This is a revised and expanded version of material previously edited by Rush Rhees. The notes are undated, but Rhees thinks they were begun in late 1934 or early 1935 and finished in March 1936; von Wright's catalogue dates the first notebook to 1934-5 and the last to 1936. They must have been prepared in connection with the lectures on the same topics that Wittgenstein gave during 1935-6. Although he did not lecture from notes, "what he said was both a revision and discussion of what he had thought and written in preparing."

This edition consists of a much fuller transcription of Wittgenstein's discussion of sense data and private language in the three manuscript notebooks that Rhees used (MSS 148, 149, and 151). Rhees omitted nearly half of the source material, dropping sentences, paragraphs, and lengthy passages without any indication of the breaks. This not only left out much material that is interesting in its own right, it also made it impossible to follow Wittgenstein's train of thought. In an appendix at the end of this volume is a list of the new and substantially revised paragraphs in this edition. Like Rhees, I have left out two lengthy discussions of the philosophy of mathematics that are clearly separated from the rest of the text in the manuscripts; the location of these passages is indicated by means of footnotes in the body of the text.

Wittgenstein alternated between English and German when writing these notes. Translations of the German passages have been supplied in the main body of the text, with the German original in footnotes.

Like Rhees, I have not indicated the places where Wittgenstein's spelling has been corrected, and I have inserted additional punctuation, especially commas, question marks, and quotation marks, where they seemed to be needed, though I have not been quite as liberal as he was. While I have included Wittgenstein's alternate drafts of a single passage when they seemed to be of interest, many purely stylistic variants have been omitted. Similarly, while deletions, marginalia, and diagrams in the text are referred to where they seem particularly relevant, they have not been systematically included. Editorial conjectures and expansions (occasionally nontrivial) of Wittgenstein's abbreviations are indicated by means of square brackets.2

DAVID G. STERN

2. The transcription and additional translations were originally produced in 1984 from a microfilm of the Wittgenstein papers at the University of California, Berkeley, and revised in 1992, using the microfilm at the University of Iowa. I would like to thank Guenter Zoeller for checking my transcription and translation of the German text and Kathleen Schmidt for helping me check the transcription against the microfilm.

1. Rhees's "Note on the Text," The Philosophical Review, 1968, p. 272. Rhees's note contains further discussion of the source of these notes and the context in which they were composed.
The experience of fright appears (when we philosophize) to be an amorphous experience behind the experience of starting.

All I want to say is that it is misleading to say that the word "fright" signifies something which goes along with the experience of expressing fright.

There is here again the queer case of a difference between what we say, when we actually try to see what happens, and what we say when we think about it (giving over the reins to language).

The "far away" look, the dreamy voice, seem to be only means for conveying the real inner feeling.

"Therefore there must be something else" means nothing unless it expresses a resolution to use a certain mode of expression.

Suppose you tried to separate the feeling which music gives you from hearing music.

Say and mean "long, long ago—", "lang ist es her—" and now put instead of these words new ones with many more syllables and try if you can [to] put the same meaning into the words. Put instead of the copula a very long word say "Kalamazoo".

Puella, Poeta.¹ "Masculine' and 'feminine' feeling' 'attached' to a.

Aren't there two (or more) ways to any event I might describe?

1. These are the Latin words for "girl" (a feminine noun) and "poet" (a masculine noun).
You say you have an intangible impression. I am not doubting what you say. But I question whether you have said anything by it. I.e., what was the point of uttering these words, in what game? 

It is as though, if /although/ you can't tell me exactly what happens inside you, you can nevertheless tell me something general about it. By saying e.g. that you are having an impression which can't be further described.

As it were: There is something further about it, only you can say it; you can only make the general statement.

It is this idea /form of expression/ which plays hell with us.

"There is not only the gesture but a particular feeling which I can't describe": instead of that you might have said: "I am trying to point out a feeling to you"—this would be a grammatical remark showing how my information is meant to be used. This is almost similar as though I said: “This I call ‘A’ and I am pointing out a colour to you and not a shape.”

How can one point to the colour and not to the shape? Or to the feeling of toothache and not to the tooth, etc.?

What does one call “describing a feeling to someone”?

"Never mind the shape,—look at the colour!"

"Was there a feeling of pastness when you said you rememberd . . . ?”

‘I know of none’.

How does one point to a number, draw attention to a number, mean a number?

How do I call a taste “lemon taste”? Is it by having that taste and saying the words: “I call this taste . . . ”?

Du sagst, Du hast einen ungreifbaren Eindruck. Ich bezweifle nicht, was Du sagst. Aber ich frage, ob Du damit etwas gesagt hast. D.h., wozu hast Du diese Worte geäußert, in welchem Spiel?

And can I give a name to my own taste experience without giving the taste a common name which is to be used in common language? —“I give my feeling a name, nobody else can know what the name means”.

A [slave] has to remind me of something and isn't to know what he reminds me of.

I note down a word in my diary which serves to bring back a taste.

"I use the name for the impression directly and not in such a way that anyone else can understand it."

Buying something from oneself. Going through the operations of buying.

My right hand selling to my left hand.

Feeling—(thought.) Transference.

A good way of naming a colour would be to write its name in an ink of the corresponding colour. ‘I name the feeling’.—I don't quite know how you do this, what use you are making of the word /name/.

"I'm giving the feeling which I have just /I'm having/ now a name.”—I don't quite know what you are doing.

One might say: “What is the use of talking of our feeling at all. Let us devise a language which really only says what can be understood”. Thus I am not to say “I have a feeling of pastness”: But . . .

“This pain I call ‘toothache’ and I can never make him understand what it means.”
We are under the impression that we can point to the pain, as it were unseen by the other person, and name it.

For what does it mean that this pain /feeling/ is the meaning of this name?

Or, that the pain is the bearer of the name?
It is the substantive 'pain' which puzzles us. This substantive seems to produce an illusion. What would things look like if we expressed pains by moaning and holding the painful spot?
Or that we utter the word pain pointing to a spot.
"But the point is that we should say 'pain' when there really is pain." But how am I to know if there really is pain? If what I feel really is pain? Or if I really have a feeling?

It is very useful to consider: How would I express in a language of gestures: "I wasn't in pain, but was acting as though I were."14

"Surely it isn't enough that he moans, I must be able to describe the state when he moans and hasn't got pains."

"He has pains, says he has pains and saying 'pains' he means his pains". How does he mean his pains by the word 'pain' or 'toothache'?

"He says 'I see green' and means the colour he sees". — If asked afterwards "what did you mean by 'green'?" he might answer 'I meant this colour', pointing to it.

"In my own case I know that when I say 'I have pain' this utterance is accompanied by something;—but is it also accompanied by something in another man?"
In as much as his utterance needn't be accompanied by my pain I may say that it isn't accompanied by anything.

"I know what I mean by 'toothache' but the other person can't know it."

Notes for Lectures on "Private Experience" and "Sense Data"

15. As negation: "The deuce he is..."

The philosophy of a tribe which uses /knows/ only the expression "I'll be damned if..." for negation.16

"It's all very well to say..." 17

"One can never see a whole body; rather, always only a part of its surface."18,19

"Wouldn't one like to know with real certainty whether the other had pains?"

Feeling of pastness. "The experiences bound up with the gesture etc. aren't the experience of pastness, for they could be there without the feeling of pastness."—"But, on the other hand, would it be that experience of pastness without those experiences bound up with the gesture?"—Why should we say that the characteristic /essential/ part is the part outside these experiences? Isn't the experience at least partially described if I have described the gestures etc.?

In this way also: The words "long long ago" sometimes evoke a particular feeling in me. Sometimes they don't. But when they do evoke it, then they, their tone, are part of the characteristic experience.20

Speaking to others and to myself.
"If I have a certain experience, I give myself the sign..."21

14. Es ist sehr nützlich zu bedenken: Wie würde ich in einer Gebärdenprüche ausdrücken: "Ich hatte keine Schmerzen, aber stellte mich, als ob ich welche hätte"?

15. Als
16. Die Philosophie eines Stammes, der als Negation nur den Ausdruck benutzt /kennt/: "I'll be damned if..."
17. On a beau dire... 18. "Man kann nie einen ganzen Körper sehen sondern nur immer einen Teil seiner Oberfläche."
19. At this point in the manuscript, there is a separately paginated sequence of 47 pages of notes on the philosophy of mathematics.
"Wenn ich eine gewisse Erfahrung habe, gebe ich mir das Zeichen..."
When one says "I talk to myself" one generally means just that one speaks and is the only person listening.

If I look at something red and say to myself, this is red, am I giving myself information? Am I communicating a personal experience to myself? Some people philosophizing might be inclined to say that this is the only real case of communication of personal experience because only I know what I really mean by "red."

Remember in which special cases only it has sense to inform another person that the colour which he sees now is red.

One doesn't say to one's self "This is a chair.—Oh really?"

How then can I give an experience (say, a pain) a name? Isn't it as if I wanted to, so to speak, put a hat on it? Let's suppose one said "One can only put a hat on it indirectly". Then I would ask: Do you believe that one would have got the idea of speaking of someone that way if one hadn't thought that one can put a hat on a person in pain? Yes, saying that one could only indirectly put a hat on the pain makes it look as if there nevertheless were a direct way which would now indeed be unquestionable.

The difficulty is that we feel that we have said something about the nature of pain when we say that one person can't have another person's pain. Perhaps we shouldn't be inclined to say that we had said anything physiological or even psychological, but something metaphysical. Something about the essence, nature, of pain as opposed to its causal connections to other phenomena.

It seems to me as though it would be not false but nonsense to say "I feel his pains," but as though this were because of the nature of pain of the person etc. as though, therefore, this statement were ultimately a statement about the nature of things.

So we speak for example of an asymmetry in our mode of expression and we look on it as a mirror image of the essence of the things.

Intangibility of impressions. (Anguish). Some we should say were more tangible than others. Seeing more tangible than a faint pain; and this more tangible than a vague fear, longing etc.

In what way are these intangible experiences less easy to communicate, to describe, than the 'simpler' ones?

In what way do we use the phrase: "This experience is difficult to describe".

And can it even be impossible to describe certain experiences?

What sense does it make to say: this experience is not describable? We would like to say: it is too complex, too subtle.

"This experience is not communicable, but I know it—because I have it."

"There is the experience and the description of the experience.—So it cannot be a matter for indifference whether the other has the same experience as I or not; and therefore what matters when I talk to myself must be my experience. It must be a decisive factor that I know this experience (whereas I am not directly acquainted with the other's experience)."


Wir sprechen also etwa von einer Asymmetrie unserer Ausdrucksweise und fassen diese auf als ein Spiegelbild des Wesens der Dinge.


26. „Diese Erfahrung ist nicht mitteilbar, aber ich kenne sie,—weil ich sie habe."

27. „Es gibt die Erfahrung, und die Beschreibung der Erfahrung. —Daher kann es nicht gleichgültig sein, ob der Andere dieselbe Erfahrung hat wie ich, oder nicht;—und daher muß es, wenn ich mit mir selbst rede, auf meine Erfahrung ankommen. Es muß dabei eine entscheidende Rolle spielen, daß ich diese Erfahrung kenne (während ich mit der des Andern nicht direkt vertraut bin)."
Can one say: “In what I say of someone else’s experience, that experience (itself) does not play any part. But in what I say of my experience the experience itself does play a part?”

“I speak about my experience, so to say, in its presence.”28

As if someone were to say: “There isn’t only the description of the table, but also the table”.29

“There isn’t only the word ‘toothache’, there’s also such a thing as toothache itself—there’s also toothache.”30

It seems that since I cannot, for example, describe an experience, but have it, it follows that I can know it more exactly than anyone else. But what does knowing an experience mean, if it doesn’t mean describing it and doesn’t mean having it?

Is there a knowledge of experience that we cannot communicate?31

Does it make sense to say “I know this experience better //more exactly// than anyone else can know it”? Are there experiences which the other person can know just as well as I and those which he cannot? Does this mean: he can’t have this very same intricate experience?—It would mean: “He can have it, but we can never //can’t/ know that he has had just //exactly/ this one”. E.g., it seems as though we could say: “We can, in a sense, know that he sees precisely this monochrome, smooth, red surface, but not that he sees exactly this glimmering. Because the exact visual image of the glimmering cannot be described.32

There is, after all, also the case in which we can describe a visual image more exactly by means of a painted picture than by means of words.33

Consider this: “One can describe a figure more accurately with the help of numerical values than without them.”34

But the experience which I have seems, in a certain sense, to take the place of a description of this experience. “It is its own description.”35

Aren’t we mixing up two things here: the compositeness of experience and what one could call its original flavour /tone/? Its own natural colour.36

The conception is that only a part of the original experience is preserved in the process of communication, and something else is lost. Namely “its timbre” or whatever one wants to call it. Here it

28. Kann man sagen: „In dem das, was ich über die Erfahrung des Andern sage, spielt solche Erfahrung (selbst) nicht hinein. In dem das, was ich über meine Erfahrung sage, spielt diese Erfahrung selbst hinein“?

29. „Ich spreche über meine Erfahrung, sozusagen, in ihrer Anwesenheit.“

30. „Es gibt nicht nur das Wort „Zahnschmerz“, es gibt auch etwas wie //such a thing as/ den Zahnschmerz selbst.// — — es gibt auch Zahnschmerzen.“

31. Es scheint, daß, da ich etwa eine Erfahrung nicht beschreiben kann, sie aber habe, daß ich sie daher genauer kennen kann als irgend ein Anderer. Aber was heißt, die Erfahrung kennen, wenn es nicht heißt, sie beschreiben und nicht heißt, sie haben?

Gibt es eine Kenntnis der Erfahrung, die wir nicht mitteilen können?

Notes for Lectures on “Private Experience” and “Sense Data”
strikes one as though one could only convey the coloured drawing and the other inserts his colours in it. But that is, naturally, (a) deception.37

But couldn't we really say that we had produced a picture in the other by means of our description but that we cannot know whether this picture is now precisely the same as our own? Let us think here of the use of the word 'same' in such sentences as: "These circles are, to all appearances, entirely the same".38

It is relevant to this that we don't usually experience our visual image as something in us, like say a pain in the eye, that we are however inclined to think according to this picture when we philosophize.39

The 'if-sensation'. Compare with the 'table-sensation'. There is the question “What's the table sensation like?” and the answer is a picture of a table. In what sense is the if-sensation analogous to the table-sensation? Is there a description of this sensation and what do we call a description of it? Putting the gestures instead of the sensations means just giving the nearest rough description there is of the experience.

Example.

("I have a peculiar feeling of pastness in my wrist.")

6)40 “We shall never know whether he meant this or that”. C died after the training in that room. We say: Perhaps he would have reacted like B when taken into the daylight. But we shall never know.

c) We should say this question was decided if he arose from his grave and we then made the experiment with him. Or his ghost appeared to us in a spiritualist séance and told us that he has a certain experience.

b) We don't accept any evidence. But what if we didn't accept the evidence in 5 either and said (something like) “we can't be sure that he is the identical man who was trained in the room” or: “he is the identical man but we can't know whether he would have behaved like this in the past time when he was trained.”

7) We introduce a new notation for the expression “If P happens then always (as a rule) Q happens. P didn't happen this time and Q didn't happen”. We say instead: “If P had happened Q would have happened”. E.g. “If the gunpowder is dry under these circumstances a spark of this strength explodes it. It wasn't dry this time and didn't explode under the same circumstances”. We say instead “If the gunpowder had been dry this time it would have exploded”. The point of this notation is that it nears the form of this proposition very much to the form: "The gunpowder was dry this time so it exploded". I mean the new form doesn't stress the fact that it did not explode but, we might say, paints a vivid picture of it exploding this time. We could imagine a form of expression in a picture language corresponding to the two kinds of notations in the word language. The second notation will be particularly appropriate e.g. if we wish to give a person a shock by making him vividly imagine that which would have happened, stressing only slightly that it didn't happen.

8 Someone might say to us: “But are you sure that the second sentence means just what the first one means and not just something similar or that and something else as well?” (Moore) I should say: I'm talking of the case where it means just this, and this seems to me an important case (which you concede by saying what you have said). But of course I don't say that it isn't used in other ways as well and then we'll have to talk about these other cases separately.

9 Someone says “Lowering one's voice sometimes means that what you say is less important than the rest, in other cases you lower your

40. This series of remarks presumably continues a sequence of remarks that were numbered 1)–5), but they are not part of the source manuscripts, and I have been unable to locate them elsewhere in the Wittgenstein papers.
voice to show that you wish to draw special attention to what you now say.

We must be clear that our examples are not preparations to the analysis of the actual meaning of the expression so-and-so (Nicod) but giving them effects that “analysis”.

Have we now shown that to say in 5) “We can't know whether he would have behaved . . .” makes no sense? We should say the sentence /to say this sentence/ under these circumstances has lost its /the/ point which it would have had under other circumstances but this doesn't mean that we can't give it another point.

10) We say “We can't know whether this spark would have been sufficient to ignite that mixture; because we can't reproduce the exact mixture not having the exact ingredients or not having a balance to weigh them etc., etc.” But suppose we could reproduce all the circumstances and someone said “we can't know whether it would have exploded”, and being asked why he said “Because we can't know whether under these circumstances it would have exploded then.” This answer would set our head whirling. We would feel he wasn't playing the same game with that expression as we do. We should be inclined to say “This makes no sense!” And this means that we are at a loss not knowing what reasonings, what actions, go with this expression. Moreover we believe that he made up a sentence analogous to sentences used in certain language games not noticing that he took the point away.

In which case do we say that a sentence has point? That comes to asking in which case do we call something a language game. I can only answer: Look at the family of language games, that will show you whatever can be shown about the matter.

12) (The private visual image.) B is trained to describe his afterimage when he has looked say into a bright red light. He is made to look into the light, then to shut his eyes and he is then asked “What do you see?” This question before was put to him only if he looked at physical objects. We suppose he reacts by a description of what he sees with closed eyes.—But halt! This description of the training seems wrong for what if I had had to describe my own, not B's, training. Would I then also have said: “I reacted to the question by . . .” and not rather: “When I had closed my eyes I saw an image and described it.” If I say “I saw an image and described it” I say this as opposed to the case where /in which/ I gave a description without seeing an image. (I might have lied or not). Now we could of course also distinguish these cases if B describes an afterimage. But we don’t wish to consider now cases in which the mechanism of lying plays any part. For if you say “I always know whether I am lying but not whether the other person is”, I say: in the case I’m considering I can’t be said to know that I’m not lying, or let us say not saying the untruth, because the dilemma [of either] saying the truth or the untruth is in this case unknown to me. Remember that when I’m asked “What do you see here?” I don’t always ask myself: “Now shall I say the truth or something else?” If you say “but surely if you in fact speak the truth then you did see something and you saw what you said you saw”. I answer: How can I know that I see what I say I see? Do I have a criterion or use one for the colour I see actually being red?

13) We imagine that the expression “I can't see what you see” has been given sense by explaining it to mean: “I can't see what you see, being in a different position relative to the object we are looking at”, or “. . . having not as good eyes as you”, or “. . . having found as in . . . that B sees something which we don't think we look at the same object” etc. “I can't see your afterimage” might be explained to mean “I can't see what you see if I close my eyes”, meaning you say you see a red circle, I see a yellow one.

14) Identity of physical objects, of shapes, colours, dreams, toothache. 15) (The object we see.) The physical object and its appearance. Form of expression: different views of the same physical object are different objects seen. We ask “What do you see?” and he can either answer “a chair”, or “this” (and draw the particular view of the chair). So we are now inclined to say that each man sees a different object and one which no other person sees, for even if they look at the same chair from the same spot it may appear different to them and the objects before the other mind's eye I can't look at.

16) [278] (I can't know whether he sees anything at all or only behaves as I do when I see something.) There seems to be an undoubted asymmetry in the use of the word “to see” (and all words relating to personal experience). One can /is inclined to/ state this in the way that “I know when I see something by just seeing it, without hearing what I say or observing the rest of my behaviour, whereas I know that he sees and what he sees only by observing his behaviour, i.e. indirectly.”

(a) There is a mistake in this, viz.: “I know what I see because I see it.” What does it mean to know that?

(b) It is true to say that my reason for saying that I see is not the observation of my behaviour. But this is a grammatical proposition.
(c) It seems to be an imperfection that I can only know — — — —
[indirectly that he sees]. But this is just the way we use the word
— — — — (“see”). Could we then — — — — [say I know directly
that he sees] if we would? Certainly.41

Does /Should we say that/ the person who has not learned the
language knows that he sees red but can’t express it?— Or should we
say: “He knows what he sees but can’t express it”? — So, besides
seeing it, he also knows what he sees?

Imagine we described a totally different experiment, say this, that I
sting someone with a needle and observe whether he cries out or not
/makes a sound or not/. Then surely it would interest us if the
subject whenever we stung him saw, say, a red circle. And we would
distinguish the case when he cried out and saw a circle from the case
when he cried out and didn’t see one.

This case is quite straightforward and there is no problem about it
/seems to be nothing problematic about it./

If I say “I tell myself that I see red, I tell myself what I see” it seems
that after having told myself I now know better what I see, am better
acquainted with it, than before. (Now in a sense this may be so . . .)

“When he asked me what colour I saw, I guessed what he meant
/wanted to know/ and told him.”

“It is not enough to distinguish between the cases in which B or I
say that I see red and do see red, and the case [in which] I say this but
don't see red, but we must distinguish between the cases in which I
see red, say I see red and mean to describe what I see and the cases in
which I don’t mean this.”

Consider the case in which I don’t say what I see in words but by
pointing to a sample. Here again I distinguish now between the case
in which I ‘just meant by pointing’ and the case in which I see and
point.

Now suppose I asked: “How do I know that I see, and that I see
red? I.e., how do I know that I do what you call seeing and seeing

41. The manuscript contains only the dashes, not the words suggested in
brackets.

Notes for Lectures on “Private Experience” and “Sense Data”
word. It chuckles while doing so. This is, one may say, a rudimentary form of cheating. One might even say: "This child is going to be a liar". But if it had not said the aside but only imagined itself pointing to one colour on the chart and then said the wrong word,—was this cheating too?

Can a child cheat like a banker without the knowledge of the banker?

"I can assure you that before when I said 'I see red' I saw black".

"He tells us his private experience, that experience which nobody but he knows anything about".

"Surely his memory is worth more than our indirect criteria, as only he could know what he saw."

But let us see,—we sometimes say outside philosophy such things as "of course only he knows how he feels" /or "I can't know what you feel"/. Now how do we apply such a statement? Mostly it is an expression of helplessness like "I don't know what to do". But this helplessness isn't due to an unfortunate metaphysical fact, 'the privacy of personal experience', or it would worry us constantly. Our expression is comparable to this: "What's done can't be undone!"

We also say to the doctor "Surely I must know whether I have pains or not!" How do we use this statement?

"All right, if we can't talk in this way about someone else, I can certainly say of myself that I either saw red at that time or didn't /had some other experience/. I may not remember now, but at the time I saw one thing or the /an/ other!" This is like saying "one of these two pictures must have fitted." And my answer is not that perhaps neither of them fits but that I'm not yet clear about what 'fitting' in this case means.

Now is it the same case, are these different cases: A blind man sees everything just as we do but he acts as a blind man does and on the other hand he sees nothing and acts as a blind man does. At first sight we should say: here we have obviously two clearly different cases although we admit that we can't know which we have before us. I should say: We obviously use two different pictures which one /we/
could describe like this: . . . But we use the pictures in such a way that the two games 'come to the same'.

By the way,—would you say that he surely /certainly/ knew that he was blind if he was so? Why do you feel more reluctant about this statement?

"Surely he knew that he saw red but he couldn't say so!"—Does that mean "Surely he saw, knew that he saw the colour which we call 'red'" . . . —or would you say it means "he knew that he saw this colour" (pointing to a red patch). But did he, while he knew it, point to this patch?

Use of: "He knows what colour he sees," "I know what colour I saw," etc.

"Darkening of memory" does this expression make sense and in what cases? And isn't, on the other hand, the picture which we use quite clear in all cases?

The case of old people usually having /getting/ memories of the time in which they learnt to speak and understand speech:

a) They say or paint that such and such things have happened although other records always contradict them.

b) The memories agree with the records. Only in this case shall we say that they remember.

Suppose they paint the scenes they say they remember and paint the faces being dark,—shall we say that they saw them that dark or that the colour had become darker in their memory?

How do we know what colour a person sees? By the sample he points to? And how do we know what relation the sample is meant to have to the original? Now are we to say "We never know . . ."? Or had we better cut these "We never know" out of our language and consider how as a matter of fact we are wont to use the word "to know"?

[279] What if someone asked: "How do I know that what I call seeing red isn't an entirely different experience every time? and that I

42. „Nachdunkeln der Erinnerung“
am not deluded into thinking that it is the same or nearly the same?"
Here again the answer "I can't know" and the subsequent removal of the question.

Is it ever true that when I call a colour 'red' I serve myself of memory? /make use of memory?/

To use the memory of what happened when we were taught language is all right as long as we don't think that this memory teaches us something essentially private.

"A rod has one length or another however we find it out". Here again the picture It.

"Though he can't say what it is he sees while he is learning No.1, he'll tell us afterwards what he saw." We mix this case up with the one: "When his gag will have been removed he'll tell us what he saw".

What does it mean, 'to tell someone what one sees'? Or (perhaps), 'to show someone what one sees?'

When we say 'He'll tell us what he saw' we have an idea that then we'll know what he really saw in a direct way ("at least if he isn't lying").

"He is in a better position to say what he sees than we are."—That depends.—

If we say "he'll tell us what he saw," it is as though he would make use of language which we had never taught him.

It is as if now we have got an insight into something which before we had only seen from the outside.

Inside and outside!

"Our teaching /training/ connects the word 'red' (or is meant to connect it) with a particular impression of his (a private impression, an impression in him). He then communicates this impression—indirectly, of course—through the medium of speech."
"He'll tell us later what it was he saw" means that we'll get to know in a (comparatively) direct and a sure way what he saw as opposed to the guesses we could make before.

We don't realise that the answer he gives us now is only part of a game like No.1, only more complicated.

We don't deny that he can remember having dreamt so-and-so before he was born. Denying this to us would be like denying that he can say he remembers having dreamt so-and-so before he was born.

I.e. we don't deny that he can make this move but we say that the move alone or together with all the sensations feelings etc. he might have while he is making it does not tell us what game it is a move of /to what game the move belongs/. We might e.g. never try to connect up a statement of this sort with anything past (in another sense). We might treat it as an interesting phenomenon and possibly connect it up with the person in a Freudian way or on the other hand we may look for some phenomena in the brain of the embryo which might be called dreams etc. etc... Or we may just say: "old people are liable to say such things" and leave it at that.

Suppose now someone remembered that yesterday he called red 'green' and vice versa but that this didn't appear as he also saw green what today he sees red and vice versa. Now here is a case in which we might be inclined to say that we learn from him today something about the working of his mind yesterday, that yesterday we judged by the outside while today we are allowed to look at the inside of what happened. It is as though we looked back but now got a glance at something that was closed to us /covered up/ yesterday.

If I say what it is I see, how do I compare what I say with what I see in order to know whether I say the truth?

Lying about what I see, you might say, is knowing what I see and saying something else. Supposing I said it just consists of saying to myself 'this is red' and aloud 'this is green.'

Compare lying and telling the truth in the case of telling what colour you see, with the case of describing a picture which you saw, or telling the right number of things you had to count.
224 Ludwig Wittgenstein

[281] But what about the criterion whether there is anything inside or not? Here we say "I know there's something inside in my case. And this is how I know of the 'inside' at all first hand." "And this is how I have first hand knowledge of the inside at all." "This is how I know about an inside and am led to suppose it in the other person too."

Further, we are not inclined to say that only hitherto we have not known the inside of another person, but that the idea of this knowledge is bound up with the idea of myself.

"So if I say 'he has toothache' I am supposing that he has what I have when I have toothache." Suppose I said: "If I say 'I suppose he has toothache' I am supposing that he has what I have if I have toothache"—this would be like saying "If I say 'this cushion is red' I mean that it has the same color which the sofa has if it is red." But this isn't what I intended /was meant/ to say with the first sentence. I wished to say that talking about his toothache at all was based upon a supposition, a supposition which by its very essence could not be verified.

But if you look closer you will see that this is an entire misrepresentation of the use of the word 'toothache.'

Can two people have the same afterimage?

Language game: 'Description of imaginings /the picture before one's mind's eye/.'

Can two persons have the same picture before their mind's eye?

In which case would we say that they had two images exactly alike but not identical?

The fact that two ideas seem here inseparably bound up suggests to us that we are dealing with one idea only and not with two and that by a queer trick our language suggests a totally different structure of grammar than the one actually used. For we have the sentence that only I can know directly my experience and only indirectly the experience of the other person. Language suggests 4 possible configurations but rules out 2. It is as though I had used the 4 letters a, b, c, d to denote two objects only but by my notation somehow suggesting that I am talking of 4.

It seems as though I wished to say that to me L.W. something applied which does not apply to other people. That is, there seems to be an asymmetry.

I express things asymmetrically and could express them symmetrically; only then one would see what facts prompt us to the asymmetrical expression.

I do this by spreading the use of the word "I" over all human bodies as opposed to L.W. alone.

[282] I want to describe a situation in which I should not be tempted to say that I assumed or believed that the other had what I have. Or, in other words, a situation in which we would not [speak] of my consciousness and his consciousness. And in which the idea would not occur to us that we could only be conscious of our own consciousness.

The idea of the ego inhabiting a body to be abolished.

If whatever consciousness [there is] spreads over all human bodies, then there won't be any temptation to use the word 'ego.'

Let's assume that hearing was done by no organ of the body we know of . . .

Let us imagine the following arrangement: . . .

If it is absurd to say that I only know that I see but not that the others do—isn't this at any rate less absurd than to say the opposite?

Is it impossible to imagine a philosophy that would be the diametrical opposite of solipsism? 43

43. Ist eine Philosophie undenkbar, die das diametrale Gegenteil des Solips-ismus ist?
The idea of the constituent of a fact: “Is my person (or a person) a constituent of the fact that I see or not?” This expresses a question concerning the symbolism just as if it were a question about nature.

“It thinks”. Is this proposition true and “I think” false?

Language game: I paint, for myself, what I see. The picture doesn’t contain me.

A board game, in fact chess, but the board has a square which must never be used. This may be misleading.

A board game in which only one man is said to play, the other to ‘answer’.

What if the other person always correctly described what I saw and imagined, would I not say he knows what I see?—“But what if he describes it wrongly on some occasion? Mustn’t I say he was mistaken?” Why should I say this and not, rather, he has forgotten the meanings of his words?

“But after all, only I can finally decide whether what he said is right. We can’t assume that he knows what I see and I don’t!” We can also do this!

Can a man doubt whether what he sees is red or green? (Elaborate this.)

[283] “Surely if he knows anything he must know what he sees!”—It is true that the game of “showing or telling what one sees” is one of the most fundamental language games; which means that what we use in ordinary life call using language mostly presupposes this game.

I can for what I see use the impersonal form of description, and the fact that I say “for what I see” doesn’t say at all that after all this is only a disguised personal description! For I just expressed myself in our ordinary form of expression, in English.

Is a cube an extremely regular symmetrical body, or the irregular thing that I see if I look at it from an angle? What should I emphasize? Should I say: it is primarily irregular but one could represent it as something regular, irregularly projected, or: it is primarily regular but irregularly projected?

What’s the difference between my being angry and he being angry? If I wish to write down my experiences the two experiences that I am angry and that he is angry are absolutely, entirely different (although the words used for describing them are very similar. I might, therefore, naturally object to this way of expression.)

“A cube has 9 real edges and 3 imaginary ones”.

If I write down my own experiences nothing is more natural than to refer by “I” only to my body (or: LW’s body) as opposed to other bodies, but not to distinguish my toothache from his by the words “I” and “he”.

The usual game played with the word “toothache” involves the distinction of bodies which have the toothache.

Does the solipsist also say that only he can play chess?

44. „Es denkt“. Ist dieser Satz wahr und „ich denke“ falsch?

45. Ist ein Würfel ein äußerst regelmäßiger symmetrischer Körper, oder das Unregelmäßige, was ich sehe, wenn ich ihn von einer Ecke aus sehe? Was soll ich hervorheben? Soll ich sagen: er sei primär unregelmäßig aber man könne ihn als etwas Regelmäßiges unregelmäßig projiziert darstellen, oder er sei primär regelmäßig aber unregelmäßig projiziert?

46. „Ein Würfel hat 9 reelle Kanten und 3 imaginäre“. 
But he will say that behind the sentence ‘I see . . .’ when he says it and it's true, there stands something which does not stand behind “he sees” or “I see” when the other man says it.

I'll start with a description of what ‘I see’ but in impersonal form.

“I speak” and “the other speaks” are two totally different experiences.47

I say “it’s nice” then I say “I said that”. Thereby I have—neither to myself nor to the other—said who has uttered it. I have said it to him.48

“But how do I know that I have spoken if not in the peculiar experience of speaking?”49

The word “I” does not designate a person.50

Remember that whatever the word ‘I’ means to you, to the other man it shows /draws his attention to/ a human body, and is of no value otherwise.51

Does it make sense to say the star stays at the same point?52

I could write a book on physics in which every sentence starts with “I remember”.

Could one say: Here the sentences are all directly backed by real experience or by primary reality.

We must be misled in a queer way!

“But surely,” I want to say, “if I'm to be quite /really/ frank I must say that I have something which nobody has.”—But who's I?—Hell! I don't express myself properly, but there's something! You can't deny that there is my personal experience and that this in a most important sense has no neighbour.—But you don't mean that it happens to be alone but that its grammatical position is that of having no neighbour.

“But somehow our language doesn't bring it out that there is something unique, namely real present experience, and do you just wish me to /advise me to/ resign myself to that?”

(A philosophical book might be entitled “the wonders of the jungle”.)

(Funny that in ordinary life we never feel that we have to resign ourselves to something by using ordinary language!)

How is it that the utterance,52 I might propose for those sentences which describe my personal experience does /do/ not really quite satisfy me?

Partly because of what we call “imagining that the other person sees (feels) pain”.

We [too] are inclined to use the same picture for both processes.53

Now imagine this: as soon as ever he has learnt enough of language to express it, he tells us that he saw blue when he said “red” in No. 1.

This sounds as if, then, we really ought to be convinced that he saw blue etc.

The person who paints his memories.

It reminds one misleadingly of “as soon as ever he had learnt enough of their language, the stranger informed his hosts of . . .”

This hangs together with the idea that the child remembers before it says that it does.

52. Aussprechung

53. [Auch] wir sind geneigt, dasselbe Bild für beide Vorgänge zu verwenden.
Consider the case of the child drawing/painting its memories. It has painted a blue light instead of a red one.

Augustine, about expressing the wishes inside him.

Why shouldn't we consider the case that the child learns to think and always assume that it had a private language before it learnt ours.

Only: what do we mean by learning the language? In what sense can we be said to teach the child the natural gesture-language? Or can't we teach him that?

Can't the child learn to wish for an apple by learning to draw an apple?

Circle and ellipse. Should I say "he saw the circle as an ellipse yesterday" or "this is how he represented a circle on the following day".

(Remembering that one thought so-and-so. "I don't remember him but I know, remember, that he struck me as being a fool.")

"He mostly sees red where we see red."

The normal use of the expression "he sees [red]" where . . . is this: We take it as the criterion for meaning the same by 'red' as we do, that as a rule he agrees with us in giving the same names to the colours of objects as we do. If then in a particular instance he says something is red where we should say that it's green, we say he sees it different from us.

Notice how in such a case we would behave. We should look for a cause of his different judgment, and if we had found one we should certainly be inclined to say he saw red where we saw green. It is further clear that even before ever finding such a [284] cause we might under circumstances be inclined to say this. But also that we can't give a strict rule for . . .

54. Kreis und Ellipse. Soll ich sagen „er hat den Kreis gestern als Ellipse gesehen“ oder „so stellte er den folgenden Tag einen Kreis dar“?
55. (Sich daran erinnern, das und das gedacht zu haben. „Ich erinnere mich nicht an ihn, aber ich weiß, erinnere mich, daß er mir einen dümmlchen Eindruck gemacht hat.")
56. The text reads "green" here, but this was probably a slip.

Consider this case: someone says "it's queer /I can't understand it/, I see everything red blue today and vice versa." We answer "it must look queer!" He says it does and, e.g., goes on to say how cold the glowing coal looks and how warm the clear (blue) sky. I think we should understand these or similar circumst[ances] be incl[ined] to say that he saw red what we saw [blue]. 57 And again we should say that we know that he means by the words 'blue' and 'red' what we do as he has always used them as we do.

On the other hand: Someone tells us today that yesterday he always saw everything red blue, and v[ice] v[ersa]. We say: But you called the glowing coal red, you know, and the sky blue. He answers: That was because I had also changed the names. We say: But didn't it feel very queer? and he says: No, it seemed all perfectly ordinary /natural/. Would we in this case too say: . . . ?

Case of contradicting memory images: tomorrow he remembers this, the day after tomorrow something else.

The whole trend, to show that the expression "letting one look into his soul," is often misleading.

Back to the example of the after image /or No. 1./ We can say that these cases are not cases of communic[ation] of personal exp[erience] if there were no pers[onal] exp[erience] but only the 'outward signs.'

Now I ask what are our criteria for there being or there having been a pers[onal] exp[erience] besides the expression? And the answer seems to be that for the outsider //the other man// the criteria are indeed more outside expressions, but that I myself know whether I have an experience or not; in particular, whether I see red or not.

But let me ask: what is knowing that I see red like? I mean: look at something red, 'know that it is red,' and ask yourself /observe /mark/// what you're doing. Don't you mean seeing red and impressing it on your mind that you are doing so? But there are, I suppose, several things that you are doing: You probably say to yourself the word 'red' or 'this is red' or something of the sort, or perhaps glance from the

57. The text reads "green," but this is because Wittgenstein had changed an earlier use of "green" to "blue" but failed to make the change here.
red object to another red one which you're taking to be the paradigm of red, and suchlike. On the other hand you just intently stare at the red thing.

[285] In part of their uses the expression[s] “visual image” and “picture” run parallel; but where they don't, the analogy which does exist tends to delude us.

Tautology.

The grammar of ‘seeing red’ connected to the expression of seeing red closer than one thinks.

“You talk as though one couldn't /can’t/ see a red patch if one can't say that one does; as if seeing something was saying that one sees it”.

“Seeing something” of course doesn't mean the same as saying that one sees something but the senses of these expressions are closer related than it might appear to you.

We say a blind man does not see anything. But not only do we say so but he too says that he does not see. I don't mean “he agrees with us that he does not see,” “he doesn't dispute it,” but rather: he too describes the facts in this way, having learned the same language as we have. Now whom do we call blind, what is our criterion for blindness? A certain kind of behaviour. And if the person behaves in that particular way, we not only call him blind but teach him to call himself blind. And in this sense his behaviour also determines the meaning of blindness for him. But now you will say: “Surely blindness isn't a behaviour; it's clear that a man can behave like a blind man and not be blind. Therefore ‘blindness’ means something different; his behaviour only helps him to understand what we mean by ‘blindness.’ The outward circumstances are what both he and we know. Whenever he behaves in a certain way, we say that he sees nothing and he notices that a certain private experience of his coincides with all these cases and thereby knows /so concludes/ that we mean this experience of his by saying that he sees nothing.”

The idea is that we teach a person the meaning of expressions relating to personal experiences indirectly. Such an indirect mode of teaching we could imagine as follows. I teach a child the names of colours and a game, say, of bringing objects of a certain colour when ‘the name of the colour’ is called out. I don't however teach him the colour names by pointing to a sample which I and he see and saying, e.g., the word red. Instead I have various spectacles [286] each of which, when I look through it, makes me see the white paper in a different colour. These spectacles are also distinguished by their outside appearance: the one that makes me see red has circular glasses another one elliptical ones, etc. I now teach the child in this way: that when I see it putting the circular ones on its nose I say the word ‘red,’ when the elliptical ones ‘green,’ and so forth. This one might call teaching the child the meanings of the colour names in an indirect way, because one could here /in this case/ say that I led the child to correlate the word ‘red’ with something that I didn't see but hoped the child would see if it looked through the circular glasses. And this way is indirect as opposed to the direct way of pointing to a red object etc.

(Mind-reading)

From this it should follow that we sometimes rightly, sometimes wrongly, teach a man to say that he is blind: for what if he saw all the time but nevertheless behaved exactly like a blind man?—Or should we say: “Nature wouldn't play such a trick on us!”

We can see here that we don't quite understand the real use of the expression “to see something” or “to see nothing.”

And what is so misleading to us when we consider this use is the following. We say, “Surely we can see something without ever saying or showing that we do, and on the other hand we can say that we see so-and-so without seeing it; therefore seeing is one process and expressing that we see another, and all that they have to do with each other is that they sometimes coincide—they have the same connections as being red and being sweet. Sometimes what is red is sweet—etc.” Now this is obviously not quite true and not quite false. It seems somehow that we look at the use of these words with some prejudice. It is clear that we in our language use the words 'seeing red' in such a way that we can say “he /A/ sees red but doesn't show it”; on the other hand it is easy to see that we would have no use for these words if their application was severed from the criteria of behaviour. That is to say: to the language game which we play with these words it is both essential that the people who play it (should) behave in the particular way we call expressing /saying, showing/ what they see, and also that sometimes and under certain circumstances they should more or less entirely conceal what they see.

[287] Balance. The point of the game depends upon what usually happens.
Point of a game.

But doesn't the word "seeing red" mean to me a particular process /certain (private) experience/ or (mental) event, a fact in the realm of primary experience—which surely is utterly different from saying certain words?

The words "seeing red means a particular experience" are useless unless we can follow them up by: "namely this → (pointing)." Or else they may say experience as opposed to physical object; but then this is grammar.

How does he know that he sees red /has the visual impression/ i.e. how does he connect the word 'red' with 'a particular colour'? In fact what does the expression 'a particular colour' here mean? What is the criterion for his connecting it /the word/ always to the same colour /experience/? Is it not often just that he calls it red?

In fact, if he is to play a language game, the possibility of this will depend upon his own and the other people's reactions. The game depends upon the agreement of these reactions; i.e., they must describe the same things as 'red.'

"But if he speaks to himself, surely this is different. For then he needn't consult other people's reactions and he just gives the name 'red' now to the same colour to which he gave it on a previous occasion." But how does he know that it is the same colour? Does he also recognise the sameness of colour as what he used to call sameness of colour, and so on ad infinitum? It is quite true he /connects/ uses, in agreement with ordinary use, the word "red" /and the same colour/ and that he would not say that he saw now the colour he had seen before, that that colour is red but that what he sees now is not red etc.

It is quite true he connects the word and the experience.

But I could use language just for making entries in my diary and without ever having learned it. I could have invented a name for the particular colour sensation, say, the name "red" and then used this name to note down whenever I had that colour sensation. That means, you (would) play a private language game with yourself. But let's see, how are we to describe this game?—Christening. The words

"seeing red means a particular experience" are senseless unless we can follow them up by namely this → (pointing) or else they may say experience as opposed to physical object, but then this is grammar.

When you say "the expression 'red' means to you a certain private experience" you are (indeed) supplementing this statement by imagining a colour /red/ or looking at a red object (which supply the 'namely this') but how do you use /make use of/ the expression and the experience you thus connect with it? For what we call the meaning of the word lies in the game we play with it.

But it seems to me that I either see red or don't see red. Whether I express it or not.

Picture we use here.

This picture not questioned but its application.

Other cases of tautologies.

"Surely seeing is one thing, and showing that I see is another thing."—This certainly is like saying "skipping is one thing and jumping another." But there is a supplement to this statement—"skipping is this (showing it) and jumping is this (showing it)." Now how about this supplement in the first case? "Seeing red is this (showing it) and showing that we see red is this (showing it)." The point is just that there just isn't a 'showing that I see' except showing that I see. "But can't I say 'seeing red is what I'm doing now' (looking at something red)? And although in a sense the other man can't directly see what I'm talking about /be aware of the activity/, I certainly know what it is that I'm talking about. That is, although for him I can't point directly to my seeing red, for myself I can point to it; and in this sense I can give an ostensive definition of the expression to myself." But an ostensive definition is not a magic act. If I explain to someone [the] use of ... by ... giving the ostensive definition simply consists in ...

One might be inclined to say that casting was not just the act of ... But it is the game of which it is part ...

So what does giving myself the ostensive definition of red consist in?—Now how am I to describe it? Shall I say: seeing red and saying to myself 'I see red,'—or is it 'seeing a certain colour sensation and saying 'I see red'"? The first (version) it seems won't do as /doesn't
account for the fact that it isn't essential to us that when I do what I for myself call 'seeing red,' that should necessarily be what we then mean by 'seeing red.' / The first version I don't like. It assumes that the other knows the very same private impression which I am having./ So I would rather leave it open what colour I am concentrating my attention on. But then how can I call it a colour? Isn't it just as uncertain that I mean by 'colour' what they mean as that I mean by 'red' what they mean? And the same applies of course to 'seeing' (for what here I mean by this word is not an activity of the human eye). (The second version is justified only if I wish to say that it does not matter here to which of the colours (say, red green blue yellow) he assigns the name 'red' and so we might have said "he sees some colour, say, blue and says 'I see red'.")

"But it's a blatant error to mix up 'seeing red' with showing that you see red! I know what seeing red is and I know what showing... is." Couldn't we say that knowing what showing... is is seeing showing? Now what is knowing what seeing is? In knowing what seeing red is you seem to say to yourself 'seeing red is this'—you seem to give yourself a sample but you don't because the usual criteria for the sameness of the sample [289] don't apply. I can say I call 'red' always the same colour, or whenever I explain 'red' I point to a sample of the same colour.

Consider the proposition: He makes sure what it means to him by... Would you say the word had meaning to him if it meant something else every time? And what is the criterion of the same colour coming twice?

If we describe a game which he plays with himself, is it relevant that he should use the word 'red' [for] the same colour in our sense, or would we also call it a language game if he used it anyhow? Then what is the criterion for using it in the same way? Not merely the connection between "same," "colour," and "red."

Which is the same colour as that I saw? Not the one to which I apply the words 'this is the same colour'?

"Let me see if I still know which of these colours is red?— (Looking about.) Yes I know." (Here I could have said "is called red.")

So he can be sure, in this private way, of what toothache means by having a private sensation?!

Making sure that you know what 'seeing red' means, is good only if you can make use of this knowledge in a further case. Now what if I see a colour again, can I say I made sure I knew what 'red' was /means/ so now I shall know that I'll recognise it correctly? In what sense is having said the words 'this is red' before a guarantee that I now see the same colour when I say again I see red?

We can indeed imagine a Robinson Crusoe using a language for himself but then he must behave in a certain way or we shouldn't say that he plays language games with himself.

The grammar of 'private sense data.'

What's interesting is not that I don't have to pay attention to my behaviour in order to know that I have toothache, but rather that my behaviour says nothing at all to me.58

"I sent him to the doctor because he moans" is just as correct as "I sent him to the doctor because he has toothache".

"I moan because I have pain".—Are you sure that that's why you moan?

"But damn it all the nucleus of our language remains untouched whatever we might imagine our behaviour to be!" The nucleus is the word together with its meaning.

"Toothache" is a word which I use in a game which I play with other people, but it has a private meaning to me.

"Christen toothache".

Changing the meaning of a word.
Meaning connected with the use of the ostensive definition.

58. Das Interessante ist nicht, daß ich nicht auf mein Benehmen achten muß, um zu wissen, daß ich Zahnschmerzen habe, sondern daß mir mein Benehmen gar nichts sagt.
In the use of the word ‘meaning’ it is essential that the same meaning is kept throughout a game.

Consider a game in which this isn’t so. Would you call this sort of activity a game?

“Are you sure that you call ‘toothache’ always the same private experience?”

“I recognise it as being the same”. And are you also recognising the meaning of the word the same, so you can be sure that “recognising it to be the same” now means the same to you which it did before?

“But in ostensibly defining a word for myself I impress its meaning on me so as not to forget it later on”. But how do you know that this helps? Do you know later on whether you remember it rightly or wrongly?

Can you recognise something to be red which isn’t red?

To be sure that so-and-so is the case. To know. Does ‘p’ follow from ‘I know p’?

The normal case of being sure, of a strong conviction.

Does it make sense to say, that what you see is green, and you recognise it to be red?

“It seems to me to have sense.” You are undoubtedly using a picture, therefore it ‘seems to you to have sense’. But ask yourself what use you are making of that picture? We shall have to talk about sense and nonsense later.

What’s the use here of being sure, if it doesn’t follow that it is so and if your being sure is the only criterion there is for its being so?

That means: This isn’t at all a case of being sure, of conviction.

The [phrase] ‘recognising as . . .’ is used where you can be wrong in recognising.

Sometimes these bodies change their weight, and then we look for the cause of the change and find, say, that something’s come off the body. Sometimes however the weight of a body changes and we can’t account for the change at all. But we nevertheless don’t say that weighing it had lost its point “because now the body really doesn’t have any weight.” Rather we say that the body had changed somehow—that this was the cause of the change of weight—but that hitherto we have not found this cause. That is, we will go on playing the game of weighing, and we try to find an explanation for the exceptional behaviour.

We use the form of expression “the weight of this body” to designate something inherent in the body, something which could only be diminished by destroying part of the body. The same body—the same weight. (And this is a grammatical proposition.)

Grocer.

Supposing what in fact is the rule became the exception. Under certain peculiar circumstances indeed a body kept on weighing the same; say, iron in the presence of mercury. A piece of cheese, on the other hand, though keeping its size, calories, etc., weighed different weights at different times unaccountably. Would we still . . .

On the one hand it seems that if there wasn’t the behaviour of toothache . . .

“So-and-so has excellent health, he never had to go to the dentist, never complained about toothache; but as toothache is a private experience, we can’t know whether he hasn’t had terrible toothache all his life.”

How does one assume such and such to be the case? What is an assumption that, e.g., ‘A has [toothache]’? Is it saying the words “A has [toothache]”? Or doesn’t it consist in doing something with these words?

“A game of assumption.”—


“But the point is just that we don’t assume that we have [toothache]. Therefore, even if we have no ground to assume that anyone else has
Ludwig Wittgenstein

[240]

Notes for Lectures on “Private Experience” and “Sense Data” 241

that that is the right thing? Because I recognise it? But then it doesn't matter what it is, as long as I recognise it as toothache! ...

“But when you ask me ‘do you know what toothache is?’ I answer ‘yes’ after having brought before my mind a certain sensation”. But how is this certain sensory characterization used? Only by that, that it comes when you say the word ‘toothache’? Or that it comes and you are in some way satisfied?

“To give a sensation a name” means nothing unless I know already in what sort of a game this name is to be used.

We describe certain behaviour by: “it is obvious that he was hiding his pain,” or: “I think he was hiding his pain,” or: “I don’t know at all whether he was hiding pain.”

But can’t I just assume with some degree of certainty that he has pain although I have no reason whatever for it? I can say “I assume . . .,” but if I sent them all to the doctor although they showed no sign of illness /pain/, I should just be called mad.

That we try to account for something is due to the fact that we often can account for it. If I saw no regularity whatever I should not be inclined to say that there is one which I haven't as yet discovered. What usually happens makes me take this point of view.

The ‘private definition’ is not binding.

In our private language game we had, it seemed, given a name to an impression—in order, of course, to use the name for this impression in the future. The definition, that is, should have determined on future occasions for what impression to use the name and for which not to use it. Now we said that on certain occasions after having given the definition we did use the word [and] on others we didn’t; but we described these occasions only by saying that we had ‘certain impressions’—that is, we didn’t describe them at all. The
only thing that characterized them was that we used such and such words. What seemed to be a definition didn’t play the role of a definition at all. It did not justify one subsequent use of the word; and all that remains of our private language game is therefore that I sometimes without justification, without any particular reason, write the word ‘red’ in my diary without any justification whatever.

“But surely I feel justified when normally I use the word ‘red’ although I don’t think of a definition while doing so.” Do you mean that whenever normally you use the word ‘red’ you have a particular feeling which you call a feeling of justification? I wonder if that is true. But anyhow by justification I didn’t mean a feeling. But I think I know what makes you say that on saying, e.g., ‘this book is red’ you have a feeling of being justified in using the word. For you might ask: isn’t there an obvious difference between the case in which I use a word in its well known meaning—as when I say to someone “the sky is blue today”—and the case in which I say any arbitrary word on such an occasion, e.g., “the sky is moo.” In this case, you will say, I either know that I am just giving a meaning to the word ‘moo,’ or else I shall feel that there is no justification whatever for using the word. The word is just any word and not the appropriate word. I quite agree that there is a difference in experience between the cases of ‘using the name of the colour,’ ‘giving a new name to the colour,’ and ‘using some arbitrary word in place of the name of the colour.’ But that doesn’t mean that it is correct to say that I have a feeling of appropriateness in the first case which is absent in the third. “But ‘red’ somehow seems to us to fit this colour.” We certainly may be inclined to say this sentence on certain occasions, but it would be wrong to say that therefore we had a feeling of fitting when ordinarily we said that something was red.

“But do you mean that one man couldn’t play a game of chess with himself and without anyone else knowing that he did?”—What would you say he should do to be playing a private game of chess? Just anything?

I suppose you would say, e.g., that he imagines a chessboard with the chessmen on it, that he imagines certain moves, etc. And if you were asked what it means to imagine a chessboard, you would explain it by pointing to a real chessboard, or say to a picture of one, and analogously if you were asked what does it mean to imagine the king of chess, a pawn, a knight’s move etc. Or should you have said: he must go through certain . . . ? But what private experiences are there? and would any of them do in this case? For instance, feeling hot? “No! The private experience I am talking of must have the multiplicity of the game of chess.” But again, does he recognise two private experiences to be different by a further private experience and this to be the same in different cases? (Private experience in fiction.) Mustn’t we say in this case that we can’t say anything whatever about private experiences and are in fact not entitled to use the word ‘experiences’ at all? What makes us believe that we are is that we really think of the cases in which we can describe his private experiences, describing different ways of playing chess in one’s imagination.

How can we say he may see red although nobody may be able to find it out?

If we go through with this idea of a private experience which we don’t know, we can’t talk of a certain private experience either, because this expression is taken from the case in which it alludes to a certain class of experiences which we know—though we don’t know which one of its members he has. Rather, the private experiences /impressions/ which we imagined as the background to the foreground of our actions, dissolve into a mist/which we wished to talk about and imagined to be back of our actions, dissolve into a mist/ Rather, the private experiences which we imagined as an unknown x, y, z etc. behind our actions dissolve into a mist and into nothing.

One might suggest . . . : the word ‘toothache’ stands on the one hand for a behaviour and on the other hand for a private experience. The connection is that when a man has the private experience he tends to behave in the particular way.

But why should you talk of a private experience and not 100 private experiences as you don’t know whether there is only one or whether there are 100?

What is so confusing here is to talk of the meaning of the word instead of the use.

The idea of different kinds of objects.
Why should you know better what experiencing is like with the other person than what seeing red is like? If you were very careful you would say "a certain something".

What is it that happens when in one case I say "I have toothache / see red/" and mean it, and am not lying, and on the other hand I say the words but know that they are not true; or say them not knowing what exactly they mean, etc.?

The criteria for it being the truth have to be laid down beforehand in common language. "But how am I to know how in the particular case to apply them? For in so far as they are laid down in common language, they join the rest of the rules of common language; i.e., they do not help me in my particular case. Is there such a thing as justifying what in the particular case I do, just by what then is the case and not by a rule? Can I say I am now justified in using the sentence... just by what is now the case?" No!
Nor can I say does it help me to say "I am justified—when I feel justified." For about feeling justified the same thing can be said as about feeling toothache.

My criteria for having toothache /saying I have toothache/ are the same as /no other than/ for the other to say I have toothache; for I can't say that feeling or having toothache is my criterion for having a right to say it.

Examine: 'These two operations bring about the same pain'. The pain which they all bring about I shall call 'toothache'.
What does this show??
Did I call a behaviour "having toothache"?
Did I call a behaviour "having the same pain"?
Did I give the name "toothache" to a behaviour?
But showing toothache can never be lying.
I must assume an expression which is not lying.
I believe that I wanted to say that 'toothache' is here not given as a name of a behaviour and that one does not point to an experience behind the behaviour either.

But showing toothache can never be lying.
I must assume an expression which is not lying.
I believe that I wanted to say that 'toothache' is here not given as a name of a behaviour and that one does not point to an experience behind the behaviour either.59

Notes for Lectures on "Private Experience" and "Sense Data"

When are we to say that they do? It could be when the patient /subject/ says: I have the same pain now as... I imagine that he says this spontaneously having been taught the word the same...

Now do I say that there is not the experience of toothache but only the behaviour?!

When I say that moaning is the expression of toothache, then under certain circumstances the possibility of it being the expression without the feeling behind it mustn't enter my game.

It is nonsense to say: the expression may always lie.60
The language games with expressions of feelings (private experiences) are based on games with expressions of which we don't say that they may lie.

"But was I when a baby taught that 'toothache' meant my expression of toothache?"—I was told that a certain behaviour was called expression of toothache.

"But isn't it possible that a child should behave just as a normal child when it has toothache and not have toothache?"

But does, if we speak of the baby, "having toothache" mean the same as "behaving such-and-such"?

We say "poor thing, it moans."

Can't I, in the child too, separate the moaning from the pain? Can't I say that I pity it because it has pain, not because it moans?

You ought, I suppose, to say that you pity it because you believe that it has pains. But what is believing that it has pains like, as opposed to believing /just seeing/ that it moans? It doesn't here consist in believing that he doesn't cheat but in a different experience.

"Something clicked in my brain /mind/ when I came to this colour." (This is a picture.) But did you know from the clicking that it was red? Supposing looking at this colour your eyes opened wider and you gave a jerk,—was it by its producing this reaction that you recog-

59. Ich glaube, ich wollte sagen, daß 'toothache' hier nicht als Name eines Benchmens gegeben wird und daß man auch nicht auf eine Erfahrung hinter dem Benchmen zeigt.

60. Es ist Unsinn zu sagen: der Ausdruck kann immer lügen.
nised the colour as being red? Indeed, this is the phenomenon we call recognition, but we call it that because it happens under circumstances where we have other criteria for saying that we've recognised the object.

I saw a particular colour, concentrated on it and the word red came without tension.

“But surely there's a case in which I'm justified to say 'I see red,' where I'm not lying, and one where I'm not justified in saying so!” Of course I can be justified by the ostensive definition or by asking the others “now isn't this red?” and they answer that it is. But you didn't mean this justification, but one which justifies me privately, whatever others will say.

“But do you mean to say that the truth or falsehood of my saying 'I see red' does not consist in there being red before my mind's eye in one case and not in the other; but that it depends on such things as whether I say it in this or that tone of voice?” /with a certain tension?/

[294] If I say “I see red” without reason, how can I distinguish between saying it with truth and saying it as a lie?

It is important here that there is no such case /that I exclude the case/ of saying the untruth by mistake.

Here there is no comparing of proposition and reality! (Collating.)

Don't I know, when I say 'I see red' and am lying that I am lying?—When do I translate my experience into the words expressing my knowledge? One might say: knowing that I am lying doesn't mean saying that I do but being ready to say it.

I could say: Lying is characterised by a peculiar /an experience of/tension. What is it like to know that I don't see red and to say that I do?

61. Hier haben wir keinen Vergleich des Satzes mit der Wirklichkeit! (Kollationieren.)

Notes for Lectures on “Private Experience” and “Sense Data”

“Well, it is simply not seeing red and saying 'I see red!' There is nothing problematic about this, as seeing and saying something are utterly independent”.

“What I now call . . .”

(We never dispute the opinions of common sense but we question the expression of common sense.)

Suppose I said “I see red” and was lying, for I actually saw red—but had made a slip of the tongue.

But which lie was it I had said, or (rather) thought? Of course I may say later “I wanted to say 'I see green’” but did anything correspond to these words while I said 'I see red'?

But suppose that he felt that he was lying but never said so,—did he know that he was lying or not?

“Did he know that he was doing what we call lying?” “Did he know that he was doing what, on other occasions, he called lying?”

What is his criterion for saying—wanting to speak the truth—that he was lying? Is there a criterion?

Do these two sentences say the same: “He says he sees red and really sees red” and “He says he sees red with conviction” /and has the experience of not lying”?

“So you think seeing red consists in saying 'I see red' in a certain tone of voice?”—No, but saying 'I see red' and seeing it might be saying it in a particular tone of voice.

How do I imagine myself seeing red? Isn't it by imagining red?! But how do I imagine myself addressing a meeting?

Imagine a Robinson [Crusoe] lying to himself.—Why is this difficult to imagine?

Look at something red and say to yourself 'I see green', a) meaning by 'green' what usually you mean by 'red' (i.e. speaking the truth), b) lying.
But one might call it lying to oneself if one, e.g., turns one's watch forward to make oneself get up earlier.

Falsifying an account. I add up numbers, arrive at 273 [shillings], then rub out 3 and put a 5 instead.

When in this discussion we talk of lying, it ought always to mean subjectively lying, and subjectively lying to the other person and not to oneself.

If I see green without saying I see green, in what way can these words be said to describe what I see?

One could imagine someone constantly lying subjectively but not objectively.

Imagine this case: Someone has a particular way of lying, he always lies calling red 'green' and green 'red,' but as a matter of fact what he says agrees with the usage of the other people and so his lying is never noticed. //taken notice of.//

Supposing one said: To see red means to see that which makes me inclined to describe it by saying "...". "To know that I am lying means to have that experience which I should describe by the words "..."."

(Our language on the one hand has very much more possibilities of expression than logicians admit /dream of/ /imagine/, and on the other hand, the uses of these modes of expression are very much more limited than logicians /they/ imagine).

What makes 'I see red' into lying? The private experience of not seeing red or the private experience of feeling a certain tension?

Is it wrong to say that lying in such-and-such cases consists in saying so-and-so and feeling a tension?

One could very well say that sometimes lying is characterised by the fact that I only am conscious that things are otherwise, and sometimes not that way but by the fact that I sense the tension of bad conscience, etc.

62. Man könnte sehr wohl sagen daß manchmal die Lüge dadurch charakte-

risiert ist, daß ich nur bewußt bin, daß es sich anders verhält, und manchmal nicht so, sondern dadurch, daß ich die Spannung des schlechten Gewissens spüre, etc.
other doesn't need to know that my reaction occurs in such-and-such a way? He thinks that I tell him 'straight out' what I see and it isn't so, rather, I concoct a lie.70

"He doesn't know what I see until I tell him, I know it already //before he learns of it//". Could it also be the other way around?71

I have now been writing with a pencil for a long time: did I know that the writing is grey and the paper white?

Did I know that? or did I simply know that it is as it is?72

"I know that I didn't tell it to him straight out."—"Yes, but wasn't something of this 'reaction' already there, namely the experience, that I didn't tell him straight out?"73

"Still, can't we say that something visible to all happens (externally) and something further 'in me', that only I can recognise?"74

"How am I justified in saying that I see this apple [is] red?" You are not justified. But isn't it true that when I'm lying I am not justified and that when I say the truth I am justified?

How is a lie possible in a case where there is no justification?

Supposing one said: Lying (here) consists in applying one word to the colour and not another? A misleading word instead of a not misleading one?

70. Das Wort, welches Du sprichst, ist eine Reaktion. Die Reaktion, die wir in den Satz übersetzen ,er sieht: . . . "—Aber ist es nicht wahr, daß der Andere nicht wissen braucht, daß meine Reaktion in dieser und dieser Weise vor sich geht? Er meint, ich sage ihm ,geradeheraus', was ich sehe, und es ist nicht so sondern ich erfinde eine Lüge.

71. ,Er weiß nicht, was ich sehe, bis ich es ihm sage, ich weiß es schon vorher, //ehe er es erfährt//". Könnte es auch umgekehrt sein?

72. Ich habe jetzt lange mit einem Bleistift geschrieben: wußte ich, daß die Schrift grau und das Papier weiß ist?

Wußte ich darüber oder wußte ich bloß, daß es ist, wie es ist?

73. "Ich weiß, daß ich es ihm nicht geradeheraus gesagt habe."—"Ja, aber war nicht von dieser 'Reaktion' schon etwas da, nämlich eben das Erlebnis, daß ich es ihm nicht geradeheraus gesagt habe?"74

74. "Können wir nicht doch sagen, daß etwas, jedem sichtbar (äußerlich), geschicht und etwas weiteres, nur mir erkennbar, in mir?"
facts, the differences are quite unimportant to us (here). For our purpose they can all be said to describe the same case. (We might have said lying consists in saying 'I see red' and having stomach ache but as stomach ache is a private sensation, why not rather consider the private sensation of seeing a colour other than red?) We may say therefore that these explanations, for our purpose, were no explanations at all. They left us just where we were, and they only (seem to) say that the cases of lying and saying the truth are distinguished by the private experience accompanying the sentence. So let us put our question like this: Lying, in our case, consists in saying 'I see red' and seeing green; what does seeing green consist in? As an answer we immediately give ourselves a sample for 'green'. But is it essential that this sample should be what the others also call green? No, it might be what they call yellow or blue. But are you inclined to say it might be what they call hot, cold or tepid? Then, after all, you are thinking of games played with others though you left a certain latitude . . .

When we talk of the private experience which the others don't know, we don't originally mean to talk of a shapeless nothing but of a variable with a certain definite value.

It is said sometimes that if I and someone else are looking at some objects I can never know what colour the other really sees. But with what right do we here use 'colour' and 'seeing'? Some philosophers (e.g. Driesch) would here be inclined to think that they can save the situation by using the senseless phrase "We can't know what the other has." Compare Driesch: . . . But as long as 'to have' here has any meaning at all it can't help us and when it has no meaning at all I think it can't help us either.

'We distinguish between . . . and . . . ' That means: We sometimes use the expression "I lied when I said that I saw green" as opposed to "I told the truth when I said '.'. But isn't this enough?—"But under what circumstances do you use the expression ' . . . '?" But must I necessarily stop giving you circumstances when I have given you a sample? Why not when I have given you a word, a verbal expression? Is the use of such an expression necessarily indefnite as compared with the use of a sample? Can't a sample be used, compared with objects in many different ways?

The word 'lying' is taught us in a particular way in which it was fastened to a certain behaviour, to the use of certain expressions under certain circumstances. Then we use it, saying that we have been lying, when our behaviour was not like the one which first constituted the meaning.

But in the same way we were taught the word 'red' in a game, say like No. 1, and then we use it when the conditions are different (compare the past in the description of a dream) (and of course it isn't just the word 'red' we use but the whole imagery connected with it.)

"But you talk as though there was only the expression 'I see red' but not an impression corresponding to it." On the contrary, I don't say that when a man says . . . he also has the impression.

But is all that happens that you say "I see red"? Isn't there something else being the case, happening, when you say this and it is true? But if you ask, isn't there something else happening, you don't mean just anything else, e.g. that it's raining. So after all you have to give a description of what it is you mean is happening and insofar as you give a description of it you must know what it is that happens, and it is not an X. And keeping it partly unknown does not help you either.

On the other hand, there is no reason why you should always stop with giving a sample and not with giving an expression (in this sense one can say that an expression acts as a picture).

The philosophical puzzle seems insoluble if we are frank with ourselves, and is insoluble. That is, till we change our question.

"Expressions can always be lying." How can we say this of the expressions to which we fasten our words?

"But I always know whether I'm lying or not!"—You are just now obsessed with the use of the word 'lying.' In general you talk without thinking of lying and of whether you lie or not.

But (then) I'm always either lying or not lying! (Whether I always know it or not.)

(Is there always a link between reality and our expression?)
Suppose a child learned the word 'toothache' as an equivalent for its moaning, and noticed that whenever it said the word or moaned the grown-ups treated it particularly well. The child then uses moaning or the word 'toothache' as a means to bring about the desired effect: is the child lying?

You say: "Surely I can moan with toothache and I can moan without toothache; so why shouldn't it be so with the child? Of course I only see and hear the child's behaviour but from my own experience I know what toothache is (like) //I know toothache apart from behaviour// and I am led to believe that the others sometimes have the pains I have."—The first sentence already is misleading. It isn't the question whether I can moan with or without toothache, the point is that I distinguish 'moaning with toothache' and 'moaning without toothache' and now we can't go on to say that of course in the child we make the same distinction. In fact we don't. We teach the child to use the words "I have toothache" to replace its moans, and this was how I too was taught the expression. How do I know that I've learned the word 'toothache' to mean what they wanted me to express? I ought to say I believe I have!

Now one can moan because one has pain, or, e.g., one can moan on the stage. How do I know that the child, small as it is, doesn't already act, and in this case I teach it to mean by 'toothache' something I don't intend it to mean?

I have taught the child to use the expression 'I have toothache' under certain circumstances. And now it uses the words under these circumstances.—But what are these circumstances? Shall I say "the circumstances under which it moaned," and what are these?

But now I also teach the child to moan on the stage! That is to say, I even teach it to use this expression in a different game. I also teach it to read out the sentence 'I have toothache' from a book, when it hasn't toothache. In fact I could teach it to lie, as a separate language game. (In fact we often play this kind of game with children.)

"But doesn't what you say come to this: that it doesn't matter what the persons feel as long as only they behave in a particular way?"

"Do you mean that you can define pain in terms of behaviour?"

But this is what we do if we teach the child to use the expression 'I have toothache'? Did I define: "Toothache is such and such a behaviour"? This obviously contradicts entirely the normal use of the word! "But can't you, on the other hand, at least for yourself give an ostensive definition of 'toothache'? Pointing to the place of your pain and saying 'this is . . . ?' Can't I give a name to the pain I've got? Queer idea to give one's pain a name! What's it to do with a name? Or what do I do with it? What do I do with the name of a person whom I call by the name? I mean to say, what connection is the name to have with the pain? The only connection so far is this: that you had toothache, pointed to your cheek, and pronounced the word 'moo.' "So what?" Remember what we said about private ostensive definition.

"But aren't you neglecting something—the experience or whatever you might call it—Almost the world behind the mere words?"

[297] But here solipsism teaches us a lesson: It is that thought which is on the way to destroy this error. For if the world is idea it isn't any person's idea. (Solipsism stops short of saying this and says that it is my idea.) But then how could I say what the world is if the realm of ideas has no neighbour? What I do comes to defining the word 'world.'

'I neglect that which goes without saying.'

"What is seen I see" (pointing to my body). I point at my geometrical eye, saying this. Or I point with closed eyes and touch my breast and feel it. In no case do I make a connection between what is seen and a person.

Back to 'neglecting'? It seems that I neglect life. But not life physiologically understood but life as consciousness. And consciousness not physiologically understood, or understood from the outside, but consciousness as the very essence of experience, the appearance of the world, the world.

Couldn't I say: If I had to add the world to my language it would have to be one sign for the whole of language, which sign could therefore be left out.

How am I to describe the way the child learns the word 'tooth-
ache'—like this?: The child sometimes has toothache, it moans and holds its cheek, the grown-ups say "... etc. Or: The child sometimes moans and holds its cheek, the grown-ups...? Does the first description say something superfluous or false, or does the second leave out something essential? Both descriptions are correct.

"But it seems as if you were neglecting something." But what more can I do than distinguish the case of saying 'I have toothache' when I really have toothache, and the case of saying the words without having toothache. I am also /further/ ready to talk of any x behind my words so long as it keeps its identity.

Isn't what you reproach me of as though you said: "In your language you're only speaking!"

[298] But why should I say "I have toothache in his tooth"? I would insist on his tooth being extracted. Who is supposed to cry out if it is?

What does it mean: distributing primary experience over all subjects? Imagine that they have all real toothache in their teeth. The one which you only have. I now describe certain facts. (Not metaphysical ones, but facts about the coincidence of certain experiences.)

He gets a blow and cries—I think: "no wonder for it really hurts." But wouldn't I say to myself: Queer that he cries, for I feel the pain all right—but he?!

What does it consist in, that I have pain, I feel myself crying, I hear that I am crying, my mouth cries?

It seems there is a phenomenon which in general I refer to as 'my toothache,' which, experience teaches me, is always connected with one particular person (not 'I' but) L.W. I now imagine facts other than they are and connect up this phenomenon to all sorts of persons so as to make it not at all tempting to call this phenomenon "my toothache."

Isn't it a particular phenomenon to hear myself speak (not, 'to hear L.W speak').— — —

Notes for Lectures on "Private Experience" and "Sense Data"

"I see so-and-so" does not mean "the person so-and-so, e.g., L.W., sees so-and-so."

A language game in which everybody calls out what he sees but without saying "I see..." Could anybody say that what I call out is incomplete because I have left out to mention the person?

A language game in which everybody (and I too) calls out what I see without mentioning me.

They always know what I see. If they don't seem to, I misunderstand what they say.

I am tempted to say: "It seems at least a fact of experience that at the source of the visual field there is mostly a small man with gray flannel trousers, in fact L.W."—Someone might answer this to me: It is true you almost always wear gray flannel trousers and often look at them.

[299] "But I am in a favored position. I am the center of the world." Suppose I saw myself in the mirror saying this and pointing to myself. Would it still be all right?75

When I say I play a unique role I really mean the geometrical eye.

On the other hand, if I describe the usual appearance of my body around the geometrical eye, this is on the same level as saying that in the middle of the visual field there is in general a brown table and at the edges a white wall (as I generally sit in my room).

Now suppose I described this in the form: The visual world in general is like this: (follows the description). Would this be wrong?—Why should it be wrong? But the question is, what game I intend to be played with this sentence; e.g., who is allowed to say it and in what way are those to whom it is said to react to it? I should like to say, that it's I who is to say it, not L.W, but the person at the source of the visual field. But this I seem not to be able to explain to anyone but

75. "Ich bin doch bevorzugt. Ich bin der Mittelpunkt der Welt." Denken wir uns ich sähe mich in einem Spiegel das sagen und auf mich zeigen! Wäre es noch richtig?
me /anyone/. (Queer state of affairs.) The game played might be the one which is in general played with "I see so-and-so."

Can't I say something to nobody, neither to anybody else nor to myself? What is the criterion of saying it to myself?

If I see a fire he runs to extinguish it.

At intervals I paint what I see. But can't someone else paint it for me? Or the picture be presented to me somehow, already finished?

What if I see before me a picture of the room as I am seeing the room? Is this a language game?

I want to say: "the visual world is like this..."—but why say anything?

But the point is that I don't establish a relation between a person and what is seen. All I do is that alternately I point in front of me and to myself.

Solipsism. /The conception of solipsism/ does not stretch to games. The other can play chess as well as I. I.e., when we play a language game we are on the same level.

"I am in the lucky position of being in the source of the visual world /field/. It is I who see it!" I have a comfortable feeling while saying this although the statement isn't one of the class of statements which in general give me this kind of feeling. I said it as though I had said "I have more money than anyone else in this place".

But what I now see, this view of my room, plays a unique rôle, it is the visual world!

[300] (The solipsist flutters and flutters in the flyglass, strikes against the walls, flutters further. How can he be brought to rest?)

76. Der Solipsismus. /Die Auffassung des Solipsismus/ erstreckt sich nicht auf Spiele. Der Andere kann Schach spielen so gut wie ich.

77. (Der Solipsist flattert und flattert in der Fliegenglocke, stößt sich an die Wänden, flattert weiter. Wie ist er zur Ruhe zu bringen?)

Notes for Lectures on "Private Experience" and "Sense Data"

"Description: this is what I now see". Leave out the "see" leave out the "now" and leave out the "I".

"(Description): this is the visual world". But why do you say visual and why do you say that it's the world?

"A red patch is (now) at the centre." All others must say "I see...". But is this distinction necessary, as I know anyhow who's saying it, whether I or one of the others?

But the real question for me here is: How am I defined? Who is it that is favoured? I. But may I lift up my hand to indicate who it is?—Supposing I constantly change and my surrounding does: is there still some continuity, namely, by it being me and my surrounding that change?!

(Isn't this similar to thinking that when things in space have changed entirely there's still one thing that remains the same, namely space.) (Space confused with room.)

But is my hand favoured as compared to someone else's hand I see? This is ridiculous. Then either nobody is favoured or I am, that is, the person L.W. whose hand lifted.

All right,—then I, L.W., see what's seen!

Where is my toothache? I.e. how is its place determined?

"What I now see justifies me in saying that I see red". And what do you now see? The answer may be "this" but by this answer I don't tell myself what it is I see. I don't see what I see more definitely if at the same time I see my finger pointing to it. (The question ought to have been: what are you now looking at?) I don't tell myself what it is I see by seeing my finger pointing to something.

Suppose I said "What I now see justifies me in saying 'I see red' because it is the same colour as this sample", this is a justification.

78. The original draft includes the words 'leave out the "this"' but they have been crossed out.
only if I use the expression 'the same colour' in a fixed way. That is, when we judge how this word is used on the ordinary grounds of behaviour etc.

Is the criterion for my playing a private game of chess my being however strongly inclined to say that I am playing one?

How does one tell whether I am strongly inclined?

What would I say if I, in my private judgements, came into contradiction with all other people? I.e., if I could no longer play a language game with them. Or if all the facts around me became extraordinary? Would I stick to my judgements?

Suppose someone asked me, “What does it mean to play a private game of chess with oneself?” and I answered: “Anything, because if I said I was playing a game of chess I would be so sure that I was that I would stick to what I said, whatever anyone else might say.”

Suppose someone painted pictures of the landscape which surrounds him. He sometimes paints the leaves of trees orange, sometimes blue, sometimes the clear sky red, etc. Under what circumstances would we agree with him that he was portraying the landscape?

Under what circumstances would we say that he did what we call portraying, and under what circumstances that he called something portraying which we didn’t call that? Suppose here we said: “Well I can never know what he does inwardly”—would this be anything more than resignation?

We call something a calculation if, for instance, it leads to a house being built.

We call something a language game if it plays a particular rôle in our human life.

“But can’t he play a game with the colour names, against whatever anybody else says?” But why should we call it a game with the colour names? [301] “But if I played it I would stick to saying that I was playing a game with the colour names.” But is that all I can say about it; is all that I can say for its being this kind of game that I stick to calling it so?

Under what circumstances do I say I am entitled to say that I’m seeing red? The answer is showing a sample, i.e., giving the rule. But if now I came into constant contradiction with what anybody else said, should I not say that I am applying the rule in a way which prevents me from playing the game? That is: is all that is necessary that the rule I give should be the rule they give, or isn’t besides this an agreement in the application necessary?

If “having the same pain” means the same as “saying that one has the same pain,” then “I have the same pain” means the same as “I say that I have the same pain” and the exclamation “Oh!” means “I say ‘Oh!’”

Roughly speaking: The expression ‘I have [toothache]’ stands for a moan but it does not mean ‘I moan.’

But if ‘I have [toothache]’ stands for a moan, what does ‘he has [toothache]’ stand for? One might say: it, too, stands for a moan, that of compassion.

“Toothache], seeing, etc. I only know from myself and not from the other.”

“I never know that he has [toothache], I only know when I have it.”

“I can only believe that he has it, that he has what I have.”

“Has [toothache] then a different meaning in my case and in his?”

“Isn’t it possible that everybody should have [toothache] but without expressing it?”

“If it is possible that sometimes one can have ‘[toothache]’ without expressing it, it is possible that always this should be so.”

“If my personal experience is all I know, how can I even assume that there is any other besides?”

“Does ‘[toothache]’ in the other mean behaviour?”

“I only know what I mean by ‘[toothache].’”

“I was taught the word ‘[toothache]’ in connection with my behaviour but interpreted it to mean my pain.”

“Only my [toothache] is real [toothache].”

“What justifies me in saying that the other has [toothache] is his behaviour, what justifies me in saying that I have is the experience of [toothache].”
“Is there only the expression of [toothache] and not the [toothache]?"

“I know what it means to say that the other has ‘[toothache]’ even if I have no means to find out whether he has.”

“Only he knows whether he has [toothache], we can never know”.

“Does the I enter into the personal experience or not?”

If I say we must assume an expression which can’t lie, this can’t be explained by saying that pain really corresponds to this expression.

We aren’t lying, we are speaking the truth, if a fact corresponds to the sentence. This is no explanation at all but a mere repetition unless we can supplement it by ‘namely this’ → and a demonstration; and then the whole explanation lies just in this demonstration. The whole problem here only arose through the fact that in this case the demonstration of ‘I see red,’ ‘I have [toothache],’ seems indirect.

[302] “But aren’t you saying, that all that happens is the moaning, and that there is nothing behind it?”—I am saying that there is nothing behind the moaning.

“But you deny that the moaning is the expression of something?”

No, that is, I too should call moaning an expression (or even an expression of something, though this is misleading). But the word ‘expression’ here only characterises the lang[uage] game played with it. I react differently . . .

“So you don’t really have pain, you just moan!”—There seems to be a description of my behaviour; and also, in the same sense, a description of my experience, my pain! The one, so to speak, the description of an external, the other of an internal fact. This corresponds to the idea that in the sense in which I can give a part of my body a name, I can give a name to a private experience (only indirectly).

And I am drawing your attention to this: that the lang[uage] games are very much more different than you think /it appears/.

You couldn’t call moaning a description! But this shows you how far the proposition ‘I have [toothache]’ is from a ‘description,’ and how far teaching the use of the word ‘[toothache]’ is from teaching the word ‘tooth.’

One could from the beginning teach the child the expression “I think he has toothache” instead of “he has [toothache],” with the corresponding uncertain tone of voice. This mode of expression could be described by saying that we can only believe that the other has [toothache].

But why not in the child’s own case? Because there the tone of voice is simply determined by nature.

In “I have [toothache]” the expression of pain is brought to the same form as a description “I have a matchbox/5 shillings/.”

We teach the child to say “I have been lying” when it has behaved in a certain way. (Imagine here a typical case of a lie.) Also this expression goes along with a particular situation, facial expressions, say of shame, tones of reproach, etc.

- “But doesn’t the child know that it is lying before ever I teach him the word /verbal expression/?” Is this meant to be a metaphysical question or a question about facts? It doesn’t know it in words. And why should it know it at all?—“But do you assume that it has only the facial expression of shame, e.g., without the feeling of shame? Mustn’t you describe the inside situation as well as the outside one?”—But what if I said that by facial exp[ression] of shame I meant what you mean by ‘the facial exp[ression] + the feeling,’ unless I explicitly distinguish between genuine and simulated fac[ial] expressions? It is, I think, misleading to describe the genuine expression as a sum of the expression and something else, though it is just as misleading—we get the function of our expressions wrong—if we say that the genuine expression is a particular behaviour and nothing besides.

We teach the child the use of the word “to speak.”—Later it uses the expression “I spoke to myself.”—We then say “We never know whether and what a person speaks to himself.”

Surely the desc[ription] of the facial exp[ression] can be meant (used) /is used/ as a description of feelings and can be meant /used/ otherwise. We constantly use such expressions as “when he heard that, he pulled a long face” and don’t add that the expression was genuine. In other cases we describe the acting79 of a person in the same words, or again we wish to leave it open whether the expression

79. On the stage.
Ludwig Wittgenstein

was genuine or not. To say that we describe the feeling indirectly by the description of expressions is wrong!

Imagine a language in which toothache is called “moaning” and the difference between just moaning and moaning with pain is expressed by the moaning or dry tone in which the word is pronounced. People would not say in this language that it became clear later on that A didn't really have pain, but they would perhaps in an angry tone say that at first he moaned and then he suddenly laughed.

Suppose he says to himself “I lie,” what is to show that he means it? But we would any day describe this lying by saying: “He said..., and told himself at the same time that he was lying.” Is this too an indirect description of lying?

But couldn't one say that if I speak of a man’s angry voice, meaning that he was angry, and again of his angry voice, not meaning that he was angry, in the first case the meaning of the description of his voice was much further reaching than in the second case? I will admit that our description in the first case doesn’t omit anything and is as complete as though we had said that he really was angry—but somehow the meaning of the expression then reaches below the surface.

But how does it do that? The answer to this would be an explanation of the two uses of the expression. But how could this explanation reach under the surface? It is an explanation about symbols and it states in which cases these symbols are used. But how does it characterize these cases? Can it in the end do more than distinguish two expressions? i.e., describe a game with two expressions?

"Then is there nothing under the surface?" But I said that I was going to distinguish two expressions, one for the ‘surface’ and one for what is below the surface—only remember that these expressions themselves correspond just to a picture, not to its usage. It is just as misleading to say that there is just surface and nothing underneath it, as that there is something below the surface and that there isn’t just the surface. Because once we make use of the picture of the ‘surface’ it is most natural to express with it the distinction as on and below the surface. //Because we naturally use this picture to express the distinction between ‘on the surface’ and ‘below the surface.’// But we misapply the picture if we ask whether both cases are or aren’t on the surface.

Notes for Lectures on “Private Experience” and “Sense Data”

Now in order that with its normal meaning we should teach a child the expression “I have lied” the child must behave in the normal way. E.g., it must under certain circumstances ‘admit’ that it lied, it must do so with a certain facial expression etc., etc., etc. We may not always find out whether he lied or not, but if we never found out, the word would have a different meaning. “But once he has learned the word he can't be in doubt whether he is lying or not!”—Consider the case of the person who finds that his subjective lies are, judged by the ordinary criteria, truths. He says that he has been to school feeling that it's a lie but the teacher and the boys confirm that he has been etc. etc. You might say: “But surely he can't doubt that he said a subjective lie”.

This of course is like saying that he can't be in doubt about whether he has toothache or whether he sees red, etc. On the one hand: doubting whether I have the experience is not like doubting whether someone else has it. Remember what we said about the asymmetry of the game No. 1. On the other hand: one can't say “surely I must know what it is I see” unless ‘to know what I see’ is to mean ‘to see whatever I see.’ The question is what we are to call “knowing what it is I see,” “not being in doubt about what I see.” Under what circumstances are we to say that a person is in no doubt (or is in doubt) about this? (Such cases as being in no doubt about whether this looks red to the normal eye, and analogous ones, of course don't interest us here.) I suppose that the knowledge of what it is I see must be the knowledge that it is so-and-so I see; 'so-and-so' standing for some expressions, verbal or otherwise. (But remember that I don't give myself information by pointing to something I see with my finger and saying to myself I see this.) 'So-and-so' in fact stands for a word of a language game. And doubting what it is I see is doubting, e.g., what to call what I see. Doubting, e.g., whether to say 'I see red' or 'I see green.' "But this is a simple doubt about the appellation of a colour, and it can be settled by asking someone what this colour (pointing) is called.” But are all such doubts removable by this question (or which comes to the same, by giving a definition: “I shall call this colour so-and-so”)?

"What colour do you see?"—"I don't know, is it red or isn't it red; I don't know what colour it is I see."—"What do you mean? Is the colour constantly changing, or do you see it very faintly, practically black?" Could I say here: “don't you see what you see?”? This obviously would make no sense.
Colour: black and white /red and blue/ chequered.

“What colour do you call: a, e, i, o, or u?”—“I don’t know what colour I see?”

“Primary colours are those used in flags.”

It is queer that one never uses brown on a flag and says it is a blend of yellow, black, and red although nobody can really produce a proper brown by mixing these colours.

Is there a reason for not admitting brown as a primary colour?

Is it not enough that we refuse to group it with red, blue, green, etc?

One sometimes thinks the reason is that we see transitions from brown to pure yellow, red, black; but we do in the case of red etc.

Imagine all objects around us were iridescent, I mean of the appearance of a white paper on which the sun is shining, you would see the surface covered with tiny specks of red, blue, green, yellow.

Shall we say that a pointillist sees the objects as he paints them?

It seems as though, however the outward circumstances change, once the word is fastened to a particular personal experience it now retains its meaning; and that therefore I can now use it with sense whatever may happen.

To say that I can’t doubt whether I see red is in a sense absurd, as the game I play with the expression ‘I see red’ doesn’t contain a doubt of this form.

It seems, whatever the circumstances I always know now whether to apply the word or not. It seems, at first it was a move in a special game but then it becomes independent of this game.

(This reminds one of the way the idea of length seems to become emancipated from any particular method of measuring it.)

80. Wittgenstein marked this paragraph and the preceding three as unsatisfactory and wrote “vague” in the margin.

[306] We are tempted to say: “damn it all, a rod has a particular length however I express it.” And one could go on to say that if I see a rod I always see (know) how long it is, although I can’t say how many feet, meters, etc.—But suppose I just say: I always know whether it looks tiny or big!

But can’t the old game lose its point when the circumstances change, so that the expression ceases to have a meaning, although of course I can still pronounce it.

He sticks to saying that he has been lying although none of the usual consequences follow. What is there left of the language game, except that he says the expression?

We learn the word ‘red’ under particular circumstances. Certain objects are usually red, and keep their colours; most people agree with us in our colour judgments. Suppose all this changes: I see blood, unaccountably sometimes one sometimes another colour, and the people around me all make different statements. But couldn’t I in all this chaos retain my meaning of ‘red,’ ‘blue,’ etc., although I couldn’t now make myself understood to anyone? Samples, e.g., would all constantly change their colour—or does it only seem so to me?

“Now am I mad or have I really called this ‘red’ yesterday?”

The situations in which we are inclined to say “I must have gone mad!”

“But we could always call a colour-impression ‘red’ and stick to this appellation!”

The atmosphere surrounding this problem is terrible. Dense mists of language are situated around the problematic point. It is almost impossible to get through to it.

If I can speak about 'what is seen', why shouldn't anyone else speak about it? —But I have a feeling that only I can; and if I assume that others also speak about what normally I should call my visual image there seems to me to be something wrong with this assumption.

If 'what I see' has nothing to do with a particular person, why should I feel that there's something wrong in assuming that anybody might talk about it? i.e. mean it when he speaks? Then of course I can't tell them what I see nor they me what they see, any more than I can tell myself what I see.

But they could make conjectures as to what might happen in future, in our visual field.

In the normal game I say: “I don't know what they see, they've got to say what they see”,—but in the game I'm considering they could as much know what I see as my hand can write down what my mouth can say.

And their different conjectures would be like conjectures made by myself at different times.

Can my mouth tell my hand what I see in order that my hand should be able to write it down?

Do I by painting what I see tell myself what I see?

“This picture is unique, for it represents what is really seen.” What justification do I have to say this? //What is my justification for saying this?//

[307] I see two spots on this wall and lift two fingers. Do I tell myself that I see two spots? But on the other hand couldn't this be the sign for my seeing two spots?!

Is it a special picture or do I give it special attention?82

“Today he points to me; and yesterday he pointed to me also.”

The meaning of: “He points at me.”

“I see that he points at A.”

“I see that he points at me.”

82. Ist das Bild ausgezeichnet, oder zeichne ich es aus?
expression for this in ordinary language? Wouldn't it be my saying that I have no toothache there?

"But who says this?"—"I!" And who says this?—"I!"

Suppose I give this rule: "Whenever I said 'I have [toothache]' I shall from now on say 'there is [toothache].'

I tell the waiter: Bring me always clear soup, and thick soup to all the others. He tries to remember my face.

Suppose I change my face (body) every day entirely, how is he to know which is me? But it's a question of the existence of the game. "If all chessmen were alike, how should one know which is the king?"

Now it seems that, although he couldn't know which is me, I still would know it.

Suppose now I said: "it wasn't so-and-so, it was I who asked for clear soup"—couldn't I be wrong? Certainly. I.e., I may think that I asked him, but didn't. Now are there two mistakes I can make: one, thinking that I asked him, the other, thinking that I asked him? I say: "I remember having asked you yesterday," he replies: "You weren't there at all yesterday." Now I could say either: "well then I suppose I remember wrongly," or: "I was here only I looked like him yesterday."

It seems that I can trace my identity, quite independent of the identity of my body. And the idea is suggested that I trace the identity of something dwelling in a body, the identity of my mind.

"If anybody asks me to describe what I see, I describe what's seen."

What we call a description of my sense datum, of what's seen, independent of what is the case in the physical world, is still a description for the other person.

If I speak of a description of my sense datum, I don't mean to give a particular person as its possessor. (No more do I want to speak about a particular person when I moan with pain.)

It must be a serious and deep-seated disease of language (one might also say 'of thought') which makes me say: "Of course this [toothache] is what's really seen."

I can tell you the fact p because I know that p is the case. It has sense to say "it rained and I knew it," but not "I had toothache and knew that I had." "I know that I have toothache" means nothing, or the same as "I have toothache."

This, however, is a remark about the use of the word "I," whoever uses it.

(q) p ⊃ ~ q
(y) f(a) ⊃ ~ f(y)

Examine the sentence: "There is something there," referring to the visual sensation I'm now having.

Aren't we inclined to think that this is a statement making sense and being true? And on the other hand, isn't it a pseudo-statement?

But what (what entity) do you mean (refer to) when you say that sentence?— Aren't we here up against the old difficulty, that it seems to us that meaning something was a special state or activity of mind? For it is true that in saying these words I am in a special state of mind, I stare at something,—but this just doesn't constitute meaning.

Compare with this such a statement as: "Of course I know what I am referring to by the word 'toothache.'"

Think of the frame of mind in which you say to yourself that p. ~p does make sense and by repeating a statement of this form you are, as it were by introspection, trying to find out what it means.
The phenomenon of staring is closely bound up with the whole puzzle of solipsism.

"If I am asked 'what do you see?' I describe the visual world."—Couldn't I say instead of this "... I am describing what is there \( \mathcal{R} \)" (pointing before me)?

But now consider the case of someone having a picture before him of the part of his room he is seeing, and he says: "This in the picture is like this (a part of his visual field as he is looking at his room)."

Thus one can, for example, compare parts of the afterimage with parts of that which is seen with open eyes.\(^{86}\)

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c}
\hline
\text{afterimage} & \text{open eyes} & \text{afterimage} \\
\hline
\includegraphics[width=0.2\textwidth]{afterimage} & \includegraphics[width=0.2\textwidth]{open_eyes} & \includegraphics[width=0.2\textwidth]{afterimage} \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

It would be a genuine mathematical problem: 'Construct the 2-gon.' And a mathematician might solve the problem i.e. devise a construction which on such and such grounds we could hardly help calling 'construction of the 2-gon.'

We may or we may not feel a discomfort about it.\(^{87}\)

Supposing I said "there is something there"; and being asked, "What do you mean?" I painted a picture of what I see. Would this justify saying that statement?—Wouldn't this picture have to be understood 'in a system'? And mustn't I understand it as an expression within a system?

"But then, how are we to account for the angle \( \alpha \)? Are we to say that \( R + \alpha = R' \) ?"

86. So kann man z.B. Teile des Nachbildes mit Teilen des mit offenen Augen Geschenen vergleichen.
87. There is an arrow from this sentence, pointing to the circle with a square inside it.

A geometry in which two straight lines which form an angle start out by running together for a while; to be compared with a device in which a body on which no force is acting moves with slowly decreasing velocity.\(^{89}\)

"Obviously this \( \mathcal{R} \) is what's seen!"

If one says to the solipsist John Smith "So you say that of all people only John Smith really sees?" he doesn't really recognise this to be his view. He didn't mean that if you regard him as one person out of many he had any special privilege.—He would be inclined to say: "Not John Smith has any particular privilege (it would be ridiculous to say this), but I have, as seen by myself."

Couldn't one assume that all those persons had a right to talk about what's seen who were being seen. I.e. all those who were [in] a picture could talk about the picture.

"But I can persuade myself that nobody else has pains even if they say they have, but not that I haven't."

It makes no sense to say "I persuade myself that I have no pain," whoever says this. I don't say anything about myself when I say that I can't persuade myself that I haven't pain, etc.

88. In the margin: "sehr wichtig, wenn auch schlecht gesagt." (Very important, although badly expressed).
89. Geometrie, in welcher zwei Geraden, die einen Winkel bilden, erst ein Stück mit einander laufen; zu vergleichen einer [Klebenbank], in der ein Körper, auf den keine Kräfte wirken, sich mit langsamer abnehmender Geschwindigkeit bewegt.
“Can’t I use the word ‘to see’ in such a way that I call only this → ‘seen’?” But how do I act according to this decision? Do I e.g., admit that someone else besides me can see it, or do I say that only I can see it?

Suppose everybody talked only about what we should now describe as “what’s seen by me, LW”. But they all know what I see; they don’t ask me. And if anybody describes it wrongly we say that he doesn’t speak properly, expresses himself wrongly. There is no such thing as deceiving someone about what I see.—Can’t I even then imagine a temptation to say “I can only know what I see, not what the others see?”

If I say “I see this” I am liable to tap my chest to show which person I am. Now suppose I had no head and pointing to my geometrical eye I would point to an empty place above my neck, wouldn’t I still feel that I pointed to the person who sees, tapping my chest? Now I might ask “how do I know in this case who sees this?” But what is this? It’s no use just pointing ahead of me, and if, instead, I point to a description and tap both my chest and the description and say ‘I see this’—it has no sense to ask “How do you know that it’s you who sees it?”, for I don’t know that it’s this person and not another one which sees before I point, but one could, in certain cases, say I know because I point.—This is [311] what I meant by saying that I don’t choose the mouth which says “I have toothache.”

The, if I may so put it, pathological character of solipsism shows itself if we try to draw the consequence that only I, NN., really see, since we immediately shrink back from this consequence. We immediately see that we didn’t want to say that at all.90

Isn’t it queer that if I look in front of me and point in front of me and say “this!” I should know what it is I mean. “I mean just these shades of colour and shapes, the appearance.”

(A scientist says that he only pursues empirical science/or a mathematician, only mathematics/and not philosophy—but he is subjected to the temptations of language like everyone else, he is in the same danger and must be on guard against it.)91

If I say “I mean the appearance,” it seems I am telling you what it is I am pointing to or looking at, e.g., the chair as opposed to the bed, etc. It is as though by the word “appearance” I had actually directed your attention to something else than, e.g., the physical objects you are looking at. And indeed there corresponds a particular stare to this ‘taking in the appearance.’ Remember here what philosophers of a certain school used to say so often: “I believe I mean something, if I say ‘...’”

It seems that the visual image which I’m having is something which I can point to and talk about; that I can say of it, it is unique. That I am pointing to the physical objects in my field of vision, but not meaning them but the appearance. This object I am talking about, if not to others then to myself. (It is almost like something painted on a screen which surrounds me.) This object is inadequately described as “that which I see,” “my visual image,” since it has nothing to do with any particular human being. Rather I should like to call it “what’s seen.” And so far it is all right, only now I’ve got to say what can be said about this object, in what sort of language game “what’s seen” is to be used. For at first sight I should feel inclined to use this expression as one uses a word designating a physical object, and only on second thought I see it appears/ that I can’t do that.—When I said that here [there] seems to be an object I can point to and talk about, it was just that I was comparing it to a physical object. For only on second thought it appears that the idea of “talking about” isn’t applicable here. (I could have compared the ‘object’ to a theatre decoration.)

Now when could I be said to speak about this object? When would I say I did speak about it?—Obviously when I describe—as we should say—my visual image. And perhaps only if I describe it, and only if I describe it to myself.

[312] But what is the point, in this case, of saying that when I

90. Der, wenn ich so sagen darf, krankhafte Charakter des Solipsismus zeigt sich, wenn wir die Konsequenz zu ziehen versuchen, daß nur ich N.N. wirklich sehe, da wir vor dieser Konsequenz sofort zurückschrecken. Wir sehen sofort, daß wir das gar nicht sagen wollten.

91. (Ein Wissenschaftler sagt, er betreibe nur empirische Wissenschaft /oder ein Mathematiker nur Mathematik/ und nicht Philosophie,—aber er ist den Versuchungen der Sprache unterworfen wie jeder, er ist in der gleichen Gefahr und muß sich vor ihr in Acht nehmen.)
describe to myself what I see, I describe a (peculiar) /an/ object called "what is seen"? Why talk of a particular object here? Isn't this due to a misunderstanding?

Imagine a game played on a kind of chessboard. You can teach the game to 64, 81, 100, etc. squares, and the situation which is losing in the 64-game is winning in the 81-game, losing in the 100-game, winning in the 121-game etc. . . .

If you are asked "What did 'meaning what he said' consist in" you will describe facts which, supplemented by certain other facts, would be characteristic of his not meaning what he said,—and so on.

"Can I imagine $10^{10^{10}} = \mu$ soldiers in a row?"
"Can I imagine an endless row of soldiers?"

Why shouldn't I say, I can imagine an endless row of soldiers? The image is something like a row the end of which I can't see and a gesture and the words "on and on for ever—" said in a particular tone of voice. And suppose I said: $\mu$ soldiers would reach from here halfway to the sun if we placed them a yard apart! Isn't this too 'imagining the row'?

It is a very remarkable and most important fact that there are numbers which all of us should call "large numbers".

There is a particular way of explaining the sense (meaning) of an expression which we may call . . .

In philosophy we often say that people wrongly imagine a certain state of affairs, e.g. "they imagine that a law of nature in some way compels things to happen" or "they imagine that it's a question of psychology how a person can know a certain fact, whereas it is one of grammar" etc. etc. But it is necessary in these cases to explain what it means "to imagine so too", what kind of image is it they are using. It often sounds as though they were able to imagine the logically impossible and it is not easy to straighten out our description of the case and to say what in this case they actually imagine.

E.g. People treat the question "how do we know that so-and-so is the case" as a question of psychology, which has nothing to do with the sense of the proposition which we say is known. But first: where do they take this idea from, how do they come by it? Which really psychological question are they thinking of?

Obviously, there is a case in which the question "How does he find this out?" is a personal and, perhaps, psychological one. "How did he find out that N was in his room?"—he saw him through the window or he was hidden under the bed.—"How did he find out that the glass was cracked?" He saw the crack with his naked eye or he saw it through the magnifying glass, etc. We say he finds out the same thing in different ways and not that what he finds depends upon how he finds it.

When do we say that he finds out the same thing in two ways? Imagine language games: Somebody is asked a question —"A?"—and trained to answer "yes" if he sees a person, A, in the next room, "no" if he doesn't. He is trained to answer the question "A?" by "yes" also if he hears A's voice from the next room. "What right have we to ask the same question in these two cases?" or "What right has he to use these two different tests to answer the same question?" Or suppose someone asked: "Now is this really one and the same question or do we have two different questions, only expressed in the same words?"

Now consider the ostensive definition: "This man is called 'A'" and ask yourself whether this definition tells us if we are to regard seeing A from a different side or in a different position or hearing his voice as criteria of his being there?—Here we are tempted to say: "But surely I just point to this man, so there can't be any doubt what object I am meaning!" But that's wrong though the doubt of course is not whether I mean this A or that A thing.

One may say that the 'object' I am inclined to say I am pointing to in the ostensive definition is not determined by the act of pointing but by the use I make of the word defined. And here one must beware of thinking that after all the pointing finger pointed to a different object in the sense in which the arrow may be said to point to A or to B, so that by a different way of pointing I might have distinguished the cases.

"But we conceive of objects, things, different from our sense data, e.g. the table as opposed to the view we get of it." But what does conceiving of this object consist in? Is it a peculiar 'mental act' occurring whenever, say, we talk about the table? Isn't it using the word 'table' in the game we do use it [in]? using it as we do use it?

We are tempted to say that the word "toothache" is the 'name of a feeling of which I don't know whether anybody except me ever has it'. But even I can be said not to know whether always mean the same by this word.
"I always thought that holding one’s cheek was having toothache; then he knocked out a tooth of mine, then I knew what ‘toothache’ meant.” Well, what does it mean?—And what was it like “to know what ‘toothache’ means”?

“Now I know what ‘pain’ means”.

A faked moan of pain isn’t necessarily a moan without something and a real moan of pain a moan with something.

But we would like to say “the surrounding circumstances are different”. But there is something incorrect in that.

You say, in this case the expression corresponds to the experience. But how does it correspond?

Imagine, you were wrong about the correspondence, then what would remain? That you said these words and that you did not cheat, but now cheating and not cheating are not ‘private experiences’? It’s no good saying “I recognise this experience as . . .” as I don’t know whether I recognise the experience of recognising rightly.

We are using the word “to cheat” in two different ways. In one way, whether I do it can be verified by the other person, in the other sense we say “only I know whether I cheat”.

“I knew all the time that I had cheated”.

Quite true, we distinguish simple acting and acting prompted by feeling, and feeling with expression. These are distinctions in our language. “But are you saying that all these distinctions are distinctions in mere behaviour?”—

Can one by multiplying 2 with itself obtain 12?

“Mere behaviour.” “There is only behaviour” would seem to say that there was no life, that we (or I) acted as automatons, as unconscious machines.

I wish to say: “The difference between me and a machine doesn’t just consist in the difference of our actions but in this, that I am conscious and the machine isn’t”.

But oughtn’t I say that this only distinguishes a machine from me, not from a human being? For why shouldn’t I say that the difference between a human being, animal, sewing machine, etc., lies in their actions, if I except myself. But then I don’t even except my body.

“I know consciousness only from myself, I don’t know whether anybody else has consciousness, but it makes sense to assume it, and I do make the assumption in a class of cases.”

What worries me is the idea of ‘behaviour + experience.’—We might think that it was possible to talk of behaviour without there being experience. ‘Could I talk about moaning if there was no such thing as hearing the moaning?’ Or: Isn’t talking of behaviour talking of experience and therefore what we call “talking of private experience” a special case of “talking about ‘behaviour’”?

One might put it by saying: “Experience is at the bottom of everything we say about phenomena; so if we call anything in particular talking about direct experience it must be just a special case of talking about phenomena in the ordinary way.”

If we say “toothache is nothing but behaviour” we seem to say that it is not so-and-so, we seem to wish to exclude something. But that’s obviously what we mustn’t do.

Our job is obviously not to reduce anything to anything, but only to avoid certain misleading ways of expression.

“ Toothache is not a behaviour but an experience”. “We distinguish between ‘behaviour’ and ‘experiences’”. Dancing is a behaviour, toothache an experience.” These are grammatical statements. About the use of the words “dancing” and “toothache”.

(“This form of words seems to mean something but means nothing.” That is: We connect a certain image with this expression or we are inclined to use it because it sounds analogous to other expressions and we connect a certain attitude, state of mind etc. with it; but

if we then ask ourselves how we are going to use it we find that we
have no use for it or a use of a totally different kind from that which
we at first vaguely imagined (expected).

First of all it seems that we are partial for 'behaviour,' that we wish
to explain everything in terms of it. Now why should we be biased in
this way? Is it because of some kind of materialism? What axe have we
to grind?

There is an ordinary (and unproblematic) way of using such a word
as "toothache," but we are inclined on philosophizing about it to give
it a different use, finding out, however, that we can then do away with
it entirely, because that proposed use as a matter of fact makes it into
a useless symbol.

"We use the expression 'x has toothache' when we perceive a cer-
tain behaviour in others, or, on the other hand, when we ourselves
have toothache." What does it mean: "I say 'I have toothache' when I
feel toothache"? What does this explain? It could, of course, be an
explanation in several ways: I say to someone: "Now, if I have stomach
ache I'll always say 'I have toothache' in order to make Smith believe
so-and-so," "I won't lie again, I will only say 'I have [toothache]' when
I really have it," or I say "I say 'I have [toothache],' when I feel a pain
here (pointing)

I wish to say that we can't adduce the 'private experience' as a
justification for expressing it.

We can't say "he is justified in moaning because he has pains" if we
call pain the justification for moaning.—We can't say "he is justified
in expressing pain, because he has pain" unless we wish to distinguish
this case of 'being justified in expressing pain from another way of
justification, e.g., that he is on the stage and has to act [as] a sick man.

If I am tempted to say "my justification for moaning is having
pain," it seems I point—at least for myself—to something to which I
give expression by moaning.

The idea is here that there is an 'expression' for everything, that we
know what it means 'to express something,' 'to describe something.'
We labour under the queer temptation to describe our language and its use, introducing into our descriptions an element of which we ourselves say that it is not part of the language. It is a peculiar phenomenon of iridescence which seems to fool us.

"But can't you imagine people behaving just as we do, showing pain etc., etc., and then if you imagine that they don't feel pain all their behaviour is, as it were, dead. You can imagine all this behaviour with or without pain." -

The pain seems to be the atmosphere in which the expression exists. (The pain seems to be a circumstance.)

Suppose we say that the image I use in the one case is different from that which I use in the other. But I can't point to the two images. So what does it come to, to say this, except just to saying it, using this expression.

We are, as I have said, tempted to describe our language by saying that we use certain elements, images, which however in the last moment we again withdraw.

Isn't the expression in its use an image, why do I refer back to an image which I can't show?

[314] "But don't you talk as though (the) pain wasn't something terribly real?" - Am I to understand this as a proposition about pain? I suppose it is a proposition about the use of the word 'pain,' and it is one more utterance, and essential part of the surrounding in which we use the word 'pain.'

Feeling justified in having expressed pain. I may concentrate on the memory of pain.

Now what's the difference between using my expressions as I do but yet not using "toothache" to mean real pain, and the proper use of the word? -

The private experience is to serve as a paradigm, and at the same time admittedly it can't be a paradigm.

Notes for Lectures on "Private Experience" and "Sense Data"

The 'private experience' is a degenerate construction of our grammar (comparable in a sense to tautology and contradiction). And this grammatical monster now fools us; when we wish to do away with it, it seems as though we denied the existence of an experience, say, toothache.

What would it mean to deny the existence of pain?!

"But when we say we have toothache we don't just talk of expressing toothache in this or that way!" - Certainly not, - we express toothache! "But you admit that the same behaviour may be the expression of pain or may not be that." - If you imagine a man cheating — cheating is done secretly but this secrecy is not that of the 'private experience.' Why shouldn't it be considered wrong in him to use language in this way?

We say "only he knows whether he says the truth or lies." "Only you can know if what you say is true."

Now compare secrecy with the 'privateness' of personal experience! In what sense is a thought of mine secret? If I think aloud it can be heard. — "I have said this to myself a thousand times but not to anyone else."

"Only you can know what colour you see." But if it is true that only you can know, you can't even impart this knowledge nor can you express it.

[315] Why shouldn't we say that I know better than you what colour you see if you say the wrong word and I can make you agree to my word, or if you point to the wrong sample, etc.?

"I didn't know that I was lying." — "You must have known!"

Examine: "If you don't know that you're having toothache, you don't have toothache."

"I don't just say 'I've got toothache,' but toothache makes me say this." (I deliberately didn't write 'the feeling of toothache,' or 'a certain feeling.')

This sentence distinguishes between, say, saying it as an example of
a sentence, or on the stage, etc., and saying it as an assertion. But it is no explanation of the expression “I have toothache,” of the use of the word “toothache.”

“I know what the word ‘toothache’ means, it makes me concentrate my attention on one particular thing.” But on what? You’re now inclined to give criteria of behaviour. Ask yourself: “what does the word ‘feeling,’ or still better ‘experience,’ make you concentrate on?” What is it like to concentrate on experience? If I try to do this I, e.g., open my eyes particularly wide and stare.

“I know what the word ‘toothache’ means, it produces one particular image in my mind.” But what image? “That can’t be explained.”—But if it can’t be explained what was the meaning of saying that it produced one particular image? You could say the same about the words “image in your mind.” And all that it comes to is that you are using certain words without an explanation. “But can’t I explain them to myself? or understand them myself without giving an explanation? Can’t I give a private explanation?” But is this anything you can call an explanation? Is staring a private explanation?

But how does this queer delusion come about?!

Here is language,—and now I try to embody something in language as an explanation, which is no explanation.

We decide to say that the triangle $\Delta$ has half the area of the rectangle $\Box$

Can’t you imagine that the question ‘how big is the area of the triangle $\Delta$?’ should make no sense to you at all as you only talked of areas of rectangles. One might be inclined to say, that the triangle had not really one particular area; perhaps that there was a series of areas which could be said to approach filling the triangle.

[316] Privacy of sense data. I must bore you by a repetition of what I said last time. We said that one reason for introducing the idea of the sense datum was that people, as we say, sometimes see different things, colours, e.g., looking at the same object. Cases in which we say “he sees dark red whereas I see light red.” We then are inclined to talk about an object other than the physical object which the person sees who is said to see the physical object. It is further clear that we only gather from the other person’s behaviour (e.g., what he tells us) what that object looks like, and so it lies near to say that he has this object before his mind’s eye and that we don’t see it. Though we can also say that we might have it before our mind’s eye as well, without however knowing that he has it before his mind’s eye. The ‘sense datum’ here—the way the physical object appears to him. In other cases no physical object enters.

Now I must draw your attention to one particular difficulty about the use of the ‘sense datum.’ We said that there were cases in which we should say that the person sees green what I see red. Now the question suggests itself: if this can be so at all, why should it [not] be always the case? It seems, if once we have admitted that it can happen under peculiar circumstances, that it may always happen. But then it is clear that the very idea of seeing red loses its use if we can never know if the other does not see something utterly different. So what are we to do: Are we to say that this can only happen in a limited number of cases? This is a very serious situation.—We introduced the expression that $A$ sees something else than $B$ and we mustn’t forget that this had only use under the circumstances under which we introduced it. Consider the proposition: “Of course we never know whether new circumstances wouldn’t show that after all he saw what we see.” Remember that this whole notion need not have been introduced. “But can’t I imagine all blind men to see as well as I do and only behaving differently; and on the other hand imagine them really blind? For if I can imagine these possibilities, then the question, even if never answerable makes sense.” Imagine a man, say $W$, now blind, now seeing, and observe what you do? How do these images give sense to the question? They don’t, and you see that the expression stands and falls with its usefulness.

The idea that the other person sees something else than I, [317] is only introduced to account for certain expressions: whereas it seems that this idea can exist without any reference to expressions. “Surely what I have he too can have.”
“And remember that we admit that the other may have pain without showing it! So if this is conceivable, why not that he never shows that he has pain; and why not that everybody has pain constantly without showing it; or that even things have pain?” What strikes us is that there seem to be a few useful applications of the idea of the other person’s having pain without showing it, and a vast number of useless applications, applications which look as though they were no applications at all. And these latter applications seem to have their justification in this, that we can imagine the other person to have what we have and in this way the proposition that he has toothache seems to make sense apart from any expression at all. “Surely,” we say, “I can imagine him to have pain or to see, etc.” Or, “As I can see myself, so I can imagine him to do the same.” In other words I can imagine him to play the same role in the act of seeing which I play. But does saying this determine what I mean by “he sees”?

We arrive at the conclusion that imagining him to have pain (etc.) does not fix the sense of the sentence “he has pain.”

“He may all along mean something different by ‘green’ than I mean.” Evidence (verification). But there is this consideration: “Surely I mean something particular, a particular impression, and therefore he may have another impression; surely I know what that would be like!” “Surely I know what it is like to have the impression I call ‘green’!” But what is it like? You are inclined to look at a green object and to say “it’s like this!” And these words, though they don’t explain anything to anybody else, seem to be at any rate an explanation you give yourself. But are they?! Will this explanation justify your future use of the word ‘green’? In fact seeing green doesn’t allow you to make the substitutions of someone else for you and of red for green.

“The sense datum is private” is a rule of grammar, it forbids use of such expressions as “they saw the same sense datum”; it may (or may not) allow such sentences as “he guessed that the other had a sense datum of this... kind.” It may only allow expressions of the form: “The other looked round, [318] had a sense datum and said... .” You see that this word in such a case has no use at all. But if you like to use it, do—

“But surely I distinguish between having toothache and expressing it, and merely expressing it; and I distinguish between these two in myself.” Surely this is not merely a matter of using different expressions, but there are two distinct experiences!” “You talk as though the case of having pain and that of not having pain were only distinguished by the way in which I expressed myself!”

But do we always distinguish between ‘mere behaviour’ and ‘experience + behaviour’? If we see someone falling into flames and crying out, do we say to ourselves: “there are of course two cases:... .”? Or if I see you here before me do I distinguish? Do you? You can’t! That we do in certain cases, doesn’t show that we do in all cases. This to some of you must sound silly and superficial; but it isn’t. When you see me do you see one thing and conjecture another? (Don’t talk of conjecturing subconsciously!) But supposing you expressed yourself in the form of such a supposition, wouldn’t this come to adopting a façon de parler?

Can we say that ‘saying that I lie is justified by a particular experience of lying’? Shall we say ‘... by a particular private experience’ or ‘... by a particular private experience’ of lying? or ‘by a particular private experience’ characterized in such and such ways?

“But what, in your opinion, is the difference between the mere expression and the expression + the experience?”

“Do you know what it means that W. behaves as he does but sees nothing; and on the other hand that he sees?”

If you ask yourself this and answer ‘yes’ you conjure up some sort of image. This image is, it seems, derived from the fact of your seeing or not seeing (if you close your eyes), and by this derivation, it seems, it must be the picture we interpret to correspond to our sentence “he sees,” “he doesn’t see.”—As when I substitute for my body, his body, and for holding a match, holding a pen.—But substituting his body for my body might mean that my body has changed so as to be now like his, and perhaps vice [319] versa. It seems a direct and simple thing to understand “thinking that he has what I have,” but it isn’t at all. The case is simple only if we speak, e.g., of physiological processes. “I know only indirectly what he sees, but directly what I see” embodies an absolutely misleading picture. I can’t be said to know that I have toothache if I can’t be said not to know that I have toothache. I can’t be said to know indirectly what the other has if I can’t be said to know it directly. The misleading picture is this: I see my own matchbox but I know only from hearsay what his looks like. We can’t say: “I say he has toothache” because I observe his behaviour, but I say that I have because I feel it.” (This might lead one to say that ‘toothache’ has two meanings, one for me and one for the other being.)
"I say 'I have toothache' because I feel it" contrasts this case with, say, the case of acting on the stage, but can't explain what 'having toothache' means because having toothache = feeling toothache, and the explanation would come to: "I say I have it because I have it" = I say I have it because it is true = I say I have it because I don't lie. One wishes to say: In order to be able to say that I have toothache I don't observe my behaviour, say in the mirror. And this is correct, but it doesn't follow that you describe an observation of any other kind. Moaning is not the description of an observation. That is, you can't be said to derive your expression from what you observe. Just as you can't be said to derive the word 'green' from your visual impression but only from a sample.—Now against this one is inclined to say: "Surely if I call a colour green I don't just say that word, but the word comes in a particular way," or "if I say 'I have toothache' I don't just use this phrase but it must come in a particular way!" Now this means nothing, for, if you like, it always comes in a particular way. "But surely seeing and saying something can't be all!" Here we make the confusion that there is still an object we haven't mentioned. You imagine that there is a pure seeing and saying, and one + something else. Therefore you imagine all distinctions to be made as between a, a + b, a + c, etc. The idea of this addition is mostly derived from consideration of our bodily organs. All that ought to interest you is whether I make all the distinctions that you make: whether, e.g., I don't distinguish between cheating and telling the truth. — "There is something else!" — "There is nothing else!" — "But what else is there?" — "Well, this!" "But surely I know that I am not a mere automaton!" — What would it be like if I were? — "How is it that I can't imagine myself not seeing, /experiencing/ hearing etc.?" — We constantly confuse and change about the commonsense use and the metaphysical use.

"I know that I see." — "I see." — you seem to read this off some fact; as though you said: "There is a chair in this corner."

"But if in an experiment, e.g., I say 'I see,' why do I say so? surely because I see!"

It is as though our expressions of personal experience needn't even spring from regularly recurrent inner experiences but just from something.

Confusion of description and samples.

The idea of the 'realm of consciousness.'
had been overlooked in the previous edition prepared by her. The distinction is preserved and discussed here.

Chapter 7

A number of improvements were possible in light of the revised edition of the German text that was first published in Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Vortrag über Ethik und andere kleine Schriften* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1989). Of these, two are significant:

- p. 128, paragraph 5 is new.
- p. 144, lines 26–27: “Interpretation” was changed to “Introspektion”.

The Brynmill edition lacks the following (marked by brackets in our text):

- p. 136, paragraph 4 through p. 140, paragraph 3;
- p. 140, paragraphs 5, 6, and 7; and
- p. 150, paragraph 3 to the end of the chapter.

Chapter 10

As Rhees did not use broken underlining and very rarely included variant wordings, there are many minor revisions, not listed here, that can be identified by looking for slashes, double slashes, and broken underlining. (For the purpose of identifying paragraphs on each page, diagrams have been counted as paragraphs here.)

- p. 202, paragraphs 3 and 5–9 are new.
- p. 203, paragraphs 1–4 and 6–8 are new.
- p. 204, paragraphs 8–12 are new.
- p. 205, paragraphs 1–9 and 11 are new.
- p. 206, paragraphs 4–12 are new.
- p. 207 is new.
- p. 208, paragraphs 4–6 are new.
- p. 209, paragraphs 2–8 are new.
- p. 210, paragraphs 3–7 are new.
- p. 211, paragraphs 1–2 and 4–5 are new.
- pp. 212–214 are new.
- p. 215, paragraphs 1–3 are new.
- p. 216, paragraphs 3–9 are new.

Additions and Corrections to the Texts

pp. 217–218 are new.
- p. 219, paragraphs 1–2 and 4–8 are new.
- p. 220, paragraphs 1–6 are new.
- p. 221, paragraphs 1–3 and 8–10 are new; paragraph 4 is substantially revised.
- p. 222, paragraphs 1–6 are new.
- p. 223, paragraphs 8–9 are new.
- p. 224, paragraph 9 is new.
- p. 225, paragraph 6 is substantially revised; paragraphs 7–8 are new.
- p. 226, paragraphs 2 and 4–6 are new.
- p. 227, paragraphs 2–8 are new.
- p. 228, paragraphs 2–11 are new.
- p. 229, paragraphs 2 and 4–11 are new.
- p. 230, paragraphs 1–9 are new.
- p. 231, paragraph 5 is new.
- p. 232, paragraph 4 is new.
- p. 234, paragraphs 1 and 7–8 are new; paragraph 2 is substantially revised; and the last sentence of paragraph 6 is new.
- p. 235, paragraphs 1 and 7 are new; the last sentence of paragraph 6 is new; and the fourth and last sentences of paragraph 8 are new.
- p. 236, paragraph 5 is new.
- p. 237, paragraphs 1, 3, 5–8, and 10–12 are new.
- p. 238, paragraphs 2, 4–10, and 13 are new.
- p. 239, paragraphs 5 and 10 are new; the last sentence of paragraph 2 is new.
- p. 240, paragraphs 1 and 8 are new.
- p. 241, paragraphs 1 and 5–6 are new; the last sentence of paragraph 7 is substantially revised.
- p. 243 is new.
- p. 244, paragraphs 1, 5–10, and 13 are new.
- p. 245, paragraphs 1–2 and 7–12 are new.
- p. 246, paragraphs 1, 3, and 7–8 are new.
- p. 247, paragraphs 1–11 and 13 are new.
- p. 248, paragraphs 4 and 7–11 are new; paragraph 6 is substantially revised.
Additions and Corrections to the Texts

Appendix C:

p. 422, we have invented the title.

Chapter 13

p. 433, paragraphs 10 and 11 are altered. Smythies's notes contain two versions of these paragraphs. The previous edition used the other version, which, however, Smythies seems to have crossed out. The version printed here contained an infelicitous (and clearly accidental) "not" which we've replaced with a bracketed ellipsis. The other version does not contain the "not" but is inferior in other respects.

p. 435, paragraph 2, the parenthetical sentence has been relocated in conformity with Smythies's indication which the previous edition inadvertedly ignored. The "[in]" has no basis in the manuscript but seems required by the context.