme of Weininger's metaphysics: the structure of the world around us is ultimately a structure that we project onto it. Weininger's only reference to Lichtenberg is in connection with Lichtenberg's famous claim that to start from "I think" is to already presume more than we know from experience, and that we ought instead to say "it thinks."¹³ However, the passage he quotes from Lichtenberg in his footnote begins with a sentence that raises a more general question, the very question under discussion here — namely, how, and whether, we can

distinguish what we contribute to our experience from that which is independent of us: "We are conscious of certain ideas that do not depend on us; others, we believe at least, depend on us; where is the boundary?"¹⁴

Lichtenberg's second remark applies the idea that "wherever we look, we see only ourselves" to philosophical texts. The philosophers we read – not just our choice of philosophical heroes, but also the philosophies of the heroes we choose – are products of our own ordering activity. Such ideas teeter on the brink of an extreme relativism. If Lichtenberg avoids the relativism implicit in this Protagorean view, it is because he holds that the "ordering of nature" is not simply up to us: how we order nature – the kind of ordering that had been the traditional concern of metaphysics, and that informs Kant's theory of the categories – is determined by human psychology and the structure of the language we speak.

Wittgenstein's and Weininger's approaches to "animal psychology" can be seen as two related and connected developments of this Lichtenbergian topic.¹⁵ Neither of them accepts Lichtenberg's psychology, however; both are closer to Kant in their emphasis on the role of logic in structuring our thought, and their insistence that logic and ethics are independent from merely empirical psychology. However, both of them are acutely aware that what we take to be absolutely fixed, seemingly a matter of logical necessity, may later prove to be a product of our desire to find an objective order in the world. Weininger's idealist response to the Lichtenbergian question about the boundary between those ideas that depend on us and those that do not is to push that boundary out to its logical extreme, so that all ideas depend on us. Wittgenstein not only rejects this Weiningerian hyperbole, but also responds to Weininger by reflecting on the way our expectations inform how we look at, and talk about, other creatures.

In Chapter 4 of *On Last Things*, Weininger opens a discussion of symbolism, time, and motion by raising just this question about the nature and extent of our contribution to what we experience in connection with a discussion of the significance of symbols:

People have perceived many symbols of a higher reality in geometrical forms. We may leave undecided the question whether the reason for this phenomenon simply lies in the fact that what we are rediscovering in them is an

a priori function of our own intuition, and no less, therefore, than something which has the properties and the value of the a priori, as Kant taught, or whether, on the contrary, we are only discovering in those laws those of our own imagination, and thus something that is rather more suitable for stripping them of all transcendental symbolism. Neither of the two answers really settles the question simply and in general.¹⁶

Thus, Weininger briefly mentions both the a priori Kantian approach and the a posteriori psychological response, only to put both of them to one side, claiming that neither of them can settle the question. Instead, he turns to a rambling, seemingly anecdotal, discussion of the significance of particular symbols, a discussion that leads up to the far-reaching conclusions about the nature of time, morality, and the meaning of life. In the course of this discussion he begins to articulate a conception of symbolism that owes something to both Kant's late a conception of the a priori and a psychological reliance on empirical and introspective observation of particular mental processes. This question about the nature of symbols and our contribution to their significance is also a principal concern in the next chapter of his book, which contains the section on "animal psychology."

Weininger's "Animal Psychology"

Chapter 5 of Weininger's *Last Things* is entitled "Metaphysics," but he begins by warning the reader that what he sets forth "diverges from the usual notions": it is not about being and not-being, but "symbolism, universal symbolism."¹⁷ Weininger's conception of "symbolism" diverges from the usual philosophical notions of a theory of symbols, too. What he claims to do is to specify the ultimate symbolic significance of each type of thing in the world. Drawing on an "introspective-psychological" method, he aims to uncover what "the sea, what iron, what ants, what the Chinese mean, the *idea* which they represent."¹⁸ In the most general terms, what he aims to do is to state "the meaning of everything particular in the totality."¹⁹ The method is underwritten in part by the idea of the human being as a microcosm: because everything we know is interpreted through our psychological categories, to say what everything in the world symbolizes is ultimately to talk about human characteristics.

Although the chapter is less than twenty pages long, and trails off into a long list of examples of symbolist interpretations of particular types of plants and things, the author clearly conceived of it as the first chapter of a book draft:

The fundamental thought and the presupposition of the book, the basis on which rests *all* that follows, is the theory of the human being as *microcosm*.²⁰ Because the human being stands in relation to all the things in the world, so all these things must surely exist in him. This thought about the microcosm is being taken seriously for the first time in this book: *according to it, the system of the world is identical with the system of humankind*. Every form of existence in nature corresponds to a characteristic in human beings, every possibility in humans corresponds to something in nature. Thus nature . . . is *interpreted* through the *psychological* categories in humans, and is regarded only as a symbol for them.²¹

However, while this makes Weininger's philosophy a form of idealism, he departs from the usual idealist view that both mental and physical phenomena are only appearances. Guided by what he calls "moral-theoretical considerations," he maintains that the mental has "more reality."²²

Weininger's most well worked out example of a symbol's significance is his account of the dog, which he maintains is a symbol of a criminal.²³ Characteristically, his defense of this view depends on a detailed exposition of the "*essence of the criminal*,"²⁴ most of which will be familiar to the reader of *Sex and Character*: the criminal has no will, no judgment, no autonomy, continually commits sins, is only concerned with his pleasure, and lacks unity of consciousness. Unable to transcend the causal nexus, or the spatio-temporal present, he or she is bound to both things and people, either as master or as servant. Dimly aware of his potential for transcendence, the criminal is driven to negate everything that exists, to kill, to destroy, and to screw around ("From Don Juan to murderer is . . . only a step").²⁵

Turning to "The Dog," Weininger finds all these traits writ large in the canine physiognomy: The evidence he offers is anecdotal, and is perhaps best understood as an invitation to interpret our experience of dogs in the light of the nexus of criminal traits just described. Characteristic canine behavior is construed as exemplifying Weiningerian criminality: "the dog's *barking* is decisive; it is the absolutely

negative expressive movement. It proves that the dog is the symbol of the criminal."²⁶ "The dog's impotency, its jumping up on people, is the functionalism of the slave."²⁷ "*The dog's tail-wagging signifies that it recognizes every other thing as more valuable than itself*."²⁸ "The dog's faithfulness [is] a symbol of baseness: the *slave mentality* (there is no merit in coming back after a beating)."²⁹ "The *sniffing* of the dog . . . indicates an inability for apperception . . . passively attracted by individual objects, without his knowing why . . . he simply has no freedom. The dog breeds with any bitch whatever, and this randomness also expresses that he has altogether given up choice."³⁰

At first sight, Weininger's "animal psychology" provides us with an extremely personal philosophical pathology, a romantic metaphysics that objectifies his vision of good and evil as the structure of the world. If we are to take Weininger at his word, he asks us to believe that everything – not only animals, but ultimately also plants and even inorganic nature – is a symbol of a Manichaean conflict between mundane evil and the transcendent goodness that can only be achieved by the extraordinary genius.³¹

How are we to make sense of this extraordinary claim? Whenever a philosopher makes a claim that appears implausible, the usual interpretive strategies are either to defend the claim, perhaps by reinterpreting it or finding further support for it, or to concede that the claim is indefensible, and to provide an explanation as to why the philosopher was attracted to it. Defenders of Weininger's views on "animal psychology" have argued that they are best understood as a dramatic presentation of his conception of the nature of evil, and must be seen as complementary to his overall ethical views about the nature of human flourishing. Weininger's harshest critics have contended that his unrelentingly harsh treatment of animals is not just a natural extension of the misogyny, homophobia and anti-Semitism that pervades his work, but are a symptom of his extreme mental instability. Let us look briefly at each of these responses to Weininger's treatment of animality.

For Freud, Weininger was a perfect example of his psychoanalytic theories about the relation of circumcision to castration, Jewishness and femininity. Sander Gilman observes that "Weininger serves Freud as a touchstone for the definition of the diseased Jew . . . For Freud,

Weininger's disease is his self-hate, both as a Jew and a homosexual; the proof of his disease is his suicide."³² Freud contends that because of small boys unconsciously believe a mythical account of the nature of sexual difference, they fear that they could lose their penis and so become a woman, a fear of castration that can also manifest itself in the behavior of the adult neurotic. In a footnote to his seminal discussion of "Little Hans," Freud links anxiety about castration to anti-Semitism:

The castration complex is the deepest unconscious root of anti-Semitism; for even in the nursery little boys hear that a Jew has something cut off his penis—a piece of his penis, they think—and this gives them a right to despise Jews. And there is no stronger unconscious root for the sense of superiority over women. Weininger (the young philosopher who, highly gifted but sexually deranged, committed suicide after producing his remarkable book, *Gesicht und Charakter*), in a chapter that attracted much attention, treated Jews and women with equal hostility and overwhelmed them with the same insults. Being a neurotic, Weininger was completely under the sway of his infantile complex; and from that standpoint what is common to Jews and women is their relation to the castration complex.³³

One consequence of this view of the matter is that Weininger's beliefs are caused by his disease, and so the problem of whether one can give a rational explanation or justification for them falls away. Gilman, fittingly, spends most of the essay just cited showing how Freud's beliefs about Weininger have their origins in the ethnopsychological theories of the time, which held that there is a close causal relation between different ethnic body types and psychic constitution. From a Freudian standpoint, the more interesting question is the precise nature of the connection between Weininger's fears and his psychic condition.³⁴ There is a close connection between the fear of the Jewish, the feminine, and the animal in Weininger's psychic economy. While Jews and women amount to human incarnations of the irrational for Weininger, it is animals, and especially dogs, precisely because they are not human, yet take on a certain human character, that symbolize his greatest fear of all. This would hardly have surprised Freud; Little Hans's anxieties first presented themselves as a fear of horses. Artur Gerber, a close friend of Weininger's, related the story of a night in November 1902, when he talked Weininger out of killing himself. Ultimately, "in a voice as sinister, as icy cold, as desperate, and without

hope as I have ever heard from a human being," he told Gerber the following:

I know that I am a born criminal. I am a born murderer. . . . I spent a night in a hotel room in Munich once. I could not sleep. Then I heard a barking dog. I have never heard a dog bark in such a terrifying way. It must have been a black dog. It was the evil spirit. I fought with it, I fought with it for my soul. In sheer terror I bit the sheets to shreds that night. Since that time I have known that I am a murderer. That is why I must kill myself!³⁵

It is unclear how reliable this memoir, published seventeen years after the event, actually is. Abrahamson rehearses this issue at some length, pointing out that the account given by Gerber seems to telescope two separate events related by Weininger near the beginning of the discussion of "The Dog":³⁶

The dog has a remarkably deep relation to death. Months before the dog became problematic for me, I was sitting at five o'clock one afternoon in a room of the hotel in Munich where I was staying, and reflecting on various things. Suddenly I heard a dog barking in a most peculiar and piercing way that was new to me, and simultaneously I had the irresistible feeling that exactly at that moment someone *was dying*.

Months later, on the most dreadful night of my life, although I was not ill I was literally wrestling with death—for there is no spiritual death without physical death for great men, because life and death are for them the possibilities which confront one another most powerfully and intensively. Just as I was thinking of succumbing, I heard a dog bark three times in the same way as that time in Munich. This dog barked the whole night, but these three times were different. I noticed that at this moment I bit into the bed sheet with my teeth, like a dying man.³⁷

While the Freudian account can help us to see the tight nexus of associations linking these events in Weininger's life and thought, and the connections between his fear of death, dogs, Woman, and Jew, it does so at the price of treating his views as entirely explicable in terms of symptoms of mental illness. As Abrahamson puts it, "his terror became clearer and clearer, and we may believe that out of necessity he gradually filled it with rationalistic content."³⁸

We should not, however, dismiss Weininger's views as only symptoms of a struggle with insanity before we consider whether or not they can be rationally understood.³⁹ From such a perspective, his imaginative vision of how dogs symbolize evil is best understood as a further development of his reading of Ibsen's *Peer Gynt*, where the

Boyg and the Troll King epitomize the role of the subhuman and evil being. Allan Janik has recently provided an excellent exposition of Weininger's reading of *Peer Gynt*, and his conception of animality, along just these lines. Janik maintains that the point of Weininger's "proto-phenomenological description" of the Criminal is to give us a model of "what it is to be immoral in itself," with the aim of pressing his reader "to reflect upon happiness and the good life by giving us the negative example of a life in which guilt and the idea of human limitation play *no role whatsoever* . . . the polar opposite of Kant's autonomous human being."⁴⁰

Consequently, Janik construes the "Metaphysics" chapter of *Last Things* as a commentary on the issues raised by Weininger's discussion of *Peer Gynt* in the first chapter of that book, a discussion that brings out the central place in that play of the relationship between the human and the animal, reason and instinct, and autonomy and heteronomy:

Like Peer, the Criminal does not notice that he is actually the unhappiest of men despite his outwardly happy, hedonistic life and, like Peer seeking the center of the onion by peeling off its layers, he in fact destroys himself in rejecting both logic and ethics in his superficial search for self-fulfillment. However, Weininger recasts Ibsen's contrast between human and the sub-human trolls in *Peer Gynt* as a contrast between the Kantian autonomous rational agent and the fully heteronomous, self-willed, instinct-driven animal, which is only human in appearance. . . . Trolls lose themselves by being entirely self-serving, humans attain selfhood by overcoming selfishness.⁴¹

In short, Janik proposes that on a Weiningerian reading, *Peer Gynt* is "a drama of redemption, whose real hero is none other than humanity itself."⁴² However, "humanity" turns out to mean those very few people who can live up to Weininger's inhuman ideals of denying everything in this world in order to strive for one's own salvation, a salvation that turns on dwelling on the dangers of damnation. Janik praises Weininger as rejecting modernist narcissism in favor of rigorous moral ideals, without sufficiently acknowledging that those rigorous moral ideals, without sufficiently acknowledging that those ideals, which find their fullest expression in Weininger's reflections on animality, are curiously bifurcated. On the one hand, as Janik correctly stresses, Weininger's ethical outlook presents itself as nothing more than an unequivocal recovery of Kantian autonomy and

traditional Christian duties. On the other hand, those very ideals are not presented as the deliverances of Reason or Revelation, but rather as arising out of the author's characteristically post-Kantian reflections on what is given to his consciousness, and his "theory of the human being as *microcosm*."⁴³ As a result, those ideals are an unstable product of what Süss, following Foucault, has called "transcendental narcissism."⁴⁴ For the very notions that underwrite Weininger's vision of moral redemption — the freedom of consciousness, its self-constituting character, and its status as the authoritative source of truth — can, with just a slight shift in perspective, be recognized as flawed and constrained. For consciousness has its limits and limitations: aspects of the macrocosm will always elude the grasp of the microcosm, and even within the microcosm, consciousness is not always transparent to itself. What is characteristic of Foucauldian "transcendental narcissism" is an oscillation between these two standpoints: the "solipsistic grandiosity" of the perspective of consciousness, and the "felt impotence and ignorance" that results from recognizing the limitations of transcendental reflection.⁴⁵ Janik's focus on Weininger's ethical doctrine helps us see how Weininger understood himself, but fails to do justice to the extent that his fears were intertwined with his hopes. The animal symbolizes not only our moral failings, but also the limitations of the transcendental perspective itself.

Wittgenstein's "Animal Psychology"

What did Wittgenstein see in the sketch of an extraordinarily speculative metaphysics that we find articulated in Weininger's canine characterology? To put the question a little more carefully, why did Wittgenstein so admire Weininger's vilification of those servile and craven, but also frightening and uncanny character traits that Weininger identifies as essentially canine? Was he attracted to Weininger's antimodernist moral vision, as Janik proposes? Or did he see it as a philosophical joke, an extreme example of the excesses that metaphysical speculation can yield? (Wittgenstein once said to Norman Malcolm that a philosophical book could be written that consisted entirely of jokes.) Perhaps the truth lies somewhere between these extremes; he may have been attracted to Weininger's Lichtenbergian insights into the ways we project ourselves onto our world,

even as he was repulsed by the depth of Weininger's hatred for "man's best friend."

I suggest that the key to understanding the appeal for Wittgenstein of Weininger's shaggy dog story is to attend to Wittgenstein's discussion of the questions about both the differences and the similarities between humans and animals in the *Philosophical Investigations*.⁴⁶ Here, I will only be able to consider some of the leading concerns that connect the opening paragraphs of Parts I and II of that book, and the way they inform Wittgenstein's response to Weininger's view of animals.

The expression "animal psychology" occurs only once in the Wittgenstein *Nachlass*. The passage in question is part of an extended critical discussion of the idea that one's knowledge of others' "states of consciousness" is a matter of an analogical inference. Its target is the idea that I infer what another thinks on the basis of observing the other's physiognomy, relying on what I know of my physiognomy when I am in certain mental states. Wittgenstein's narrator is driven to tell his interlocutor that he "must learn to think completely differently about the use of words." This is followed by a rather compressed example of the kind of change he is trying to bring about: "Animal psychology. Does a dog gnaw a bone involuntarily? Does he hunt game involuntarily? And what do we know of his kinaesthetic sensations?"⁴⁷

If one thinks of what a dog does by analogy with our own lives, then one will be inclined to say, under certain circumstances, that a dog chooses to gnaw on a bone — perhaps when it lazily reaches over for one when it is tired and well-fed — and in other, equally imaginable circumstances, that it could not help itself. Similarly, sometimes a dog's owner may drag it away from the fire on a cold winter day to go hunting, and, on other occasions, it may eagerly go hunting. And one will think of the dog's sense of muscular effort that accompanies a voluntary motion on its part on the model of one's own first-person experience of such efforts.

In October 1916, in the context of an extended discussion of a number of Weiningerian themes, Wittgenstein had explored and criticized just this conception of psycho-physical parallelism as the basis for our knowledge of other minds. There he rejected it because he could find no suitable connection between one's psychic processes and a physiognomy, thus undermining the first step in the inference from knowledge of one's own mental states to knowledge of another's.⁴⁸

In the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein presents two leading objections to this anthropomorphic approach to animal psychology. First, it fails to do justice to the fundamental differences between ourselves and other animals, including dogs. Because they don't speak, it isn't appropriate to speak of them in ways that presuppose their mastery of a language, such as saying that they do something involuntarily. Although the passage just quoted provides no further support for the view that saying a creature does something involuntarily presupposes that the creature can speak a language, Wittgenstein does propose that attributing certain propositional attitudes to an animal presupposes that the creature can speak a language, and so it makes no sense to attribute such attitudes to creatures that cannot speak. The same goes for "voluntary" and "involuntary." Consequently, it is nonsense to say that the dog's behavior is "involuntary," for the term is only applicable to creatures that can use language.

On the Cartesian view of the nature of thought and the priority of inner mental processes over their linguistic expression, it is our capacity for thought that is the crucial distinction between us and other creatures. This naturally leads to a conception of mind in which each person knows what a mind is like from first-person experience, and then infers, on the evidence of others' actions, that they too are conscious. On this view, there need be no basic difference between one's grounds for attributing thoughts to other humans, and to dogs. We can find an interlocutory statement of this anthropomorphic view of animal thought in a manuscript of Wittgenstein's from 1933, followed first by a challenge, then a brief exposition of the train of argument just discussed:

"If a dog wags its tail, it means something by it." How could one justify that?

If a crocodile approaches a person with open jaws, we would hardly ask if it meant something by it. And we would explain: the crocodile can't think and so there isn't any question of meaning here.⁴⁹

Wittgenstein is not challenging the view that the dog's tail-wagging is significant, or meaningful — he considers it undeniable that the stereotypical signs of a happy dog are, under normal circumstances, signs that the dog is happy. What he does question is whether the dog means something, something propositional or linguistic, by the tail-wagging. Wittgenstein then reminds us that we would hardly ask the

parallel question about a crocodile's approaching a person with jaws open, because we will all agree that a crocodile doesn't think, and so can't mean anything by its actions. (*Zettel*, ss. 521-2) A later version of this passage makes the point somewhat clearer by adding the following words to the first paragraph: "Does one also say: 'By drooping its leaves, the plant means that it needs water'?" The anthropomorphic dog-lower will, in all likelihood, reject the analogy, insisting that while plants, flies, and maybe even crocodiles can't think, dogs can. But here the tail is wagging the dog: what reasons do the defenders of animal thought have for this insistence?

Sex and Character and *Philosophical Investigations* both offer the same simple answer to this question: thought, propositional thought, presupposes talk, or at least the ability to talk. The narrator of the *Philosophical Investigations* tells us:

It is sometimes said that animals do not talk because they lack the mental capacity. And this means: "they do not think, and that is why they do not talk." But — they simply do not talk. Or to put it better: they do not use language — if we except the most primitive forms of language.⁵⁰

In other words, it is talk, not thought, that comes first. No language use, no thought. And the same goes for any other activity that depends on a grasp of language. "There is nothing astonishing about certain concepts only being applicable to a being that e.g. possesses a language."⁵¹ Near the end of *Philosophical Investigations*, we are told that babies and animals cannot lie, or be sincere, for these are part of our linguistic form of life: "A child has much to learn before it can pretend. (A dog cannot be a hypocrite, but neither can it be honest.)"⁵² Likewise, Weininger says in *Sex and Character* that animals "do not speak, and consequently do not lie."⁵³

In a discussion of language, privacy, and our knowledge of others' experience in Part I of the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein's interlocutor raises the question of whether our assumption that the smile of a small baby is not a pretense might be over-hasty. If a baby did have a private language, why couldn't it have the resources needed to deceive another? Just as in the case of the dog's wagging tail, Wittgenstein's narrator immediately asks how we know: "— And on what experience is our assumption based? (Lying is a language-game that needs to be learned like any other one.)"⁵⁴ In the next remark, the conversation

turns to the case of a dog's faking being in pain, and gives a closely parallel answer.

250. Why can't a dog pretend he's in pain? Is he too honest? Could one teach a dog to pretend he's in pain? Perhaps it is possible to teach him to howl on particular occasions as if he were in pain, even when he is not. But the surroundings that are necessary for this behaviour to be real pretence are missing.⁵⁵

If one does succeed in imagining that the dog has a mental life much like one's own, then one may be struck by the fact that dogs don't pretend, and look for an answer. Weininger thinks one can best understand oneself and one's world by seeing human nature writ large in the world around us; Wittgenstein offers the complementary approach of allowing us to accede to that temptation, only to remind us of the differences between animals and ourselves.⁵⁶ Weininger, as we have seen, expresses an extreme skepticism about dogs' friendly behavior, seeing it as evidence of dissimulation, concealing craven evil. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, maintains that this is nonsense. However, because animals do not have language, and so are not capable of those forms of deception that depend on a grasp of language, animal psychology is simpler than human psychology. Wittgenstein is often said to hold an "expressive" theory about mental states; perhaps the place where he comes closest to articulating such a view is in his discussion of the case of creatures that cannot speak.

Our pursuit of the connections between Weininger and Wittgenstein on animal psychology has led us to themes that figure prominently in the openings of both Part I and Part II of the *Philosophical Investigations*. Part I, section 1, of the *Philosophical Investigations* opens with a quotation from Augustine's *Confessions* in which he describes how he learned to speak. Augustine begins by telling us that he learned the names of objects by watching his elders make sounds and move towards particular objects. Wittgenstein's narrator takes the passage to give us a "particular picture of the essence of human language": words give us a "particular picture of the essence of such names. In this picture of language, he maintains, "we find the roots" of the idea that: "Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands."⁵⁷ In section 2, he asks us to imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is

correct, the "builders' language": Builder A has four words, "block," "slab," "beam," and "pillar," and his assistant B's job is to pass them to A in the order called out.

The story of the builders can seem quite simple until we consider the final sentence: "Conceive this as a complete primitive language." Can we really do this? We seem to face a dilemma. On the one hand, we have no trouble imagining what the scenario described in section 2 looks like; on the other hand, it is very hard, perhaps impossible, to fill it in fully, to imagine what life would be like for people whose language is so limited. The point of Wittgenstein's instruction, ("Conceive . . ."), like many of his questions, is not to lead us to an obvious answer, but to encourage us to stop and think about our grasp of language, by considering imaginary people who only share an extremely rudimentary language, a single language game. Part of the problem is that we are asked to imagine that these people think, and at first sight, that seems intelligible. Yet they are clearly unable to think as we do.⁵⁸ The builders' language, like the dog's beliefs, are what Wittgenstein calls "objects of comparison":⁵⁹ his aim in telling these stories is to get us to think about our grasp of language by reflecting on the similarities and differences between our lives and the lives of creatures without language, or with only the most rudimentary ability to respond to a few words.

Wittgenstein brings these concerns together in a striking passage from his later writings on the philosophy of psychology, where an interlocutory voice contends that we have more in common with dogs than beings like the builders: "A dog is more like a human being than a being endowed with a human form, but which behaved 'mechanically'."⁶⁰ This leads to a series of reflections on the variability, complexity and interwovenness of our lives, and the way in which any given behavior will be seen in terms of "its background within human life, and this background is not monochrome, but we might picture it as a very complicated filigree pattern, which, to be sure, we can't copy, but which we can recognize from the general impression it makes."⁶¹ Subsequently, Wittgenstein explicitly extends the metaphor of the pattern of life to the case of a dog's deceiving us:

Only in a quite specific context can something be an expression of pain; but only in a much more extensively determinate context can there be the pretence of pain.

For pretence is a (determinate) pattern within the weave of life. It is repeated in never-ending variations.

A dog can't pretend to be in pain, because his life is too simple for that. It doesn't have the joints necessary for such movements.⁶²

Part II of the *Philosophical Investigations* begins by drawing our attention to just these questions about animals and language. The opening words revisit many of the themes just touched on, once again raising the question of the limits of animal psychology:

One can imagine an animal angry, frightened, unhappy, happy, startled. But hopeful? And why not?

A dog believes his master is at the door. But can he also believe his master will come the day after tomorrow? – And *what* can he not do here? – How do I do it? – How am I supposed to answer this?

Can only those hope who can talk? Only those who have mastered the use of a language. That is to say, the phenomena of hope are modes of this complicated form of life. (If a concept refers to a character of human handwriting, it has no application to beings that do not write.)⁶³

Here, Wittgenstein's narrator clearly does expect us to agree with him that a dog cannot hope, and gives us a reason: only "those who have mastered the use of a language" can hope. In other words: "the phenomena of hope are modes of this complicated form of life."⁶⁴ Likewise, Weininger draws a sharp distinction between those capacities that are part of animal forms of life, and those, such as hope and memory, that are characteristically human, although his exposition is in terms of differences in mental complexity, rather than linguistic ability:

If we now, in conclusion, ask the question whether organisms other than man possess a similar capacity for remembering earlier moments of their lives, *revisiting them again in their entirety*, then the most probable answer must be in the negative. Animals could not remain, as they do, for hours at a time, motionless and peaceful on one spot, if they were capable of thinking back about their past or of looking ahead to the future. Animals have a sense of familiarity and feelings of expectation (that of the dog greeting his returning master after twenty years away; the pigs at the slaughterhouse door, led to the appointment by a mare); but they possess no memory and no hope. *They are capable of recognition* (thanks to familiarity), *but they have no memory*.⁶⁵

Wittgenstein's first objection to the idea of animal thought, then, is that it underestimates the differences between us and creatures that cannot speak a language. His second objection to the

anthropomorphic approach to animal psychology is that it fails to do justice to the similarities between ourselves and dogs. For what we say, both about animal psychology and human psychology, is not ordinarily based on an inference from observed behavior to unobserved mental states, but rather is based on what we see.

Wittgenstein is not simply replacing the classical humanist idea that the mind of another is an unseen, inner realm by the bald naturalist conception of the mind as analyzable into behavior, and dispositions to behavior.⁶⁶ Nor should he be read as replacing this hoary false dilemma, often described as the choice between a "Cartesian" or a "behaviorist" view of the mind, with the "Wittgensteinian" criterial view that there is an internal relation between behavior and mental states that underwrites a refutation of skepticism about other minds. The core of the alternative approach that Wittgenstein elaborates is his idea that my grasp of an animal's, or a person's, psychology is a matter of my seeing what they do in a certain way, a form of response that we already take for granted in our everyday lives, but fail to properly appreciate.⁶⁷ Characteristically, we attend to the face, or the gestures of a person, or an animal, and see how they feel.⁶⁸ In a remark composed in December 1933 that occurs with minor variations in several places in the *Nachlass*, including source typescripts for the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein writes:

If I say this face has the expression of kindness, goodness, or cowardice, then I don't just seem to mean that we associate such and such feelings with the look of the face; rather, I'm tempted to say that the face is itself an aspect of cowardice, goodness, etc. (Compare, e.g. Weininger.)⁶⁹

This is not only a rejection of Weiningerian psycho-physical parallelism, but also an expression of Wittgenstein's attraction to the diametrically opposed view, that the friendliness or goodness is present in the face itself, although Wittgenstein expresses unease about the best way of putting this point. A passage written shortly afterward, that makes strikingly un-Weiningerian use of Weininger's technical term, "symbol," makes the opposition to Weininger's views even more explicit:

One can say: the dog's friendly eye, friendly mouth, wagging tail, for instance, are primary – and independent – symbols of friendliness. I mean by that: they are parts of the phenomenon one calls friendliness. If one wants to conceive of

other appearances as expressions of friendliness then one sees those symbols in them.⁷⁰

The friendliness is not inferred, a further object lying behind the appearance, but is actually seen in the dog's comportment. The relationship between the rejection of a conception of thought as a hidden inner process and the soul as the receptacle within which those processes occur is particularly clear in an exchange in the *Philosophical Investigations*, where Wittgenstein's narrator asserts that "We don't say that *possibly* a dog talks to itself."⁷¹ His interlocutor, assuming that such assurance could only be justified if we had direct access to the dog's inner states, replies "Is that because we're so minutely acquainted with its soul?"⁷² Wittgenstein's narrator responds by offering us a different way of looking at things: "Well, one might say this: If one sees the behaviour of a living being, one sees its soul."⁷³

This way of responding to Weiningerian animal psychology is a significant step away from the Kantian, and Lichtenbergian, way of putting the problem of delimiting the boundary between those aspects of the world that depend on us, and those that do not. For it involves rejecting the false dilemma that either the friendliness is something objective, the result of an inference from what is seen to another's mental state, or it is something subjective, the result of the observer's spreading his or her inner states onto the observed object. On the approach Wittgenstein begins to articulate here, the friendliness is approach Wittgenstein begins to articulate here, the friendliness is objective, in that it is present in the face of the friendly creature, yet it also has a subjective aspect, in that it takes a suitably equipped observer to attend to that aspect of what is seen. What I see in the other's face is not something I can choose at will, but that I see it is partly due to my abilities. Nor is there anything about this way of conceiving of the other creature that requires him or her to be human; we can also see happiness in a dog's face.

Conclusion: Looking, and Seeing Differences

The broad outline of Wittgenstein's approach to the principal similarities and differences between dogs and ourselves has much to recommend it. It provides a basis for a principled critique of Weiningerian anthropocentrism and the false dilemma on which the only available

positions appear to be a baldly naturalist conception of human behavior as nothing but behavior, and the classical humanist conviction that the mind is something behind the behavior. It also begins to do justice to the character of our awareness of others' psychology, both animal and human. However, it is surely too schematic and simple, if taken by itself, to do justice to the full extent of those similarities and differences.

The further similarities between ourselves and dogs have to do with the complexity of the ways in which dogs' lives and our own can be interwoven. For while dogs can only respond to certain quite limited aspects of human language, they do share people's lives in ways that create a richly significant fabric, a background against which a dog's behavior can express a subtle grasp of its circumstances. Here is an example of the kind of "being with dogs" that I have in mind:

There is (what I definitely want to call) a game I used to play with my mother's dog Sophie, in which we would run around a small pond. My aim was to catch her; hers to avoid being caught. Sometimes we would find ourselves facing each other, almost motionless, on either side of the pond, each of us watching the other for movements indicating a direction of pursuit or flight. I would try faking a movement; starting to the left but running to my right. Sophie would sometimes be foxed, but would always correct her run when she saw me coming the other way.

Sophie has a lot of Collie in her and I never caught her. But one day while we [we] were playing this game I slipped as I tried to change direction too quickly on damp grass. Almost immediately Sophie ran straight up to me. I was unhurt, but she licked my face anyway.

I do not see why this cannot be counted as a case of "mutual intelligibility." The dog could see my distress, and I could see her sympathy.⁷⁴

Part of the appeal of this story is that it is such a good example of the extent of the mutual sympathy that can arise between human and animal, the interwoven pattern of activity within which the other creature enters our lives, yet it does not ventriloquize a voice for Sophie, or place a thought bubble over her head.

The other side of the story is that it also hints at the ways animals escape our grasp: Sophie always avoided being caught. The further differences between animals and ourselves have to do with the extent to which their lives are quite different from our own, an aspect of our relationship to animals that the discussion so far has barely touched on.

Guido Frongia reads some of Wittgenstein's later remarks on animals as suggesting the following line of thought concerning the radical otherness of animals' lives: If as we take the mastery of language not only as a necessary condition for full personhood, but also as the yardstick by which we measure the significance of other creatures, then animals will only take on significance in relation to ourselves, as a means of one kind or another. But Wittgenstein also emphasizes the difficulties involved in applying our concepts to what animals do, especially if the animals in question have their own system of communication, such as birds do, or are sufficiently alien to us – such as a crocodile or a fly. The danger here is of taking our own concepts as the only possible yardstick by which to judge animal behavior. Wittgenstein is often taken to be arguing that we have no alternative, but in fact, in stressing the need for the philosopher to "regard man here as an animal,"⁷⁵ he does develop just such an alternative. For we not only reason about whether animals have certain feelings, weighing the analogies and disanalogies with our own case; we also experience instinctive and unreflective responses to animals' feelings. These include not only the familiar case in which we see the dog's happiness, but also the more unsettling case where we feel an instinctive uncertainty about an animal's psychology, precisely because it is so different from us.

Think of the uncertainty about whether animals, particularly lower animals, such as flies, feel pain.

The uncertainty whether a fly feels pain is philosophical; but couldn't it also be instinctive? And how would that show itself?

Indeed, aren't we really uncertain in our behavior towards animals? One doesn't know: Is he being cruel or not?⁷⁶

Indeed, it is this kind of uncertainty about the significance of the suffering of pain in species very different from our own, and the differences between people as to their "spontaneous sympathy"⁷⁷ for animals that is partly responsible for the deep disagreements between vegetarians and meat eaters. Frongia proposes that in asking us to see the use of language as only one form of interaction between humans and other animals, Wittgenstein's later writings open up the possibility of "considering every living being (to whatever species it may belong) *not only* as a means, *but also* as an end in itself. They tend to give us back the sense of a radical diversity of the various species of animals which

surround us, a diversity which the use of (human) language does tend to make uniform."⁷⁸

We have come a long way from our starting point, the Weiningerian proposal that we understand animals entirely in terms of the extent to which they express characteristically human concerns. Weininger's basic idea is that their real significance is an ethical one, because they are a means of human self-improvement: they provide a vivid typology of human ethical failings. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, provides a perspective from which the ethical significance of our relationship to animals is that they help us to see the dangers in taking man to be the measure of all things.

Notes

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1. McGuinness 1996, 30.
2. McGuinness 1996, 82. In *Young Ludwig* (1988) McGuinness asserts that *Sex and Character* was of more importance to Wittgenstein than *On Last Things*, but changed his mind after editing this correspondence (2002 40, n. 33.) It was *Sex and Character* that Wittgenstein recommended to English-speaking friends, but that may well have been because it was the only translation available. In a letter Wittgenstein wrote to Moore in 1931, he called the translation "beasty" (Wittgenstein 1995, 250). Both books were popular among German language readers at the time. Indeed, some Germanists maintain that *On Last Things* had a greater impact on German readers than *Sex and Character* (see Weininger 2001, x-xi.) As we shall see, there are close connections between Wittgenstein's treatment of "animal psychology" and passages in both of Weininger's books.
3. Weininger 1997, 70; 2001, 53.
4. Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, 1980, 19; 1998, 16. That list of influences is part of a passage that addresses prototypically Weiningerian themes: the relationship between originality and reproductiveness, genius and talent, and the character of the "Jewish thinker" and "Jewish spirit." For further discussion of this passage, see the Introduction to this volume. On the dating of Weininger's influence on the *Traktatus*, see Halter 1988, Janik 1985, 65, n. 8, and 2002, n. 31.
5. See Janik 1985, 65 and 2002, n. 23. The "animal psychology" section is the third of the five sections of Chapter 5 of *On Last Things*, which is on "Metaphysics."

6. Weininger 1997, 136; 2001, 108.
7. Weininger 1997, 136-7; 2001, 108. For discussion of Wittgenstein and Weininger on "the Jews" and "Jewishness," see McGuinness 2001 and Stern 2000 or 2001.
8. Weininger 1997, 137; 2001, 109.
9. Smith 1985, 228, n. 6.
10. On Wittgenstein's relationship to Lichtenberg, see von Wright 1942, Stern 1959, and McGuinness 1988.
11. Lichtenberg 1908, J375, 71; 1990, 129; 2000, 141.
12. Lichtenberg 1908, J550, 100; 1990, 136; 2000, 104-5.
13. Weininger 1980, 198. On Wittgenstein's interest in using a Lichtenbergian subjectless language for immediate experience, see Stern 1995, 72-87.
14. Lichtenberg, quoted in Weininger 1980, 526, note to 198. My translation.
15. I had hoped to include some discussion of Lichtenberg's *On Physiognomy: Against the Physiognomists* (1778), which was brought to my attention by Daniel Steuer, but that has proved impossible within the scope of this essay. The essay contains Lichtenberg's critique of Lavater, who founded the "science" of physiognomy, which aimed to deduce character and personality traits from a person's face. Weininger's animal psychology is part of that physiognomic tradition, and Wittgenstein's objections to Weininger echo aspects of Lichtenberg's *On Physiognomy*, there would have been remarks on physiognomy in the material Wittgenstein did read, and he was certainly acquainted with Schopenhauer's summary of those arguments in *The World as Will and Representation* I s.12 (1958). For a brief discussion of Lichtenberg's anti-physiognomy, see Stern 1959, 88-92.
16. Weininger 1997, 104; 2001, 82.
17. Weininger 1997, 122; 2001, 96. The subtitle is rather more informative: "Containing the idea of a universal symbolism, animal psychology (with a fairly complete psychology of the criminal) etc."
18. Weininger 1997, 122; 2001, 96.
19. Weininger 1997, 122; 2001, 96.
20. See Wittgenstein, *Notebooks 1914-1916*, 84; *Traktatus*, 5.63.
21. Weininger 1997, 122-23; 2001, 96.
22. Weininger 1997, 123; 2001, 97.
23. Weininger 1997, 124; 2001, 98.
24. Weininger 1997, 124; 2001, 98. The discussion of the criminal character, the first part of the section entitled "Animal Psychology," occupies 7 pages of *Über die letzten Dinge* (124-31), and 5 pages of *On Last Things* (98-103). The remainder of this section consists of subsections on "The Dog," "The Horse," and "General remarks." The final two sections are "Plants," and "Inorganic Nature" (1997, 131-40; 2001, 103-11.)
25. Weininger 1997, 130; 2001, 103.
26. Weininger 1997, 132; 2001, 104.

27. Weininger 1997, 132; 2001, 105.
28. Weininger 1997, 133; 2001, 105.
29. Weininger 1997, 133; 2001, 105.
30. Weininger 1997, 133-4; 2001, 106.
31. Weininger 1997, 138-40; 2001, 109-11.
32. Gilman 1995, 105.
33. Freud 1980, 198 fn.
34. For further discussion of Weininger and Freud on Jews and gender, see Gilman 1995 and Le Rider 1993, ch. 9.
35. Weininger 1919, 19-20. This translation is from Abrahamson 1946, 92-3. The text omitted between the second and third sentences consists of Geber's description of the circumstances, and does not contain anything said by Weininger.
36. Abrahamson 1946, 96-7; see also 94-6.
37. Weininger 1997, 130; 2001, 103-4.
38. Abrahamson 1946, 97.
39. One should also note that Abrahamson's remarkably confident psychiatric diagnoses are based on scanty evidence.
40. Janik 2002, main text, between notes 32 and 33 (the document is a web page and so has no standard pagination).
41. Janik 2001 64; the relationship between Weininger and Ibsen is the topic of his ch. 3. See also Janik in Weininger 2001, xxvii-xxxiii.
42. Janik 2001.
43. Weininger 1997, 122; 2001, 96. This passage is quoted in full at the beginning of my section entitled Weininger's "Animal Psychology."
44. Sass 1994, ch. 11, and especially 327-31; see also Foucault 1972, 203; and 1973 318-35.
45. Sass 1994, 331.
46. For a related but rather different treatment of this topic, see Janik 2002.
47. Wittgenstein, *Wittgenstein's Nachlass*, MS 134, 115-16; 7 April 1947. *Du mußt fundamental unternehmen über den Gebrauch der Wörter: Tierpsychologie: Nagt der Hund unwillkürlich am Knochen? Hetzt er das Wild unwillkürlich? Und was wissen wir von seinen kinästhetischen Empfindungen?*
48. Wittgenstein, *Notebooks 1914-1916*, 84-5.
49. Wittgenstein, *Wittgenstein's Nachlass*, MS 115, 39; 14 Dec. 1933. "Der Hund meint etwas damit, wenn er mit dem Schwanz wedelt." *Wie könnte man das begründen?*
Wir würden kaum fragen, ob das Krokodil etwas damit meint, wenn es mit offenem Rachen auf einen Menschen zukommt. Und wir würden erklären: das Krokodil könne nicht denken und darum sei eigentlich hier von einem Meinen keine Rede.
50. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, s.25. Wittgenstein translations are based on published translations, when available, but I have made a number of changes.
51. Wittgenstein, *Zettel*, s.5:20.
52. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, II, 229.

53. Weininger 1980, 384; not in 1906 translation. The context, however, is quintessentially Weiningerian; it comes from his discussion of the essence of Woman, where it qualifies his statement of the thesis that an animal "has just as little metaphysical reality as the true woman." ("Das Tier hat zwar *ebensowenig metaphysische Realität wie die echte Frau; aber es spricht nicht, und folglich liegt es nicht.*")
54. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, s.249. The parenthetical remark forms a self-contained paragraph, and so has the tone of a comment on the previous exchange, and a reminder of something everyday, rather than a continuation of either of the previous voices.
55. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, s.250. See also *Zettel*, s.389 and s.518.
56. It is relevant here that he once considered King Lear's "I'll teach you differences" as a motto for the *Philosophical Investigations*.
57. For further discussion of *Philosophical Investigations* s.1 and the sections that follow, see Stern 2004, ch. 4.
58. See Wittgenstein, *Zettel*, s.99 and s.390; *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, II, s.623. See also Stern 2004, ch. 4, and Schulte (forthcoming).
59. *Philosophical Investigations*, s.130.
60. *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, II, s.623.
61. *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, II, s.624.
62. *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology*, ss.861-2.
63. *Philosophical Investigations*, II, 174. The second paragraph echoes s.650, where a similar question is raised, but not answered: "We say a dog is afraid his master will beat him; but not, he is afraid his master will beat him to-morrow. Why not?"
64. For some further discussion of the issues raised by this cryptic but suggestive final sentence, see Hacker 1993a, ch. 4, and 1993b, 36-46, s.3; Garver 1994, ch. 15, s.3, and Stern 1995, ch. 6, s.4.
65. Weininger 1980, 186; my translation. Weininger 1906, 145. This leads Weininger to maintain that memory is essentially human, and closely related to both logic and ethics.
66. "Bald naturalism" is taken from McDowell 1994, and "classical humanism" from Glendinning 1998.
67. Mullgan (1981) provides a complementary perspective on Wittgenstein's break with the subject/object distinction, and its relationship to Weininger's treatment of animals.
68. Allan Janik has drawn my attention to Spengler's discussion of dogs, language, and the primacy of nonverbal communication as a source of this train of thought: "He who would penetrate into the essence of language should begin by putting aside all the philologist's apparatus and observe how a hunter speaks to his dog." Spengler 1939, vol. 2, ch. 5, part iv, 131.
69. Wittgenstein, *Wittgenstein's Nachlass*, MS 115 23-4. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Grammar*, p. 176. For later versions of this passage, see Wittgenstein's *Nachlass*, MS 146, 82; MS 228 117, and MS 230, p. 18 s.65. The topic is discussed at length in the *Brown Book*, pp. 162-180 and in *Philosophical*

- Investigations* II xi. See also Szabados's essay in this volume. Compare this to Wittgenstein's question in *Notebooks 1914-1916*, 84: "Is, e.g., an angry face angry in itself or merely because it is empirically connected with bad temper?"
70. Wittgenstein, *Wittgenstein's Nachlass*, MS 115, 25-6. See also *Philosophical Grammar*, 178 and *Zettel*, s.506.
71. *Philosophical Investigations*, s.357.
72. *Philosophical Investigations*, s.357. See also *Philosophical Investigations*, II iv-v.
73. *Philosophical Investigations*, s.357.
74. Glendinning 1998, 142.
75. *On Certainty*, s.475.
76. *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, II, s.659.
77. *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, II, s.699.
78. Frongia 1995, 352.

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