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THE "MIDDLE WITTGENSTEIN":
FROM LOGICAL ATOMISM TO PRACTICAL HOLISM*

1. THE "MIDDLE WITTGENSTEIN"

Wittgenstein arranged the *Tractatus* in its final form during the summer of 1918; Part I of the *Philosophical Investigations* was put into the form in which we now have it during the mid 1940s. The *Tractatus* was published in 1922; the *Philosophical Investigations* in 1953, two years after Wittgenstein's death. Because the two books were widely studied and interpreted at a time when the rest of his writing was unavailable, it became common practice to speak of the author of the first book as "Early Wittgenstein", and the author of the second as the "Late Wittgenstein". As it gradually became clear that his writing during the intervening years was not only voluminous, but also could not simply be understood as a rejection of one view and the adoption of another, it was natural to speak of the author of this further body of writing, or at least those parts of it which could not be regarded as "Early", or "Late", as "Middle Wittgenstein".

While it is certainly convenient to use this talk of an early, middle and late Wittgenstein as conversational shorthand for lengthier and more cautious ways of discussing the development of his philosophy, it also has its dangers. One of the main assumptions which commonly accompanies this periodisation is the belief that we can neatly divide the development of Wittgenstein's thought into several sharply demarcated phases. While there is some truth to this, it is only a half-truth, and for this reason it is particularly dangerous. First, it can lead to an interpretive strategy which cuts Wittgenstein up into a number of independent time-slices and so loses sight of the unity of his philosophy. Such an outlook lends itself to schematic summaries of what Wittgenstein really meant, summaries which turn his writing into just the kind of philosophical theories which he so vigorously opposed. I think it should be clear by now that we ought to take Wittgenstein's rejection of philosophical theorising, his lifelong conviction that philosophy is "not a theory but an activity" seriously, even if we don't ultimately take him at his word.¹

But perhaps the greatest danger in this talk of early, middle and late Wittgenstein is that we read Wittgenstein in the light of currently fashionable interpretations, rather than evaluating those interpretations against a careful reading of what Wittgenstein actually wrote. Much of the recent work on "Middle Wittgenstein" has been particularly valuable precisely because it is based on close examination of the full range of Wittgenstein's writing. While I don't think we should give up trying to provide interpretive schemata when studying Wittgenstein, such schemata cannot be based on an analysis of isolated fragments selected from his writing. Rather, we have to start by asking what Wittgenstein's problems were, and need to understand the "problem background" against which he worked.² To do this, we need to read his writing as a whole, rather than concentrating on isolated fragments. For this reason, I begin by looking at a passage from the *Blue Book* which highlights these issues. The first forty or so pages of the *Blue Book* are about the nature of meaning, the last thirty about solipsism and the nature of experience. In between, there is a short passage in which he compares different ways of making progress in philosophy with different ways of arranging books scattered across a library floor. Wittgenstein contrasts the straightforward case in which one can pick up each book and put it in its final place with a situation where one might have to start by putting several books in the right order, simply to show that they belong together in that order. This leads him to the following reflections:

In this case, in fact, it is pretty obvious that having put together books which belong together was a definite achievement, even though the whole row of them had to be shifted. But some of the greatest achievements in philosophy could only be compared with taking up some books which seemed to belong together, and putting them on different shelves; nothing more being final about their positions than that they no longer lie side by side. The onlooker who doesn't know the difficulty of the task might well think in such a case that nothing at all has been achieved.³

In its place in the *Blue Book*, in between the discussion of meaning in the first part of the book and the discussion of experience in the second, the point of the simile is to explain the overall relationship between these two parts. The first part of the book argues that meaning does not consist in the occurrence of mental processes, separating two problems which he had previously thought of as belonging together. But the results achieved in the first part of the book are only provisional, and their final location is not yet determined, for "every new problem

which arises may put in question the *position* which our previous partial results are to occupy in the final picture".⁴

Perhaps this image of organising a library, of working out what goes where, is also an apposite description of our present relationship to Wittgenstein's writings as a whole: we need to sort out which parts belong together, and why. In this paper, I offer a selective outline of my interpretation of the development of Wittgenstein's work, one which concentrates on the so-called "Middle period".⁵ I do this by discussing a number of crucial passages in his writing, passages in which he decisively changes his conception of the nature of mind and language, moving away from the *Tractatus* and toward the *Philosophical Investigations*. I identify a train of thought in Wittgenstein's writings which leads from Tractarian logical atomism, through the logical holism of the late 1920s and early 1930s, and from there to his later practical holism. In outline, my reading can be summarised as follows.

Wittgenstein's initial break with the *Tractatus*, which probably occurred in the late 1920s, consisted in the realisation that he had been wrong to think that all logic could be reduced to the truth-functional logic of the *Tractatus*. Consequently, he gave up logical *atomism*, the doctrine that all meaningful discourse can be analysed into logically independent elementary propositions, for logical *holism*, the thesis that analysis leads to systems of logically related propositions. At first, he retained the Tractarian conviction that language is grounded on reference to objects, which he now identified with the contents of experience. This project of analysing the structure of the experientially given is briefly articulated in the paper, 'Some Remarks on Logical Form'.⁶ At this point, in the early months of 1929, he conceived of the project as a matter of articulating a "phenomenological language", a language for the description of immediate experience. Later that year, he gave up the idea that philosophy ought to start from a description of the immediately given, motivated by the conviction that philosophy must begin with the language we ordinarily speak. This led him to reject the idea that language is animated by intrinsically representational mental processes, in favour of a conception of a language on which the meaning of a sentence is determined by the rules for its use. Finally, he replaced the view that each case in which one applies a rule requires an act of *insight* with the view that the application of a rule is a matter of *deciding* to apply the rule in a certain way.

These changes are followed by a transitional period during the first

half of the 1930s in which Wittgenstein explored their implications. The transitional period comes to end in the mid 1930s, with the first exposition of what has since become known as “the private language argument”, and the construction of the ‘first part of what von Wright has called the “Early Investigations”, which roughly corresponds to the first 188 sections of the published *Philosophical Investigations*. During this period, he moves away from a conception of language as constituting a formal system of rules, embracing the view that mastery of rules is dependent on a background of shared practices. As he stresses in the *Investigations*, his use of “the term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the *speaking* of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life”.⁷ Though these forms of life, the taken-for-granted ways of acting which make language possible, are social and practical, not individual and incorrigible, they occupy an analogous role in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy to the role he gave to the experientially given in 1929 or objects in the *Tractatus*, for they are the point at which the later Wittgenstein acknowledges the limits of language. Thus the *Philosophical Investigations* also states that “what has to be accepted, the given, is – so one could say – *forms of life*”.⁸

Consequently, he no longer thinks of the rules of our language as a matter for decision or convention, though he does not return to his earlier essentialism, either; rather, he tries to achieve a clear view of the relation between logic and practice by exploring the attractions and shortcomings of both the conventionalist and essentialist positions. This *practical* holism is sharply opposed to the *logical* holism which it replaces. I take this term from Dreyfus’s analysis of Heidegger and late Wittgenstein in ‘Holism and Hermeneutics’, where he draws a parallel distinction between *theoretical* holism, the view that all interpretation is a matter of translating between theories, and *practical* holism, the view that while everyday coping with things and people “involves explicit beliefs and hypotheses, these can only be meaningful in specific contexts and against a background of shared practices”.⁹ Because this inherited background involves skills, habits and customs, it cannot be spelled out in a theory. In the remainder of this paper, I shall flesh out the line of development I have just indicated, from logical atomism to logical holism, and from logical holism to practical holism.¹⁰ I shall also argue that a certain conception of the primacy of immediate experience lies behind the earlier view, and that the rejection of this conception of

experience is crucial for the subsequent development of Wittgenstein’s philosophy.

2. LOGICAL ATOMISM

At the heart of the Tractarian system is an argument for the necessary existence of simple objects. That argument begins from the observation that I speak and understand language, and leads to the conclusion that language must be analysable into elementary propositions, “logical atoms”. This argument is extremely abstract, for it turns on establishing that it is only possible for language to be composite if there are simples out of which it is composed. As a result, Wittgenstein concluded that every significant statement must be composed of logical atoms, yet was unable to give any examples. Indeed, it was the rationalistic and abstract character of this train of thought which Wittgenstein most vehemently criticised after he rejected logical atomism in the late 1920s. Shortly afterwards, he branded his earlier work as “dogmatic” – a term with strongly Kantian overtones – precisely because he had placed so much weight on the claim that it was possible to carry out an analysis of our language yet had failed to do so.¹¹ The *Tractatus* is an abstract metaphysical framework, a product of trying to think through a number of key issues in the philosophy of mathematics and language which Wittgenstein took from Frege and Russell. Because of this, it is misleading to read a well worked out position on the nature of experience and knowledge back into it, although that is just what Wittgenstein did in the early 1930s, when he identified the simple objects with sense-data. Instead, I want to stress the way Wittgenstein’s “dogmatism” gives the *Tractatus* its schematic character, which lends itself to any number of interpretations of “what Wittgenstein really meant”.

But the main lines of Wittgenstein’s conclusions about logical atoms in the *Tractatus* can be summed up in a few sentences. These atoms, the so-called elementary propositions, cannot be decomposed into smaller units, but they are nevertheless made up of names, which play the role of sub-atomic particles: they refer to the simple objects which make up the world.¹² The meaning of what we ordinarily say is the logical product of the combination of these sub-atomic particles into the molecules of ordinary speech. A proposition is a picture, or a model, of reality: the fact that the names of which it is composed are related to

one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same way.¹³ A proposition is true if things are arranged as it says they are, false if they are not. Even though Wittgenstein had found no examples of the elementary propositions, the basic components of his theory of meaning, he thought he had shown that they must be logically independent of each other. By this, he meant that the truth or falsity of each atomic proposition did not depend on the truth or falsity of any other atomic proposition.¹⁴

Of course, the signs from which our propositions are constructed – the words of everyday language, and the corresponding psychical constituents which make up our thoughts – do not clearly display the underlying structure which Wittgenstein had deduced.¹⁵ However, he believed that any meaningful proposition of ordinary language must have an analysis which does clearly display its underlying structure. This would be a truth-functionally related ensemble of atomic propositions whose surface structure is identical with the structure of the facts it represents. Wittgenstein distinguished between the sign, the perceptible part of the proposition, and the symbol, the sign together with its application, its representational relation to the world.¹⁶ Ordinary language consists of relatively simple signs, which stand in a very complex representational relationship with the world; a fully analysed language would consist of a much more complex arrangement of signs in a very simple representational relationship with the world. But no sign, considered in isolation, is intrinsically meaningful: one always has to see how the signs are to be applied, to grasp the way they represent. This leads Wittgenstein to distinguish two ways of conceiving of a picture, corresponding to his distinction between sign and symbol: as a fact, a determinate arrangement of objects, and that fact, together with the representational relation which makes it into a picture.¹⁷

This ability to apply language, to see signs as symbols, as intrinsically related to their objects, is not itself a further fact in the world, but is a matter of our establishing a projective relationship between certain facts. The projective relation, the sign's meaning, cannot itself be a fact, for all facts are logically independent of one another, and there is a logical connection between a picture *qua* symbol and what it pictures. Thus this connection cannot itself be stated, for only facts can be stated. But it can be shown by the structure of our language, much as the projective connection between two depictions of the same thing in different perspectives can be shown. Any combination of signs is

only meaningful due to our applying them in a certain way; everyday language depends on the existence of extremely complex conventions connecting the words we use with the objects they stand for. Similarly, even the signs of a fully analysed language would have to be explained before we could understand them. Like the signs that make up the propositions we presently speak, utter and think, they would be conventionally meaningful: their meaning would be a product of linguistic conventions, just as the meaning of the words we presently use is conventional. In both cases, we would also have to know how to use the words in question, how to apply them. But not all signs can be given a meaning in this way: some must be non-conventionally meaningful and so not susceptible to being either interpreted or misinterpreted. In the *Tractatus*, “thoughts” play this role: a thought is an *applied* propositional sign, a picture together with the method of projection which gives it its significance.¹⁸ A Tractarian thought is not simply an inner monologue or image, for these are facts on a par with physical facts composed of words and pictures. Indeed, Wittgenstein explicitly told Russell that a thought consists of “psychical constituents that have the same sort of relation to reality as words. What those constituents are I don’t know”.¹⁹ However, a thought is not just a concatenation of signs, it is the signs together with their application, the projective relation which gives them their life. This is the original private language, the inner symbolic processes which give public language its significance. Unlike any physical language, thoughts are essentially meaningful and so cannot be misunderstood. They encompass the “meaning-locus” which provides the ground for our use of language, the projective relationship we apply to the signs.²⁰ A thought, an applied and thought out propositional sign, is intrinsically related to its object. There is a logical connection between the thought and its object. Our language is like paper currency; it is only meaningful insofar as it is backed up by gold in the bank – both are intrinsically representational processes.

Wittgenstein’s view of the irreducibly mental and intentional character of meaning was diametrically opposed to Russell’s Humean view of meaning, on which it is nothing more than a feeling which accompanies certain mental processes.²¹ But this view is only implicit in the *Tractatus*; it is protected from explicit formulation by the Tractarian doctrine that the relation between language and world cannot be stated, but can only be “shown”. However, I believe it was motivated by a picture of the relationship between language, experience and world, a picture that

is best described as Cartesian, though it also has affinities with post-Kantian thought. While this picture is hinted at in the *Tractatus*, in the central role Wittgenstein gives to thought in his account of propositions, in his sympathy for solipsism and his identification of the world with life, it only emerges clearly in his subsequent work.²² For it was only in the late 1920s, when Wittgenstein realised that the *Tractatus*'s dogmatism would not do, that he returned to grappling with the problems raised by his essentialism about meaning and the need for an account of the relationship between language and experience.

3. FROM LOGICAL ATOMISM TO LOGICAL HOLISM

By the late 1920s, Wittgenstein had come to think of the task of arriving at a characterisation of the ultimate level of analysis as a matter of formulating what he called a "phenomenological language".²³ However, in the first section of the *Philosophical Remarks*, drafted in October 1929, he wrote that he no longer had

phenomenological language, or "primary language" as I used to call it, in mind as my goal. I no longer hold it to be necessary. All that is possible and necessary is to separate what is essential from what is inessential in *our* language.²⁴

The original manuscript volume entry reads instead: "I no longer hold it to be possible".²⁵ Some commentators regard the replacement of this impossibility claim by the seemingly weaker claim that a phenomenological language is not necessary as a qualification which implies that Wittgenstein had recognized that he could not yet prove that phenomenological language is impossible. Hintikka and Hintikka, for instance, argue that this lacuna would only be filled much later by the private language argument.²⁶ However, the continuation of the passage in question suggests a much simpler explanation for the rewording: Wittgenstein sometimes uses the term "phenomenological language" in a restricted sense, to mean a canonical analysis of the experience of the present moment. In this sense, he consistently maintained after 1929 that such a language was indeed impossible. But he also spoke of "phenomenological language" in a looser sense, meaning by it any way of talking about the content of experience, and in this sense of the term, he holds that a phenomenological language is possible but not necessary. Thus, he turned away from phenomenological language in the narrow sense, the construction of an artificial philosophical language

that would be capable of fully describing present experience, in favour of a study of the structure of the language we ordinarily speak, which still included a study of phenomenological language in the looser sense of the term.

Wittgenstein's clearest explanation of what he had meant by the term "phenomenological language" occurs in the first section of the chapter entitled 'Idealism' in the Big Typescript, assembled during 1932–33; the section is entitled 'The Representation of Immediate Experience'. There, he writes: "Phenomenological language: the description of immediate sense perception, without hypothetical addition".²⁷ Unlike our ordinary ways of describing sense perception, in terms of persisting objects, a phenomenological language would make no such hypothetical commitments; instead, it would restrict itself to representing whatever is immediately experienced. But his objection to this conception is already implicit in the broken underlining he put under "language", Wittgenstein's way of indicating that he was not satisfied with his choice of words. For he had realised that the motives which led him to seek a phenomenological language ensured that no language could be adequate. What one really wants to do, he suggests, is to directly present what is experienced:

If anything, then depiction by means of a painted picture or something like it must surely be such a description of immediate experience. As when we, e.g., look in a telescope and record or paint the constellation seen.²⁸

But even the most direct language cannot be more than a re-presentation, and so the very idea of a phenomenological language turns out to be incoherent. The desire for a transparent intermediary, present to consciousness, which guarantees that my thoughts are about their objects, and which provides an ultimate basis for language, is the product of philosophical confusion.

Wittgenstein sets out his objection to phenomenological language by asking us to consider how we might go about actually reproducing sense perception; he suggests that we imagine constructing a mechanical scale model of what is seen. Seen from the correct point, the model produces the appropriate perception:

the model could be set in the right motions by a crank-drive and we could by turning the crank read off the description. (An approximation to this would be a representation in film.)

If *that* is not a representation of the immediate – what would be one? – Anything

which tried to be more immediate still, would have to give up being a description. Instead of a description what would then come out would, rather, be that inarticulate sound with which some writers would like to begin philosophy. ("I am, knowing of my knowledge, conscious of something" Driesch.)²⁹

The very generality of this criticism, the fact that it does not turn on any specific formulation of a sense-datum theory, implies that it would be a mistake to construe Wittgenstein's "phenomenological language" too narrowly, as expressing a commitment to a specific philosophical theory about how to analyse ordinary language into observation statements. Rather, phenomenological language inherits much of the generality of the Tractarian notion of the ultimate level of analysis: it is the language, whatever it is, that enables one to describe immediate experience without any hypothetical additions. But the work I have just been discussing was motivated by an overall conception of the relation between experience and the external world. During this period, Wittgenstein frequently explained his conception of the relation between experience and the world in terms of a comparison with the relation between the picture one sees on the screen at the movies and the pictures on the reel of film in the movie projector. Although this analogy is never fully elaborated in any of the published works, there are a number of references to it in Wittgenstein's manuscripts, in the *Philosophical Remarks* and Big Typescript, and in the notes of his lectures and conversations in the years following 1929.

Talking to Bouwsma in 1949, Wittgenstein mentioned that the "figure of the cinema lamp" had first struck him when he was talking to Frege in 1911.³⁰ Bouwsma recalls a meeting of Malcolm's discussion group in Cornell in which Bouwsma began the conversation by briefly talking about Descartes's *Cogito, ergo sum*. Wittgenstein responded by saying that the real question was "How did Descartes come to do this?" Bouwsma asked whether he meant to ask what led up to the *cogito* in Descartes's own thought, to which Wittgenstein replied

No. One must do this for oneself. . . I always think of it as like the cinema. You see before you the picture on the screen, but behind you is the operator, and he has a roll here on this side from which he is winding and another on that side into which he is winding. The present is the picture which is before the light, but the future is still on the roll to pass, and the past is on that roll. It's gone through already. Now imagine that there is only the present. There is no future roll, and no past roll. And now further imagine what language there could be in such a situation. One could just gape. This!³¹

The difference between the picture on the film-reel which is in front of

the projector and the picture on the screen is emphasised by contrasting the way in which the picture on the reel is part of a sequence of neighbouring pictures which either have been or will be projected, while the picture on the screen has no such neighbours. If we are serious about trying to represent the picture on the screen without any hypothetical additions, we must take it by itself, excluding the sequence of past, present and future pictures on the film reel; in fact, we must exclude the whole physical world. But any description of the picture would be a sequence of symbols which was another part of the physical world. Furthermore, our ordinary language is temporal; how could we use it to talk about an atemporal, self-contained world without misdescribing it?

If we restrict ourselves to the case of describing presently given experience, it may be hard to see the full force of the problem: Why worry about how to represent it when it is already present? But even if we were to accept, for the sake of argument, that representing the immediately given is unproblematic, we would still have to account for our ability to remember and think about phenomena which are not part of occurrent sensory experience. Wittgenstein's discussions of the representation of experience often employ examples in which the intended object is not given in current experience. While the events depicted on the roll of film seemed unproblematic when considered by themselves, our ability to think about those events, to grasp that certain signs mean those events, became highly puzzling. Thus, Wittgenstein wrote in late 1929:

The application of words, considered as extended in time, is easy to understand; in contrast, I find it infinitely difficult to understand the sense in the moment of application.

What does it mean e.g. to understand a sentence as a member of a system of sentences?³²

Wittgenstein tried to express his conception of a categorical distinction between experience and the world by saying that the picture on the screen, unlike the picture on the film-reel, "has no neighbours". This is not a matter of saying that my experiential field has a certain location, and that there is nothing next to it. Rather, it is to say that it makes no sense to think of my immediate experience as adjoining anything else – that it is neighbourless: self-contained, complete. In lectures given in the early 1930s, Wittgenstein said that

... the pictures in the lantern are all "on the same level" but that the picture which is at any given time on the screen is not "on the same level" with any of them, and that if we were to use "conscious" to say of one of the pictures in the lantern that it was at that time being thrown on the screen, it would be meaningless to say of the picture on the screen that it was "conscious". The pictures on the film, he said, "have neighbours", whereas that on the screen has none.³³

This is closely connected with the idea that it makes no sense to speak of experience as "present": just as Wittgenstein denies that experience has a spatial location, he also denies it has a temporal location. In both cases, he wants to resist the temptation to project our everyday grammar onto the phenomena. For he holds that there is a "grammatical" difference between the two; the picture on the film and the picture on the screen are not "on the same level". The pictures are not two related objects which share a common space; instead, they represent two different spatialities.³⁴ If we try to bring the two together, we shall run up against the limits of language.

In the early 1930s, Wittgenstein came to think that the mistake which leads to solipsism of the present moment, the view that only my present experience is real, can be explained in terms of the movie metaphor. On this account, the solipsist mistakenly compares "present" experience to the frame of the film which is currently being projected, in front of those past frames which have been projected and behind those future frames which will be projected. Wittgenstein's reply is to contend that the correct analogy is with the picture on the screen, which does not lie in this order at all, and so "present" – and for that matter, "my", "experience", and "real" – is inapplicable:

The present we are talking about here is not the picture in front of the projector's lens at precisely this moment, as opposed to the pictures before and after it, which have already been there or are yet to come; but the picture on the screen which would illegitimately be called present, since "present" would not be used here to distinguish it from past and future. And so it is a meaningless epithet.³⁵

During the period when he still found the movie metaphor a compelling illustration of our predicament, Wittgenstein must have wished he could get around the need to use language to convey what cannot be said, to find a way of getting his readers to simply see the nature of the phenomena. One aspect of this problem is his recognition that language itself is part of the physical world and so is on a different level from the phenomena. Thus, early in 1929 he raised the following

question about the relation between physical language and phenomenological language:

Language itself belongs to the second system. If I describe a language, I am essentially describing something that belongs to physics. But how can a physical language describe the phenomenal?³⁶

Shortly afterwards, he began to realise that it was this very conception of present experience which was responsible for his difficulties:

The way of looking which leads into a magic valley, as it were, from which there is no way into the open countryside is taking the present as the only reality. This present, constantly flowing or, rather, constantly changing, cannot be caught hold of. It disappears before we can think of grasping it. We stay stuck in this valley, bewitched, in a whirl of thoughts. . . .

What I may not think, language can't express. That is our comfort.

But if one says: the philosopher must step down into this encircled valley and grasp the pure reality itself and bring it to the light of day, then the answer runs that he would have to in so doing leave language behind and so come back without having achieved anything.

And yet there can be a phenomenological language. (Where must it stop?)³⁷

Soon after, in the same notebook, Wittgenstein decisively rejected this conception of a phenomenological language.³⁸ In short, what Wittgenstein realised, late in 1929, is that there cannot be a phenomenological language of the kind he had hoped for – a complete analysis of experience – and that we must start from our everyday language in describing experience. In the *Tractatus*, he had held that while truth-functional propositional logic limits what can be said, its logical form shows the common structure of language and world: "Logic must take care of itself".³⁹ Once he gave up the logical atomist doctrine that all relations between propositions are ultimately truth-functional, it is language as a whole which takes its place: "Language has to speak for itself".⁴⁰ The logical holist conceives of everyday language as a system of rules, such as the rules of a formal calculus, or a scientific theory.⁴¹ In the final section of this paper, I summarise why Wittgenstein replaced this with a practical holist conception of everyday language on which even formal rules must be understood in terms of their practical background: "rules leave loop-holes open, and the practice has to speak for itself".⁴²

4. FROM LOGICAL HOLISM TO PRACTICAL HOLISM

In 1929, Wittgenstein rejected logical atomism for a logical holist conception of language as a system of calculi, formal systems characterised by their constitutive rules. But by the mid 1930s he came to see that the rules of our language are more like the rules of a game than a calculus, for they concern actions within a social context. This context, our practices and the 'forms of life' they embody, on the one hand, and the facts of nature on which those practices depend, on the other, are the background against which rule-following is possible. It is this emphasis on both the social and natural context of rule-following which is characteristic of Wittgenstein's later conception of language as a practice.

Both the logical holist conception of language as a calculus or a theory and the later practical holist notion of a language-game stress the paramount role of context, the notion that the context in which an utterance belongs is the whole of language. This is why both conceptions are holistic: the meaning of an utterance, an inscription or a thought is not an entity independent of the rest of our language, but rather consists in its relation to the rest of language. There is no sharp transition from the calculus model to the language-game model, from logical holism to practical holism: Wittgenstein does not give up the idea that our linguistic practices are rule-governed, but rather comes to see that rule-governed behaviour is only possible against a background of practices which cannot themselves be explicitly formulated as rules. Alternatively, one might say that his conception of language becomes increasingly broad, until it includes the whole range of human activity.

Despite these continuities, Wittgenstein's conception of language changed radically during the 1930s. During the early 1930s, Wittgenstein frequently compares language to a calculus, a formal system of rules. While he retains this analogy in subsequent writing, it is usually as an object of comparison, as a way of bringing out the *disanalogies* between ordinary language and a calculus. Thus, he dismisses the idea that we can think of the meaning of a word as an entity, a "meaning-body", which lies behind the use of our words, in favour of a description of the rules which we accept for the use of the word.⁴³ In the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein implies that the analogy between a calculus and ordinary language had been responsible for his conception of language as governed by a system of rules:

F. P. Ramsey once emphasized in conversation with me that logic was a "normative

science". I do not know exactly what he had in mind, but it was doubtless closely related to what only dawned on me later: namely, that in philosophy we often *compare* the use of words with games and calculi which have fixed rules, but cannot say that someone who is using language *must* be playing such a game. . . .

All this can only appear in the right light when one has attained greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning and thinking. For it will then also become clear what can lead us (and did lead me) to think that if anyone utters a sentence and *means* or *understands* it he is operating a calculus according to definite rules.⁴⁴

By the mid 1930s, Wittgenstein plays down the role of explicit rules in explaining what a word means, and instead stresses that in practice, we usually explain the meaning of words by giving paradigmatic examples, not by ostensive definition or stating necessary and sufficient conditions. The examples need not be given in such a way that they are protected against all possibilities of misunderstanding; it is enough that they usually work. In discussing the Tractarian theory of the nature of the proposition, Wittgenstein replies in section 135 of the *Philosophical Investigations*: "Asked what a proposition is . . . we shall give examples". Most of the next one hundred sections of the *Philosophical Investigations* are occupied with exploring and undermining the two main avenues of reply to this position: the view that meaning consists in mental processes and the view that meaning consists in implicit rules, views which Wittgenstein had previously been attracted to. The aim of this discussion is to discredit the idea of hidden processes which underlie meaning, whether they be subjective mental processes or objective rules.

A key argument which motivates this train of thought is that just as no mental content is intrinsically meaningful, so no strict rule by itself can determine how we go on, as all determination of meaning is dependent on interpretation. Given any mental process or any formulation of a rule, it is always, in principle, open to a further, deviant, interpretation.⁴⁵ No occurrent act of meaning or intending, or of grasping an essence or of deciding to go on in a certain way, can give a rule the power to determine our future actions, because there is always the question of how that act is to be interpreted. As a result, the idea that a rule can determine all its future applications turns out to be misguided. Only if we ignore the context can we think that some isolated act or event can have a determinate meaning regardless of its context. A change in the context of application can yield a change in meaning, and therefore meaning cannot be identified with anything independent of context.

We can see a parallel development in Wittgenstein's conception of following a rule. In the *Philosophical Remarks*, he still thinks that the application of a rule always depends on an act of insight, the insight that the rule can be applied in *this* case:

Is it like this: I need a new insight at each step in a proof? . . . Something of the following sort: Supposing there to be a certain general rule (therefore one containing a variable), I must recognise afresh that this rule may be applied *here*. No act of foresight can absolve me from this act of insight. Since the form to which the rule is applied is in fact different at every step.⁴⁶

But there is a marginal note in the original copy of the *Philosophical Remarks* which encapsulates the next phase of Wittgenstein's thought. Next to "No act of foresight can absolve me from this act of insight" he wrote in the margin: "Act of *decision*, not *insight*". That is, the application of the rule is no longer treated as a matter of my seeing that it *must* apply, but rather in terms of *my* deciding to apply it here. The issue arises again in the *Brown Book* in an early version of the rule-following discussion in *Philosophical Investigations* section 185ff. Wittgenstein discusses the possibility that someone might learn how to add one as we do with small numbers, but does what we would call adding two when asked to add one to numbers between one hundred and three hundred, adds three when asked to add one to larger numbers, and persists in regarding this procedure as a correct application of the rule he or she was taught. This leads Wittgenstein's interlocutor to ask whether he thinks an act of intuition will always be needed to protect us against the possibility of a deviant interpretation of the rule:

"I suppose what you say comes to this, that in order to follow the rule 'Add 1' correctly a new insight, intuition is needed at every step."⁴⁷

Instead of giving a direct answer to this question, Wittgenstein replies by asking the interlocutor to explain the notion of following the rule correctly, a notion which he has simply taken for granted in his question:

– But what does it mean to follow the rule *correctly*? How and when is it to be decided which at a particular point is the correct step to take?⁴⁸

The interlocutor responds by appealing to the rule-giver's intentions:

"The correct step at every point is that which is in accordance with the rule as it was *meant*, intended."⁴⁹

In the ensuing dialogue, the interlocutor tries to specify what the rule-giver's intentions consist in, and Wittgenstein repeatedly undermines him by asking how the application of the intention, meaning, mental act or whatever other candidate, is offered can be guaranteed in advance: the same deviant possibilities can always be raised. A page later, Wittgenstein sums up:

If the mere words of the rule could not anticipate a future transition, no more could any mental act accompanying these words.

We meet again and again with this curious superstition, as one might be inclined to call it, that the mental act is capable of crossing a bridge before we've got to it. This trouble crops up whenever we try to think about the ideas of thinking, wishing, expecting, believing, knowing, trying to solve a mathematical problem, mathematical induction, and so forth.

It is no act of insight, intuition, which makes us use the rule as we do at the particular point of the series. It would be less confusing to call it an act of decision, though this too is misleading, for nothing like an act of decision must take place, but possibly just an act of writing or speaking.⁵⁰

Here, there is no suggestion that there must be an act of decision; only that if any mental process at all is involved, it is a decision, not an intuition. The search for a self-interpreting interpretation only arises if one treats the words and actions in which the rule was expressed as an interpretation, a construal of the rule which still needs to be made completely determinate. In some cases, of course, our words or actions will be ambiguous. But in others, we can just get on with it and write or say the next term in the series. Wittgenstein is proposing that we look at these cases, the cases in which we do not do any interpreting, but simply grasp the rule in practice, such as everyday conversation and arithmetic, as prototypical instances of rule-following. As he puts it in *On Certainty*:

As if giving grounds did not come to an end sometime. But the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting.⁵¹

In pursuing these issues in *Philosophical Investigations* section 138ff., Wittgenstein focusses on the question: What is it to understand a word in a flash or, as he had previously put it, "to understand the sense in the moment of application"?⁵² For, on the one hand, understanding a sentence is a matter of being able to use those words correctly, in applying them "in the course of time"; on the other hand, we may grasp the meaning of a sentence in a flash, when it "comes before our

mind in an instant".⁵³ In other words, there is both a subjective and an objective aspect to understanding and we need to understand how they hang together. The problem is directly descended from Wittgenstein's earlier worries about the relationship between the words I use in describing my experiences and the experiences themselves, and the way in which the words seemed to be unable to describe "that which goes on in the reading of the description",⁵⁴ the mental processes which animate our words. Certainly we do, on occasion, understand words in a flash, but the danger here is to think that this can give us an insight into the essence of understanding. The same image can mean different things in different contexts:

What is essential is to see that the same thing can come before our minds when we hear the words and the application still be different. Has it the *same* meaning both times? I think we shall say not.⁵⁵

Wittgenstein holds that it is the circumstances in which the experiences occur, not the experience taken by itself, to which we should look if we want to get at what justifies someone in saying that he or she has understood. The therapy he proposes is that we consider relatively simple cases of mental activity, such as what goes on when we read out loud, in order to see how the temptation of thinking that ineffable mental processes are involved arises.⁵⁶ In other words, he asks us to consider "the activity of rendering out loud what is written or printed; and also of writing from dictation, writing out something printed, playing from a score, and so on".⁵⁷ The first point Wittgenstein makes in this connection is that although we are all very familiar with such activities, we would find it difficult to describe the part which they play in our life "even in rough outline". The observations that follow suggest that this is due to the differences between what goes on when a skilled reader reads, where all kinds of things may go on, and often nothing at all over and above the successful completion of the task, with what goes on with a beginner, who makes a conscious effort to read. And if we concentrate on the case of the beginner we shall indeed be inclined to say that it is "a special conscious activity of the mind".⁵⁸ The idea is that there must be some special conscious act of reading, "the act of reading the sounds off from the letters".⁵⁹ Here Wittgenstein replies by thinking of cases in which the experience goes on, but the "reader" does not really understand (perhaps he or she has been drugged), and cases in which the reader does understand, but nothing or something

else goes on. Whether something is reading or not is a matter of whether the activity is successful, not a matter of whether I consciously apply a rule or feel guided or whatever. One wants to say that in reading "the words *come* in a special way" or that "I experience the because", but in practice, the words don't have to come in a special way and we needn't experience anything in particular.⁶⁰

In most cases of proficient reading, we just get on with it and do it. Here we have an example of what Heidegger calls "readiness-to-hand" [*Zuhandenheit*]: our ordinary use of everyday things does not call for reflective awareness of what we are doing. We only become aware of these things when something goes wrong or some other unusual circumstance draws our attention to them, making them "present-at-hand" [*vorhanden*].⁶¹ Thus, under normal circumstances, reading a familiar language, "can we say anything but that . . . this sound comes automatically when we look at the mark?".⁶² But if we try to understand the cases where we are proficient on the model of what goes on in abnormal or problematic cases, we shall inevitably look at what goes on when we make an effort to read as revealing the essence of being influenced, an essence that is concealed in normal usage.⁶³ We think of particular cases of being guided or being influenced, and think that the experience we have in this or that case is paradigmatic, what goes on in every case.

Ultimately, our explicit beliefs and interpretations are only meaningful in specific contexts and against a background of shared practices – these practices are the skills and customs which we have learnt, ways of acting which were not acquired as beliefs, even though we may express them in beliefs. It is this "way of grasping a rule which is *not* an *interpretation*, but which is exhibited in what we call 'obeying the rule' and 'going against it'" which ultimately ends the regress of interpretations.⁶⁴ In other words, "It is our *acting*, which lies at the bottom of the language game".⁶⁵

NOTES

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¹ L. Wittgenstein: 1933, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, translated by C. K. Ogden

(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul), 4.112. Cf. *Philosophical Investigations*: 1967, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell) #109ff., #124ff. The German text and English translation are on adjacent pages. While the quotations from Wittgenstein's published writing in this paper are based on the available translations, they are sometimes rather more literal.

² J. Hintikka: 1988, "'Die Wende der Philosophie': Wittgenstein's New Logic of 1928", *Proceedings of the Twelfth International Wittgenstein Symposium* (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky), p. 380.

³ L. Wittgenstein: 1975, *The Blue and Brown Books* [hereafter either *Blue Book* or *Brown Book*] (Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 44–45. He introduces the analogy as an illustration of the way in which philosophical problems are interdependent.

⁴ *Blue Book*, p. 44.

⁵ While it is clearly impossible to do justice to the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy during this period in a paper of this length, I believe it is possible to indicate some of its main characteristics. I explore these themes in greater depth in *Wittgenstein on Mind and Language* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

⁶ L. Wittgenstein: 1929, 'Some Remarks on Logical Form', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, supplementary volume, pp. 162–71.

⁷ L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, #23.

⁸ *Philosophical Investigations*, p. 226.

⁹ H. Dreyfus: 1980, 'Holism and Hermeneutics', *The Review of Metaphysics* 34, p. 9. Cf. the discussion of the background in chapter 5 of J. Searle: 1983, *Intentionality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

¹⁰ While this way of dividing up the development of Wittgenstein's thought amounts to qualified support for the notion of a "Middle Wittgenstein", these are certainly not the only important turning points in Wittgenstein's work. For instance, his criticism of his earlier work culminates in the completion of Part I of the *Philosophical Investigations* in the mid 1940s, after which he made a fresh start. This work resists classification but can loosely be described as being on philosophical psychology, the inner and the outer, knowledge, certainty and relativism.

¹¹ See F. Waismann: 1979, 'On Dogmatism', in *Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: Conversations Recorded by Friedrich Waismann*, edited by B. F. McGuinness, translated by J. Schulte and B. F. McGuinness (Oxford: Blackwell), 9 December 1931, p. 182 ff. German edition, with the same pagination: 1967, *Ludwig Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis: Gespräche aufgezeichnet von Friedrich Waismann*, edited by B. F. McGuinness (Oxford: Blackwell).

¹² *Tractatus*, 3.2 ff.

¹³ *Tractatus*, 2.15.

¹⁴ *Tractatus*, 1.21, 2.062, 4.211, 5.134–5.135.

¹⁵ *Tractatus*, 4.002.

¹⁶ *Tractatus*, 3.262, 3.31, 3.32.

¹⁷ *Tractatus*, 2.14, 2.1513.

¹⁸ *Tractatus*, 3.5; see also 3 ff., and 4.

¹⁹ L. Wittgenstein: 1974, *Letters to Russell, Keynes, and Moore*, edited by G. H. von Wright (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), 19 August 1919, p. 72.

²⁰ B. Goldberg: 1968, 'The Correspondence Hypothesis', *Philosophical Review* 77, 438–54.

²¹ See: R. M. McDonough: 1986, *The Argument of the Tractatus* (Buffalo, NY: SUNY

Press), Ch. VI.1; and S. S. Hilmy: 1987, *The Later Wittgenstein* (Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 109 ff.

²² See *Tractatus*, 3–3.12, 5.6–5.641, and 6.431–6.4311.

²³ See MSS 105–107 and 'Some Remarks on Logical Form'. I discuss this material in greater detail in *Wittgenstein on Mind and Language*.

References to Wittgenstein's typescripts and manuscripts use the numbering system in G. H. von Wright's catalogue of the Wittgenstein papers, originally published in the *Philosophical Review* 78 (1969). The latest revisions can be found in the version published in S. Shankar: 1986, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments* (Wolfeboro, NH: Croom Helm), volume 5, pp. 1–21.

²⁴ L. Wittgenstein: 1975, *Philosophical Remarks*, 2nd edition, edited by Rush Rhees, translated by R. Hargreaves and R. White (Oxford: Blackwell), #1. German edition, with the same pagination: 1964, *Philosophische Bemerkungen*, edited by R. Rhees (Oxford: Blackwell).

²⁵ MS 107, p. 205.

²⁶ M. Hintikka and J. Hintikka: 1986, *Investigating Wittgenstein* (Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 137 ff., 172, 241 ff.

²⁷ Big Typescript, #101, p. 491. The German reads:

Phänomenologische Sprache: Die Beschreibung der unmittelbaren Sinneswahrnehmung, ohne hypothetische Zutat.

The Big Typescript, TS 213 in von Wright's catalogue, is a book-length draft which Wittgenstein assembled in 1932–33, based on material which he had written since his return to Cambridge in 1929. For a discussion of the place of the Big Typescript in the Wittgenstein oeuvre, see A. Kenny: 1976, 'From the Big Typescript to the *Philosophical Grammar*', edited by J. Hintikka, *Essays on Wittgenstein in Honour of G. H. von Wright*, *Acta Philosophica Fennica* 28; reprinted in Kenny: 1984, *The Legacy of Wittgenstein* (Oxford: Blackwell).

²⁸ Big Typescript, #101, pp. 491–92. The German reads:

Wenn etwas, dann muss doch wohl die Abbildung durch ein gemaltes Bild oder dergleichen eine solche Beschreibung der unmittelbaren Erfahrung sein. Wenn wir also z.B. in ein Fernrohr sehen und die gesehene Konstellation aufzeichnen oder malen.

²⁹ Big Typescript #101, p. 492. The German reads:

Denken wir uns sogar unsere Sinneswahrnehmung dadurch reproduziert, dass zu ihrer Beschreibung ein Modell erzeugt wird, welches, von einem bestimmten Punkt gesehen, diese Wahrnehmungen erzeugt; das Modell könnte mit einem Kurbelantrieb in die richtige Bewegung gesetzt werden und wir könnten durch Drehen der Kurbel die Beschreibung herunterlesen. (Eine Annäherung hierzu wäre eine Darstellung im Film.)

Ist das keine Darstellung des Unmittelbaren – was sollte eine sein? – Was noch unmittelbarer sein wollte, müsste es aufgeben, eine Beschreibung zu sein. Es kommt dann vielmehr statt einer Beschreibung jener unartikulierte Laut heraus, mit dem manche Autoren die Philosophie gerne anfangen möchten. ("Ich habe, um mein Wissen wissend, bewusst etwas" Driesch.)

Cf. *Philosophical Remarks*, #67–68; *Philosophical Investigations*, #261.

The quotation from Driesch is taken from page 19 of his *Ordnungslehre*, where he calls it “our first philosophical proposition, the primal philosophical proposition. It still points to the birthplace of all philosophy, ‘experience’, [*Erleben*] but it nevertheless lifts itself out of the everyday toward language” (Jena: Eugen Diederichs, 2nd edition, 1923). Cf. his *Wirklichkeitslehre* (Leipzig: Emmanuel Reinicke, 1922), p. 8.

³⁰ O. K. Bouwsma: 1986, *Wittgenstein: Conversations 1949–1951*, edited by J. L. Craft and R. Hustwit (Hackett, Indianapolis), 5 August 1949, p. 10.

³¹ Bouwsma, op. cit., 7 August 1949, p. 13. See also *Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*, p. 50; and Big Typescript, #102.

³² MS 107, p. 233. The German reads:

In der Zeit ausgedehnt betrachtet ist die Anwendung der Wörter leicht zu verstehen; dagegen finde ich es unendlich schwierig den Sinn in Moment der Anwendung zu verstehen.

Was heißt es z.B. einen Satz als ein Glied eines Satzsystems zu verstehen?

³³ G. E. Moore: 1959, ‘Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930–33’, *Philosophical Papers* (London: Allen & Unwin), p. 310. Originally published in three parts in *Mind* (1954–55). Cf. Wittgenstein’s use of the term “neighbour” in the “Notes for Lectures on ‘Sense Data’ and ‘Private Experience’”, *Philosophical Review* 77 (1968), p. 297, and in the *Blue Book*, p. 72.

³⁴ Cf. *Zettel*, #648: “One language-game analogous to a fragment of another. One space projected into a limited extent of another. A ‘gappy’ space. (For ‘inner and outer.’)” L. Wittgenstein: 1967, *Zettel*, edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press). The first two sentences are from material published as the *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology I*, edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), #936.

³⁵ MS 108, p. 3; *Philosophical Remarks*, #54.

³⁶ MS 107, p. 114; *Philosophical Remarks*, #69.

³⁷ MS 107, pp. 1, 2–3 (1929).

Die Betrachtungsweise die gleichsam in einen Talkessel des Magischen führt aus dem kein Weg in die freie Landschaft führt ist die Betrachtung der Gegenwart als des einzig Realen. Diese Gegenwart in ständigem Fluß oder vielmehr in ständiger Veränderung begriffen läßt sich nicht fassen. Sie verschwindet ehe wir daran denken können sie zu erfassen. In diesem Kessel bleiben wir in einem Wirbel von Gedanken verzaubert stecken. . . .

Was ich nicht denken darf, kann die Sprache nicht ausdrücken. Das ist unsere Beruhigung.

Wenn man aber sagt: Der Philosoph muß aber in diesen Kessel hinuntersteigen und die reine Realität selbst erfassen und ans Tageslicht ziehen, so lautet die Antwort daß er dabei die Sprache hinten lassen müßte und daher unverrichteter Dinge wieder heraufkommt.

Und doch kann es eine phänomenologische Sprache geben. (Wo muß diese Halt machen?)

The translation of the first paragraph is based on the one in Hallett: 1977, *Companion to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), p. 471.

³⁸ See the discussion of this passage, MS 107, p. 205, at the beginning of this section.

³⁹ *Tractatus*, 5.473.

⁴⁰ *Philosophical Grammar*, p. 40.

⁴¹ There is thus a close affinity between Wittgenstein’s logical holism, once he had given up the goal of a phenomenological language, and what Dreyfus calls “theoretical holism”, the view that all understanding is a matter of formulating a theory.

⁴² *On Certainty*, #139. There is a valuable discussion of the triptych formed by this quotation and the preceding two in K. S. Johannessen: 1988, ‘The Concept of Practice in Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy’, *Inquiry* 31, 357–69.

⁴³ See *Philosophical Grammar*, #16, where Wittgenstein discusses how one might explain the difference between the “is” of identity and the “is” of predication in these terms [Edited by R. Rhees, translated by A. J. P. Kenny (Oxford, Blackwell, 1974)]. Cf. *Philosophical Investigations*, #558–60.

⁴⁴ *Philosophical Investigations*, #81. In both the early and intermediate versions of the *Investigations*, the parenthetical phrase “(and did lead me)” read “(and did lead me (*Tractatus*))”.

⁴⁵ See, e.g., the discussion of a schematic leaf (#73–74), following arrows (#86), the drawing of a cube (#139 ff.).

⁴⁶ *Philosophical Remarks*, #149 (1930). Cf. #104, #107, #164. See also A. Ambrose: 1979, *Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge, 1932–1935* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 131–34.

⁴⁷ *Brown Book*, p. 141 (1934–35). Cf. *Philosophical Investigations*, #185ff., and L. Wittgenstein: 1970, *Eine Philosophische Betrachtung*, edited by Rush Rhees (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp), pp. 214–16.

⁴⁸ *Brown Book*, p. 142.

⁴⁹ *Brown Book*, p. 142.

⁵⁰ *Brown Book*, p. 143.

⁵¹ L. Wittgenstein: 1969, *On Certainty*, edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe and D. Paul (Oxford: Blackwell), #110.

⁵² MS 107, p. 233 (cited at greater length above, p. 213.)

⁵³ *Philosophical Investigations*, #141, #139.

⁵⁴ Big Typescript, #102, p. 496. The German reads:

Von welcher Wichtigkeit ist denn diese Beschreibung des gegenwärtigen Phänomens, die für uns gleichsam zur fixen Idee werden kann. Dass wir darunter leiden, dass die Beschreibung nicht das beschreiben kann, was beim Lesen der Beschreibung von sich geht.

⁵⁵ *Philosophical Investigations*, #140.

⁵⁶ Cf. *Philosophical Investigations*, #431–2, on the idea that understanding animates signs, and #435–6, on the idea that understanding is a hidden rapid process.

⁵⁷ *Philosophical Investigations*, #156.

⁵⁸ *Philosophical Investigations*, #156.

⁵⁹ *Philosophical Investigations*, #159.

⁶⁰ *Philosophical Investigations*, #165, #177.

⁶¹ See M. Heidegger: 1962, *Being and Time*, translated by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York and Evanston: Harper and Row), #15-16.

⁶² *Philosophical Investigations*, #166.

⁶³ This is very clearly stated in *Philosophical Investigations*, #170; also the last paragraph of #175.

⁶⁴ *Philosophical Investigations*, #201.

⁶⁵ *On Certainty*, #204.

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