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ABOUT US

Why Labyrinth?

Plato uses the image of a winding labyrinth as a metaphor for the process of philosophical investigation in his dialogue Euthydemus. His image expresses his belief that unlike the arts of rhetoric or sophistry—which rely on mere assertion and counter-assertion—philosophy absolutely requires that we retrace our steps in an argument and constantly re-examine our views in order to arrive at knowledge of the true and good. This is what we as philosophy students aim to do, and this journal is meant to aid in that process.

Our Purpose

This journal was created with a threefold purpose. First, to provide undergraduate philosophy students with the experience and opportunity of publishing a paper in a philosophical journal. Second, to give an opportunity for students to be involved in peer to peer interaction through the editorial and overall journal creation process. Finally, to showcase the amazing philosophical work that is being done by the undergraduate students at the University of Iowa.

Attention Students!

Please consider submitting a paper for the Spring 2021 issue as the continuation of this journal relies on students like you. All submissions undergo a blind peer review to ensure a fair selection process. For further inquiries, contact Professor Carrie Swanson at carrie-e-swanson@uiowa.edu.
Presenting Nietzsche: A Non-Existent Nietzschean Utopia

Nhat Tran

In his *Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche begins to devise a political philosophy centering on maximizing impulse expression. In it, Nietzsche adopts a form of social contract theory, believing that people must suppress some impulses to remain in society. However, he critiques the amount of shame and repression found in modern societies, instead suggesting that an ideal society would minimize the suppression of impulses and maximize the expression of what he calls the “will to power.” In this paper, I will accept the “will to power” as a plausible notion, but reject the idea that the repression of impulses is inherently harmful. To do so, I will simulate a Nietzschean world and show that the result of Nietzsche’s philosophy of minimal suppression and maximal expression leads to what Nietzsche attempts to avoid: the repression of the "will to power."

Before simulating this Nietzschean world, there are a few ambiguities in Nietzsche’s philosophy that I must clarify, primarily surrounding his conception of the “will to power.” Although he uses it throughout his works, the exact definition is hard to pin down. Nietzsche defines it vaguely, sometimes using it as a basis for metaphysical claims, and sometimes to describe an “essence” for human beings. In discussing the “will to power” in the constraints of a society, the former metaphysical usage is not useful, and therefore my interpretation of it will not follow that line. Neither will I use the latter definition. For the purposes of this paper, I will use Bernard Reginster’s interpretation of the “will to power,” which he defines as a universal psychological drive “for the overcoming of resistance in the pursuit of determinate desires” (Reginster 126). In other words, it is an innate want to overcome obstacles that would prevent us from pursuing our other desires.
There are two reasons for choosing this interpretation of the “will to power.” The first reason is that interpreting the “will to power” as a psychological drive aligns with the rest of Nietzsche’s psychology and philosophy of mind. First, in *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche states that psychology should be understood as “morphology and the doctrine of the development of the will to power,” establishing the “will to power” as something psychological (or psychologically-related) (BGE 23). Furthermore, Nietzsche rejects free will, explicitly stating that there is no difference between doer and deed and that “there is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting, becoming” (GM 1.13). This statement, which hints towards a physicalist response to the mind-body problem, makes interpreting the “will to power” as a psychological drive more sensible than conceiving it as an essence that people choose to follow or something we can willingly resist. For Nietzsche, it seems like the “will to power” is an innate drive rather than something we can choose to follow.

One objection to this interpretation of the “will to power” is that it seemingly runs counter to other aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy, particularly his claim that humans are “animals with a conscience.” In the *Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche believes that humans are separated from other animals by the “right to make promises,” implying that they can go against primal drives and “choose” (GM 2.1-2). This statement seems to go against the physicalist leanings that Nietzsche displays in other parts of his works. However, an ability to make promises is not necessarily contradictory with a physicalist response to the mind-body problem; solving it only requires that we edit Nietzsche’s idea of conscience. For example, one way to modify Nietzsche’s conception of conscience might be to say that it does not reference an ability to freely make decisions, but rather to have reflective counteracting impulses that stifle expressions of the “will to power” and other primary urges. For example, Nietzsche would say
that animals, such as possums, do not have counterimpulses such as shame or guilt. Therefore, in acting, they only follow their primary impulse; if they want to eat, they eat. The only circumstance that would stop them from eating would be the existence of a nearby predator, creating a new primary urge of fear, focused on survival. Humans, on the other hand, have counterimpulses like shame or guilt. Those counterimpulses are what stops us from licking ourselves when we feel dirty. They allow us to make promises, knowing that certain counterimpulses like guilt or shame will keep us from breaking those promises. This notion of counterimpulses (which will be my primary account for the rest of the paper) or an alternate account of physical conscience allows for Nietzsche’s psychological separation between humans and animals to be compatible with his physicalist instincts.

The second reason for choosing this interpretation is that viewing the “will to power” as specifically a drive to overcome resistance aligns with Nietzsche’s views on expressing impulses and his moral genealogy. While I will discuss the specifics of the *Genealogy of Morals* more in-depth later in the paper, I will give an abridged summary of the first essay here. Nietzsche claims that throughout human history, the repression of human impulses has been excessive and has caused immense shame and resentment. At the inception of human society, according to Nietzsche, people that had more power (in terms of access to food, brute strength, etc.) controlled the laws. They could express their “will to power” and flaunt their impulses shamelessly. As such, they had the ability to restrict the impulses of others, which brought about mass shame and resentment. To express their “will to power,” those people whose impulses were suppressed revolted not in a physical sense (as they lacked the power to do so), but in a spiritual sense, reversing moral systems to disvalue expressions of power and impulses, a moral shift that
Nietzsche aligns with Christianity. Nietzsche then denounces the Christian moral system, as it denies a central part of human existence.

Taking all these facts into account, having the psychological interpretation of the will to power underpin these events is reasonable. It explains Nietzsche’s hatred of Christianity, as the existence of the “will to power” makes Christianity’s claim erroneous. If the “will to power” exists, Christianity’s emphasis on piety and humility (values that Nietzsche would claim are antithetical to following our impulses) denies an essential part of human life. It also explains the formation of Christianity as an expression of the “will to power.” Nietzsche states that the will to power appears “among the oppressed … as will to ‘freedom’ … [and] among a stronger kind of man … as will to overpower” (WP 776). Since the oppressed population did not have the strength to overpower the ruling class, it seems natural that their expression of the will to power would take a more covert form. Finally, it serves to tie Nietzsche’s psychology with his moral genealogy. If people are naturally and psychologically driven to overcome resistance to follow some primary drive, it would make sense that repressing that ability would cause some form of resentment. Combined with the concept of counterimpulses, the concept of the “will to power” provides Nietzsche’s moral genealogy some needed psychological backing.

Now that I have resolved some of Nietzsche’s philosophical inconsistencies, I will proceed into the simulation of an ideal Nietzschean society. The implication of the “will to power” and counterimpulses for societies is that an ideal Nietzschean society would maximize the exertion of the “will to power” and minimize the need for shame and counterimpulses. But if living in a society naturally restricts impulses (in the form of laws and societal norms), would anarchy be preferable? In short, no. Societal protections allow for the exertion of impulses that would otherwise not be possible. For example, if the manifestation of someone's primary drive
and "will to power" involved scientific or philosophical pursuits, it would be nearly impossible to express that without some sort of protection or cooperation from danger. As well, in a survival of the fittest scenario, "wills to power" that involved physical domination would thrive, suppressing all the impulses of those without the strength to compete. Even if civilization requires the repression of impulses that undermine societal functions, the wider range of possibly exercised impulses as well as the added safety to express them outweigh the shame of the societally necessary suppression.

But Nietzsche does not believe that all societal structures are equal in their ability to allow that expression. Nietzsche believes that society requires humans’ promise-making capacity. Being a member of society requires promising that you will follow the laws in exchange for protection. As such, members of society are “in debt” to their government for the protections that they receive, creating what Nietzsche calls the “creditor/debtor” relationship between a government and its citizens (GM 2.4). Metaphorically speaking, governments have a certain amount of credit in the form of higher standards of living, protections, and the like, that it loans out to its citizens. In turn, people repress some impulses and respect the government’s authority. However, in the case that citizens break that promise, it costs civilization and therefore requires some amount of punishment. For Nietzsche, smaller societies are disproportionately affected by violations of this contract. For small societies, not only does a lawbreaker, according to Nietzsche, disregard the protections that come from their contract and fail to hold up their end of the bargain but, by breaking the law in such a small society, the lawbreaker "attack[s] his creditor" (GM 2.9). It would make sense then that the punishment would be harsh, as the smaller society has fewer resources to recuperate the loss. For example, in the case of a murder, the loss of one worker out of ten is much more significant than one worker out of a thousand. As such, in
small societies, the punishment must be severe to discourage any sort of dissent, to the point that it may repress other, possibly positive, expressions of the “will to power.” Governments with more “credit” (higher standards of living, more protections, more influence, etc.), on the other hand, do not necessarily need to recuperate the loss. Nietzsche writes “As the power and self-confidence of a community increase, the penal law always becomes more moderate; every weakening or imperiling of the former brings with it a restoration of the harsher forms of the latter” (GM 2.10). If that is true, we might be able to imagine a society so powerful that it can choose to ignore certain crimes. As Nietzsche states, "It is not unthinkable that a society might attain such a consciousness of power that it could allow itself the noblest luxury possible to it—letting those who harm it go unpunished" (GM 2.10). Therefore, more powerful, larger societies have an advantage in reducing the amount of shame and increasing the expression of the “will to power.” Of course, certain laws would still have to be enforced, as the rampant existence of crimes such as murder and theft would cause excessive fear and shame, creating more obstacles to expressing the “will to power” than punishing those acts would. But to repress impulses as little as possible, the ideal Nietzschean society is as large as possible, able to ignore the actions of its people without exerting too much influence on their expression.

The issue of governmental size asks the question: does a government of that size naturally influence its citizens? Nietzsche partially answers this question through his moral genealogy. The answer: only if it is visible. Nietzsche argues that at the inception of societies, some people had more strength to exert their “will to power” than others, so those people became "nobles" and determined laws and morality. To exert their "will to power" (or the stronger class’s “will to overcome”), the "nobles" defined their actions as "good" and those of the oppressed as "bad." For Nietzsche, the society built around "noble morality" exemplifies what happens when
one group has visibly much more power than the other. The "nobles" had tremendous influence and they could ignore most of the misdeeds of the oppressed class, so long as those actions did not interfere with the nobles' displays of power. All the noble class did was further affirm their strength and exert their "will to power," which Nietzsche would argue was positive. For the most part, the noble class was an exemplar of the Nietzschian view of a healthy society, a class without shame. The people whose impulses were suppressed in the time of “noble morality,” on the other hand, were anything but. Nietzsche states that the oppressed class grew resentful and hateful, due to an inability to exert their influence while watching the "nobles" display their power. Nietzsche does not say that the resentment came from the force of oppression, but specifically states that it stemmed from "jealous opposition" (GM 1.7). Having to watch the expressions of power and being unable to act against it caused mass resentment that led to the rise of the “slave revolt,” which emphasized repression of the “will to power.” Therefore, “noble morality” in its former sense is not tenable with an ideal Nietzschian society, as any structure that has a stable, visible “noble” class to resent leads to the feelings of jealousy and hatred among the oppressed class that results in the “slave revolt”. To avoid another “slave revolt” then, the government in an ideal Nietzschian society must be mostly invisible to both prevent resentment and allow the lower class to exert their “will to power.”

The problem with an ideal Nietzschian society is that the necessary qualities ensure its eventual failure. So far, I have identified that the three inherent qualities of such a society are:

(a) A government sizable enough to ignore the misdeeds of the lower class

(b) A government invisible enough to not cause resentment

(c) The ability for people to express their impulses as much as possible (except those that immediately harm society, such as theft or murder)
At this point, Nietzsche’s commitment to maximizing the expression of “will to power” forces three different failure states for this ideal civilization:

(1) A new “noble morality” system (as it inevitably leads to “slave morality”)

(2) Another “slave revolt”

(3) Widespread shame resulting in impulse suppression

If the Nietzschean society can avoid all these possibilities, it might survive. However, if the society falls into either (1) or (2), it will result in another inversion of morality and more repression of the “will to power,” thereby failing to match Nietzsche’s ideals. If it succumbs to (3), the Nietzschean society will already have failed its mission.

However, the ideal Nietzschean society is itself a contradiction, as the conditions necessary for its existence inherently lead to its failure. First, there seems to be an inexorable conflict between (a), having a large government, and (b), an invisible one. The larger the government, the easier it is to identify. This conflict between necessary principles of the Nietzschean government therefore already places the world along the track to fall in either (2) or (3), leading to either mass resentment due to the overreaching government and a resulting “slave revolt,” or shame from government suppression of impulses. As well, in a world where people can express their impulses, there are bound to be plenty of clashing ones. These clashing impulses would lead to a constantly fluctuating, conflict-driven society. Furthermore, believing that this conflict would result in some form of stability and not cause mass resentment seems utopian. These conflicts show that the existence of a Nietzschean society will always lead to its own failure states, making its existence a contradiction.

As conflict underlies the failure states of the Nietzschean society, one objection to consider is the idea that a Nietzschean society might not have conflict in the first place. Some
may argue that it is possible for individuals in a society to accept and adhere to rules and
guidelines that allow for the expression of the “will to power,” but also accept limits on it in such
a way that the resulting society is more or less stable. The issue with this argument is that it fails
to recognize that the “will to power” necessitates conflict. As Nietzsche states, the will to power
appears “among the oppressed … as will to ‘freedom’: merely getting free seems to be the goal
… [and] among a stronger kind of man … as will to overpower” (WP 776). Each of these
expressions of the will to power implies some form of conflict. For the “oppressed,” their will to
“freedom” must be freedom from an oppressor. As such, their expressions of the “will to power”
involve overcoming the barriers of oppression, creating conflict with those in power. As for the
“stronger kind of man,” the “will to overpower” requires something to overpower, some form of
resistance or conflict to stand in the way. Expressing the “will to power” necessitates conflict and
resistance, something to overcome, and a society that freely accepts limits while allowing for the
full expression of the “will to power” either does not account for true expressions or fails to
allow enough expression.

Another option to resolve this contradiction might be placing people into experience
machines that allow each person to express their impulses freely in a simulation. In that sense,
everyone would be able to express, in some way, a “will to power” in their personalized
simulation. However, Nietzsche would deny this solution as a possibility, as he would state that
the “will to power” expression in the simulation does not account for real expression. He rejects
“slave morality” for a similar reason, as he states, “slave morality from the outset says No to
what is ‘outside,’ what is ‘different,’ what is not itself” (GM 1.10). Nietzsche faults “slave
morality” for requiring that negative shame and excessive counterimpulses to merely exist,
always needing a “hostile external world” (GM 1.10). Relying on a simulation commits a similar
fault, as preferring simulated expression over real action, for Nietzsche, would be similar to turning inward. As well, reliance on experience machines would be a denial of the “will to power,” as the “will to power” requires, inherently, some resistance, something that does not happen in the case of simulation. Either way, simulated expressions are not adequate for an ideal Nietzschean society.

In sum, though I accept the “will to power” as a possible psychological drive, a Nietzschean society, based purely on its maximization, will inherently fail. This failure is founded on the fact that the unfettered expression of people’s “will to power” leads to conflict which will, in the end, undermine the ideal society’s existence. As Nietzsche’s desire to maximize expressions of “will to power” is based on the idea that suppressing desires is wrong, the logical conclusion of that society's failure is that the suppression of desire is not inherently harmful.
Works Cited


Principles for a Better Life

Bailey Vormezeele

The six perfections of Buddhism are a means to spiritual end. Though the true number of perfections varies with interpretation, it has been agreed upon that the perfections are the methods for freeing oneself from cyclic existence, samsara, and for attaining Buddhahood. Escaping samsara and attaining Buddhahood are especially significant to a Mahayana Buddhist because this is thought to be the ultimate goal of the human life. Once one has attained Buddhahood, they have escaped suffering and are able to guide others in their journey towards Buddhahood. The final objective then is that eventually all beings are freed from suffering. But what if we do not believe in samsara or a super-naturalistic Buddhahood? Are we simply left to suffer in this life with nothing to gain from the six perfections or other teachings of Buddhism? I argue that this is not the case. While some Buddhists may consider it blasphemous, I believe there is much to learn from traditional Buddhist texts that can guide an individual on his or her journey through life without the necessity of theological belief. Whereas traditional Buddhist teachings provide structure and outline the methods one should implement in order to be born into a better next life, one with less suffering, I aim to extract from this knowledge various guiding principles which may better one’s current life. Buddhist teaching has always relied upon several assumptions to give reason for its methodology, but I hope to implement its lessons to lead to a more peaceful, engaged, and fulfilling life, purely based on the observable world.

The first of the six perfections, which are described in a somewhat meaningful order, is generosity. Generosity is at the core of Mahayana Buddhism as the dedicating of our merit gained through skillful action to all beings in order to aid in the elimination of their suffering is assumed to be our motivation for performing any given skillful action. As such, it is also taught
that we should attempt to directly eliminate the suffering of beings when given the opportunity, rather than simply dedicating our earned merit for their benefit. We do gain merit from any act of purposefully eliminating the suffering of others, though. These acts of generosity are also grounded in the Buddhist concept of emptiness in which things do not exist independently and there is a sort of interconnectedness of all things that arises from their quality of dependent existence. Thus what “I” have to offer or what seems to be “mine” does not truly belong to me because the possession and individual are constructs found in the conventional reality. Therefore, all things that appear to be in my possession should happily be shared with others. Essentially, there were an assortment of circumstances which lead to it being in my possession, but I am to offer it to those who need it more with the intention of eliminating their suffering. Some have argued that there may be problems with such extremes levels of generosity and that it may be warped to cause more harm than good, especially when exercised with emptiness in mind. I believe, though, that we may benefit in our current life from the teachings on generosity when they are followed carefully. This is the case whether or not we also believe that the merit gained from generous action will aid in our efforts toward Buddhahood or ultimately benefit us in the next life. While we may or may not believe in the Buddhist emptiness that reduces our thoughts of ownership sufficiently that we may offer things to those in need, we likely already believe in an interconnectedness of people and action. In our lives, we have undoubtedly been the receiver of a generous act, such as our mother’s care during infancy or a stranger’s sharing of an umbrella in a storm. And we have likely found, or will find, occasions when we are able to offer some similar act to another stranger or some form of repayment to our mother as she ages. Both situations exemplify a characteristic especially noticeable in the human species: that we are cooperative and believe in reciprocal altruism. Thus, we may be motivated to act generously by
our knowing that we may one day be repaid the favor by another stranger when we find ourselves in need. And while it may appear selfish to help or provide for others with our own future needs in mind, I believe the action is based on feelings of sympathy. Even when we may not fully understand the situation of another, we can draw on our own experiences with suffering and understand that our forfeiting of some goods or services for ourselves is eliminating the suffering of one who has suffered as we have. In this understanding of the human experience, one in which suffering is a commonality between all humans as is believed by the Buddhist, generosity seems an ideal method of mutually eliminating suffering from our own lives and those of others.

The second of the six perfections is morality. While there are many versions, definitions, and discourses on morality found throughout the study of philosophy, Buddhist morality is based mostly upon karma. Karma is the idea that skillful action ultimately eliminates suffering and unskillful action causes suffering. This suffering may be realized in this life or in subsequent lives, but it is thought to follow from unskillful action in a scientific law-like, input-and-output fashion. From the teachings of karma, various sets of non-virtuous (unskillful) actions which are known to cause suffering in one form or another have been recorded, and we are taught to abandon these actions. Following these principles, then, is believed to ultimately eliminate our own suffering as well as that of others. This idea of morality must change, though, if we come to denounce karma and do not believe in the capability of its forces. Karma is clearly a theological belief that one must believe in in order for the non-virtuous actions to be designated immoral and virtuous actions moral, so without it we may find no clear-cut definition for morality. While this initially seems problematic, a non-straightforward definition of morality may be that which will best guide us. Rather than actions being defined as causing suffering according to karma, we
may instead need to rely on our own observation. Through the experiences of our lives we will surely observe suffering with many causes, and I propose that we use these experiences to shape an internal sense of morality which will guide our lives. For example, should we see that a certain action in a certain situation causes apparent suffering to another, we will know in the future that if we were to perform the action, it will likely cause suffering to its victim. Because of this, we should deem it immoral in this specific context and refrain from performing the action. While this idea of a sense of morality gained through experience may seem to have faults such as the limitations of one’s knowledge or available observation for learning, it is not so restricted. We may also gain knowledge about those actions which tend to cause suffering through further study and thought. We may contemplate those actions which cause our own suffering and notice that they also cause suffering to others. We can also study the suffering of others through books, conversation, and many other resources, further gaining insight into those situations in which we can attempt to prevent the suffering of others. While mistakes are inevitable and the causing of some level of suffering is unfortunately probable, our reflection on even those experiences will aid in our learning of morality. Through refinement and practice we may gain a flexible, but responsible sense of morality which can help guide our lives similarly to that which is defined by the concept of karma in Buddhism.

The third of the six perfections is patience or tolerance, depending on the translation. The purpose of patience in Buddhism is less focused on limiting the suffering of others, though this is always important in Mahayana Buddhism and others are affected by our impatience, and greatly focused on limiting our own suffering. When we are impatient or intolerant, we cause ourselves great suffering through the anger which undoubtedly follows. This anger is ultimately believed to stem from ignorance within us and to garner hatred and frustration which continually
harm us. This anger also begins to destroy the merit we have earned through our skillful or virtuous actions in the past. Thus, it is believed that lack of patience will lead to immediate and sustained suffering for oneself as well as continued suffering in samsara for others, as even more skillful action will be required to regain our merit and free all beings from suffering. It is not required that we believe in a destruction of our merit to guide us towards patience, though. The philosophies demonstrated in the Buddhist perfection of patience are useful in limiting the misery that we cause ourselves on a daily basis. It is true that anger within us is unpleasant and causes us harm. It also seems to be true that such anger is contagious, spreading from one thought or action to another. Thus, it seems that these negative thoughts are not useful, and we should seek to rid ourselves of them as is taught by the Buddhists. In practicing patience, we purposefully endure some minute level of distress compared to that which would be cultivated within ourselves should we become intolerant or angry with the situation. Therefore, it seems to make more sense to practice patience than become absorbed in the anger that naturally comes. In continuously practicing patience, we become accustomed to it. What once was considered an act of suffering will no longer be so with anticipation and previous acclimation to small grievances or disruptions that we continuously come to face. Patience may grow within us as anger would, though it will aid in continuing to limit our misery rather than spread it. In this way, adopting Buddhist methods for incorporating patience into our lives may prevent us from contributing to our own negative thoughts.

The fourth of the perfections is enthusiasm or energy. The Buddhist idea of enthusiasm is a sort of excitement or delight found in performing skillful action which will be rewarded with merit and the freeing of others from samsara. As mentioned previously, it is believed that the ultimate goal of the human life is to escape samsara and attain Buddhahood; therefore, it is
believed that we must not waste this life with wandering but strive to achieve this goal at every opportunity. Having enthusiasm in this pursuit also involves ridding ourselves of laziness that comes when we are distracted by the different aspects of samsara or absorbed into lives without purpose. Energy and refraining from laziness are not only important to the human life with the goal of attaining Buddhahood, though. It is not necessary that we adopt the Buddhist purpose of the human life in order for enthusiasm to be helpful. No matter the goals we set for ourselves and pursuits we wish to follow, it is imperative that we do so with constant effort if we wish to be successful. It is not uncommon for people to quickly become distracted from their aspirations with activities that are easy or require little effort, but indulging in these activities for extended period of time, can prevent one from achieving the purpose they want for their life. This purpose will vary extremely between people and some may not have come to a conclusive decision about what it is, but most would agree that they have some objective that they would like to achieve during their lifetime. If, rather than diligently pursuing that which we wish to accomplish, we abandon it, we destroy the chance we have at gaining the fulfillment we once yearned for. This is not dissimilar from the wasting of the opportunity given in human life that Buddhists believe. While they believe that human life is a precious gift, a chance to free oneself from the cyclic existence we have suffered in for many lifetimes, we may also see the human life as precious from a non-theological point of view. If we do not believe in cyclic existence, then we only have one lifetime to achieve that which we wish to achieve, so enthusiastically chasing our goals is as important to the non-Buddhist as it is to the Buddhist.

The fifth perfection is meditation and it takes multiple forms in Buddhism, though they are all concerned with the attainment of the concentrated state of tranquil abiding. In this state, it is thought that our minds are free from all disturbances. It is believed that the various
distractions such as our attachments to people or objects in this world distort our views and cloud our perception. Attachments are also said to cause us to suffer and, in general, distract us from our efforts towards Buddhahood. Therefore, we must use meditation to cease our suffering and continue on our journey towards freedom from samsara. One described method for obtaining tranquil abiding is the use of breathing meditation. In this form of meditation, one focuses on the breath for extended periods of time and, when the mind has wandered, returns focus on breathing. This method is thought to build one’s attention and strength for ignoring distraction in the mind. Another type of meditation involves recalling life experiences and contemplating those which may occur in the future. In remembering past situations, we are able to analyze our actions and determine whether we have acted in accordance with the perfections. This, along with the contemplation of potential situations which may arise in the future, allow us to determine which course of action to take that is in accordance with the other perfections and our morality. Thus, in future circumstances we can more easily make the right decisions. Both of these methods of meditation are advantageous, whether we value tranquil abiding for the realization of Buddhahood or for simply eliminating the distracting or anxious thoughts which cloud the minds of many today. Different types of breathing meditation have been scientifically studied and overall appear to help those with anxiety. Though it is not being used to focus Buddhist practice, it does appear to benefit those who engage in it. Meditation on experience may also be helpful, though it is less scientific or objective. While recalling past experiences may be traumatic for some, it often provides for us a chance to analyze our decisions and behaviors and determine whether or not we acted in a way conducive to our happiness. Similarly to Buddhist techniques, we may analyze these situations in order to modify our future behaviors to those which will be more favorable and constructive. Implementing meditation into the non-
Buddhist lifestyle may have ultimate goals different than in Buddhism, but it has similar immediate goals and none-the-less aids in providing a more peaceful and tranquil life.

The last, and frequently considered the most important, perfection is that of wisdom. True wisdom for the Buddhist is the ultimate realization of emptiness that occurs only after one has attained tranquil abiding, freed themselves of attachment, and becomes a Buddha. Perfecting wisdom and being able to conceptualize the lack of independent existence and conventional conception of the world simultaneously is said to be what frees one from samsara and suffering. Because of this, wisdom is the ultimate knowledge and understanding of the world and is the basis upon which all other perfections are constructed. But due to the perfection of wisdom not being achievable until Buddhahood, routine practice of wisdom in Buddhism takes a somewhat different form. More practical wisdom is thought to be an understanding of how the conventional world works. Thus, in performing the previous five perfections, one who has wisdom will have the knowledge to make decisions and take actions which will eliminate the suffering of others most effectively. One with wisdom will understand the outcomes of each option and action and how they will better or harm those affected by them. In this way, none of the perfections can be tainted by miscalculation, but instead are performed with optimization. For example, we can examine generosity. The practice of being generous to others may seem beneficial to them in all cases, but this is not true. If a schoolteacher generously provides the same treatment and education to each child in his class, inevitably some will not succeed because they do not thrive in the same environment as all other students. Some may require more personal attention, while others require less, to best learn the material that is being taught. In this case, the teacher may be acting generously in providing his instruction but is causing more harm than good for some students and they may suffer because of it. If the teacher was practicing with
wisdom, this would not be the case. In being truly wise, the teacher would discover the type of learning which works best for each student and generously teach them all in each of these ways. In this way, he is optimizing his generosity so that it leads only to elimination of suffering.

Wisdom in this sense can be applied to each of the perfections. Each requires very specific action in different contexts in order to eliminate suffering as they intend, which is why wisdom is a requirement. Wisdom is also required to benefit from the implementation of the principles of the previous perfections in the non-theological lifestyle. Without belief in emptiness, it too usually considered a religious/mythological belief, a vast knowledge is required to prevent the incorrect application of principles that leads to unintended suffering. As with morality, this knowledge may be found in our experience and may be cultivated through meditation. Wisdom expanded in this way will aid in our extraction of knowledge from each of the perfections.

Buddhism, as a religion, requires that one hold some beliefs or assumptions that cannot be conclusively proven to act as the building blocks for the construction of its guiding principles. This is true of almost all religions and why they are discerned from other belief systems or theories such as those found in science. This does not mean, though, that we cannot find useful knowledge in the principles that are taught. Though there is some debate among schools about who exactly is impacted by our skillful and unskillful action, Buddhist teaching generally aims to eliminate suffering whenever possible. This is largely because it is thought that suffering is inevitable in life, which is a belief not only held by Buddhists. Many find that life holds suffering from any number of causes and struggle to find methods for its elimination. While some turn to religion for answers and can accept the doctrines that are presented to them, others are more skeptical. The skepticism does not mean that religious teaching is not useful, but instead that applicable knowledge must be extracted from teaching which fits with currently held
beliefs. The six perfections in Buddhism are a prime example of a religious teaching which are especially helpful even to those who do not accept the foundational principles. To ignore them and other Buddhist teaching because of skepticism would truly be a waste. In lives so full of suffering, a wide and exploratory perspective is necessary to find our own happiness.
Right Intentions, Just Cause, and Just War Theory:
Deontological Perspectives of the 2003 Iraq War

Amna Haider

Introduction

According to the traditional account of Just War Theory (JWT), there are unique moral rules to an armed war that can allow it to be morally justified. This seems odd, as one would think it is nearly impossible to morally justify violence, destruction, and the inevitable death of innocent civilians. However, scholars of JWT lay out several conditions that examine justice before entering a war (jus ad bellum), justice during the war (jus in bello), and justice after a war (jus post bellum), with the ultimate end goal of ensuring any war advances humanity closer to achieving a sustainable peace.

It is difficult to separate the moral permissibility of a war with permissibility based on contingent matters such as political and legal factors. The Iraq War of 2003 led by the United States under former president George H.W. Bush has continued to be controversial in this way. Critics argue that it is difficult to think of the war as morally justified considering its unique circumstances—(and overall war type), convoluted intentions, false intelligence, and its mixed consequences. However, I am concerned at why exactly the Iraq War was impermissible in terms of the U.S.’s commitment to jus ad bellum conditions, without having to complete a post-war assessment on how potential failure to meet these conditions contingently resulted in how the war was fought (or the post-war consequences). Essentially, the significance in examining the 2003 Iraq War lies in it being the first time that states militarily invaded another state and later justified the invasion as having humanitarian outcomes, even though the outcomes were
produced by acts “primarily motivated by non-humanitarian concerns.” The war was wholly rebranded from a war of pre-emption (or prevention as I will later discuss), in which the American-Anglo coalition first waged war for the purpose of dismantling Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s alleged program of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), to one of humanitarian military intervention (HMI), which was the post-facto justification of the war after no WMDs were actually found. This produces questions on the extent to which the requirements of having right intentions and sufficient just cause morally matter in justifying a war, without looking at post-war consequences.

In this paper, I will show that the Iraq War was morally unjustified primarily because those who incited the war, the U.S. and allies, failed to declare a truly just cause and failed to honestly express true right intentions before entering the war. Furthermore, I will argue that a state cannot morally justify a war that it wages as an HMI without intending to make it an HMI before the fact, rather than after the fact the war took place. I will use the United States as an example for this when it rebranded the 2003 Iraq War as “Operation Iraqi Freedom.” I will also argue that a sufficient just cause morally depends on right intention in any war that is categorized as an HMI by referring to Kantian ethics. Thus, I ultimately believe that the criterion of right intention in JWT ought to be further developed to include that a war-waging state must properly declare a commitment to right motivations for waging war, alongside clear indication of proper intelligence. I will first go about this argument by isolating the requirements of just cause and right intention from the other conditions of jus ad bellum with the impression that those two most significantly made the Iraq War morally impermissible. Secondly, I will discuss the different

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2 Ibid. 217
interpretations of Bush’s declared causes of the war, and how each interpretation carries a
different moral weight that makes the war’s overall cause too convoluted to warrant moral
justification. Thirdly, I will discuss the relationship between just cause and right intentions based
on a Kantian perspective. Finally, I will respond to two objections: one that considers how the
shift in cause can morally justify a war that was not initially permissible, and another that
considers how the criterion of right intention cannot stand so significantly as part of *jus ad
bellum* conditions.

**Applying Other *Jus ad bellum* Conditions to Iraq**

There are six core principles of *jus ad bellum* that most scholars agree upon as valid
elements of JWT: legitimate authority, reasonable chance of success, proportionality, last resort,
just cause, and right intentions. I will show that in the case of the 2003 Iraq War, the U.S. and
Britain did not significantly violate the first four conditions as much as they violated the last two.
Moreover, Iraq shows that the first four conditions ultimately depended on right intention and
just cause.

Because the U.S. and Britain shifted their declared cause of the invasion from alleged
pre-emption to an HMI, they fulfilled the requirement of legitimate *and* lawful authority. The
invading states’ first cause that initially justified the invasion was pre-emption to stop Saddam
from using WMDs. The United States first considered this invasion as national self-defense in
order to disarm Saddam and protect national security; this means that the U.S. required
legitimate authority, or domestic permission. The United States Congress granted domestic
permission by passing a resolution that authorized the use of force in Iraq.³ I would argue that

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because Congress granted this permission, the United States succeeded in meeting this condition when its cause was to wage a pre-emptive war. However, to reiterate, the U.S. shifted its cause to an HMI after no WMDs were found. So, it follows that the Anglo-American coalition ought to have received permission from lawful authority, which spans to both domestic and international bodies such as the UN Security Council. However, the invading states did not receive permission from the UN Security Council to use force against Iraq, and thus invaded international law and violated the condition of “lawful authority.” However, I argue with David Mellow, that just because an act may be illegal vis-à-vis international humanitarian law, it does not make it morally impermissible. Assuming for now that there existed a true cause for HMI, we intuitively recognize that law ought not to carry as much moral force when the law claims that, even if a legal authority cannot take the necessary action, a third-party cannot intervene to stop a wide-scale humanitarian crisis or injustice. This is per a widely accepted belief that all states have the “responsibility to protect” when there is a grave injustice in the world. So technically, lawful authority in the case that the Iraq War was truly categorized as an HMI does not carry as much moral weight; this criterion seems to depend on the nature of the cause, which was not actually sufficient or even present in the Iraq War, which we will discuss later.

Proportionality in war requires comparing the harms a state will impose to the harms averted. However, determining the extent to which the Iraq War was proportional or not, hence deciding whether failing to meet this condition was a sufficient reason to the war’s impermissibility, is a difficult task that over-extends how much space I can allot to it in this paper. This criterion of JWT, especially in evaluating *jus ad bellum*, is more based towards empirical evaluation off weighing different concepts like casualties and sovereignty against each

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other. Moreover, measuring proportionality requires an ongoing evaluation, so it is more based on contingent matters. Meanwhile, I want to understand why the Iraq War was impermissible from a deontological view. Nevertheless, there should be a right level of just cause that makes the war proportional. If Saddam did have weapons of mass destruction that he was ready to use against American citizens, then perhaps an invasion would be proportional to disarm Saddam. However, a war of intervention in response to Saddam’s human rights abuses may be proportional depending on the U.S.’s commitment to a cause of protecting the Iraqi civilian population from human rights abuses and violence even after Saddam is toppled. This further implies that proportionality is entailed by just cause, and so just cause is more morally weighty than proportionality before the fact of war being fought, and without the need to undergo a post-war assessment.

The criterion of last resort says that one must exhaust all other alternatives before finally entering an armed war. Of these possible alternatives to war include diplomacy, sanctions, and anything that violence and military force. Many scholars debate about whether an invasion or military intervention was Bush’s last resort to disarm Saddam, remove him from power, or to prevent him from committing mass human rights abuses. I defend the claim that war was not the last resort vis-à-vis both causes that the invading states put forward. In terms of waging a pre-emptive war, the Bush administration could have let UN inspectors further investigate Saddam’s alleged WMD program with that inspection having a reasonable chance of succeeding.\footnote{Ibid. 300} In terms of the humanitarian cause, actual circumstances were that the environment in 2003 was drastically less violent than they were between 1988 and 1991 when Saddam launched the Anfal genocide against Kurdish and Shi’a Iraqis. At that time, the international community only
verbally condemned and economically sanctioned Saddam. It follows that engaging in an HMI in 2003 was not wholly a last resort. However, this also fuels the idea that there were ulterior motives to the intervention, as there seems to lack a universality in response to a situation of a more imminent humanitarian crisis. I argue at this point that right intentions inform whether there is a last resort, as if the war was truly an HMI, it would have exasperated all possible options that averted the use of military force in Iraq.

The criterion of reasonable chance of success speaks for itself—a state waging war must find themselves able to succeed in achieving a just cause in consideration of putting lives at risk. I defend the idea that before entry, the United States had a very reasonable chance of succeeding in disarming and overthrowing Saddam due to the U.S.’s obvious military clout. Therefore, the United States had no problem meeting this requirement, which did not make the Iraq War morally impermissible.

A Twisted Just Cause

I just argued that none of the other *jus ad bellum* conditions were more significantly violated than right intention and just cause. The failure to meet proportionality and last resort depends on whether the U.S. and Britain had just cause and right intentions when they waged war with Iraq in 2003. Moreover, the nature of any armed war such as the Iraq War violates the sovereignty of a state, which is to violate a state’s political or territorial integrity; it is generally agreed that sovereignty is either very inherently or instrumentally valuable. Thus, one ought to have a just cause as a foundation of morally justifying their actions before one enters a war against another. Now, I will defend the claim that the foundational causes presented by the U.S. and Britain could not have been morally justified assuming that we put aside the consequences and only focus on the facts before entering war.
The Iraq War progressed into having multiple causes throughout the war, but the primary cause of the war that incited the coalition to invade was to disarm Saddam of WMDs—before he had the chance to use them against other states. Now, this poses a challenge of determining whether this war was preventive or pre-emptive. A war is only pre-emptive if the state liable to be attacked poses a current viable threat. A preventive war occurs when the state that is attacked only posed the capability to pose a threat, which was not yet liable. But how do we know a threat is viable? For this paper, I assume that Michael Walzer’s account of a justifiable pre-emptive war is correct. Walzer believes that a threat is only “real,” and thus liable to preemptive war when there is a) a manifest intent to injure, b) active preparation by lining troops up or other expressions of preparation, and c) the concept that not fighting at that moment will increase the chance of harm. Countless scholars have argued that no pre-emptive threat was present for the American-Anglo coalition to wage war on Saddam, assuming he possessed weapons of mass destruction. The threat was not imminent. Prior to the coalition’s invasion and without considering the later discovery of falsified intelligence, there was no evidence that Iraq possessed nuclear weapons systems that could be used against the United States. Therefore, I argue that the first cause that the invading states presented, even putting aside the fact that WMDs were not found after invasion, was morally unjustified, as it constituted a preventive war in which Saddam had only the capability to pose a threat.

Perhaps without further assessment of the war, one can then argue that it was morally impermissible from the very beginning. Over thirty million people worldwide protested the

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impending invasion back in 2002-2004, and there was a generally consensus among the public that the move to go to war lacked a just cause. However, the war inevitably unfolded into events that further made the cause of the war morally unjustifiable.

After the U.S. invaded and forces took over Baghdad, no weapons of mass destruction were found, with good reason to doubt the accusation that Saddam even possessed those weapons in the first place. So, it would make moral sense for the United States to cease the war and occupation of Iraq after this revelation, as John Lango says, “a war that initially had a just cause [assuming that one can argue the war was imminently one of pre-emption] might at some critical juncture while it is being waged cease to have a just cause.” However, the war ended when Saddam was toppled, with occupation lasting for seven more years. The United States and Britain sought to legitimize this presence and the war by instilling the idea that it was fought to achieve a whole new just cause, which was to wage a humanitarian military intervention to save the Iraqi people from Saddam’s oppressive regime. However, the war was only rebranded as having this primary motive after the fact that the first just cause failed to be just. Some argue that this had always been a just cause, even when going initially unrecognized or undeclared by the United States as the primary reason to go to war, which makes the Iraq war morally justified. I argue that the act of the United States going to war with Iraq was still morally impermissible even considering these humanitarian reasons. This is because the United States did not have these motives in the first place, which shape the essence of a humanitarian military intervention,

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9 Ibid.

which I will further discuss in the next section. Considering that the first just cause ceased to remain just, one would think that the Iraq War ended up assuming another just cause which was ending Saddam’s brutal regime. But this shift in cause to excuse the war highlights that right intentions were never present in the first place, which most significantly undermine the moral justification of the war. This is particularly shown through the fact that the United States could not admit that the entry into Iraq ceased to be just shows that the U.S. attempted to twist the war to fit any just cause for the convenience of legitimizing the war. This makes meeting the just cause criterion too convoluted and telling of what ulterior motives were. If evidence to produce a sufficient just cause is falsified or exaggerated, then entering a war is morally impermissible as motives necessarily seem convoluted. Overall, the different excuses for the Iraq War alongside the false intelligence deeply undermined the United States’ attempt to satisfy the criterion of right intentions in JWT, which I believe was the primary reason that the Iraq War was morally impermissible.

Right Intentions and the New Just Cause

I have argued that the causes of the Iraq War were too convoluted and impermissible in the first place no matter how one interprets the true cause of the war. I will now argue that the relationship between the just cause and right intentions criteria, especially in a humanitarian military intervention, go hand and hand with the right intention criterion being the ultimate condition to satisfy to make an HMI morally permissible. Because the United States failed to declare and commit to right intentions from the very start of the war, many worldwide intuitively feel that the war was morally unjust.

Many argue that the true intentions of the United States when waging the Iraq War were anything but humanitarian: it is likely that the United States had the principal motives of
securing foreign oil, carrying out regime change and implementing hegemonic power in the Middle East, or to even maintain the status quo of balance of power by misguidedly attempting to contain Saddam’s alleged WMDs.\textsuperscript{11} By pushing to legitimize the war through shifting causes, no matter the consequences of the invasion, the United States reflected that it had ulterior motives that made them desire a war with Iraq. The last cause used to legitimize the war was to carry out a humanitarian intervention. However, I argue that a humanitarian intervention requires an even more explicit and pertinent commitment to satisfying the criterion of right intention, because it informs all other criterion of \textit{jus ad bellum}, especially just cause which the United States failed to do. Right intentions of an HMI inform the cause of the intervention, because the sole purpose of the intervention is to recognize the rights and inherent value of those that a state is defending. Based on the Kantian account of morality, right intentions requires special emphasis in HMIs because a state has the duty to treat those in need of humanitarian intervention as ends in themselves rather than means for other motivations. The United States ultimately treated the plight of Iraqi citizens under Saddam as a means to legitimize a war for other motivations, which captures our intuitions that the United States was morally wrong in going to war with Iraq.

Imagine your neighbor, X, has a treasure chest in their backyard that you really want, while simultaneously being aware that your neighbor beats their children. You really want that treasure chest, so you falsely accuse X of hiding a gun in their shed with the intention of killing the other people living in your neighborhood. You tell your neighbors this, and they help you kick out the neighbor X and bring him to the police, so you can seize control of his yard for the

treasure chest. However, the rest of your neighbors find out that your neighbor was not actually hiding a gun in the shed, but neighbor X was still arrested for child abuse. They shame you for lying about the alleged gun, but you claim that you only wanted to kick out X and bring him to the police for the sole reason of their history of child abuse. In this case, it seems that you purposely used X’s children as an excuse to steal the treasure chest and legitimate your failed action of lying, to maintain a good reputation of your character. One can parallel this scenario to the Iraq War. It seems plausible that your act of shifting the cause undermines your intentions of saving X’s children, just as Bush’s shift of just cause undermines the intention of intervening for humanitarian reasons. This is intuitively morally unjustifiable because you in the scenario, and accordingly George Bush, are treating innocent individuals as means to reach an ulterior motive. This can be captured as the most significant factor in why the Iraq War was impermissible, especially when rebranded as a humanitarian intervention, after the fact that the first cause proved unjustified.

Objections

I argued why a state cannot shift the cause of war to morally justify it, as it further tarnishes a state’s intentions. However, Darrel Mollendorf would object by saying that even if a war failed to satisfy its cause, it may still be justified to continue it “if the likely dangers of ending it are grave enough.”¹² This may have been true in Iraq as ceasing the war when the cause ceased to be just could have resulted in total collapse of Iraq. However, I respond to this by claiming that this is a matter of securing the criteria of jus ex bello, or justice exiting the war. My focus is the evaluation of what it took to justify entering the war. Moreover, after the first cause

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fails to be just, it would be more plausible to say that it is morally unattractive to shift the aim of a war to an aim that had already existed, but one failed to initially recognize it. It would be more acceptable to shift the aim to alleviate a wrong that was caused by one’s own entering of the war, as Mollendorf describes.

I also argued that the criterion of right intention ought to be emphasized and more demanding in JWT, especially regarding HMIs. However, David Mellow objects to this reasoning that it should stand independently, by explaining that considering this criterion results in judgment only of the state’s moral character, rather than the moral nature of the war it wages. This is a serious objection to my argument; I can try to respond by claiming that in activities as large and high stakes as war, perhaps it is necessary to consider the moral character of a state who wants to enter a war. It would be difficult to isolate the rightness and wrongness of an act such as war from the moral character of the state, because all the states’ decisions depend on its moral character (that being of the heads of state). However, I understand that JWT focuses on the rightness and wrongness of an act and not of the interveners, so I do not necessarily know how to respond to this objection.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I argued that failure to satisfy just cause and right intention were the primary reasons why the Iraq War was impermissible. They lay the basis for the other criteria to be satisfied. Moreover, I argued that the dishonest nature of establishing a truly just cause reflected the wrong intentions of the United States when entering the war, which captures our intuitions based on the Kantian account that right intentions must be pertinent to justly pursuing a humanitarian military intervention.

Bibliography

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We asked Professor Cunning several questions about his interests, and how he got started in philosophy. Check out what he said below:

**How did you first become interested in philosophy?**

I took an introduction to philosophy of mind course as an undergraduate – where the topics included free will, the mind-body problem, and the nature of thinking and consciousness – and I was totally hooked. I then started to take additional coursework in philosophy. I took courses in other disciplines also, but what interested me most in those courses were the philosophical questions that kept popping up but that the instructors were not as focused on pursuing.

**What projects/publications are you currently working on, or have recently completed?**

I am currently finishing up a book on Descartes on embodiment. The main thesis is that Descartes takes reflective metaphysical inquiry very seriously, but he thinks that embodied minds can only do extremely small amounts of it, and the appropriate goal for us is to live as embodied beings while incorporating the results of metaphysical inquiry into our daily routine. I recently finished a scholarly edition of the philosophical writings of Margaret Cavendish, and also a number of articles on Cavendish on freedom, sense perception, imagination, and gender.

**What advice would you give to an undergraduate student considering a philosophy major/minor?**

I was pre-med for much of my time as an undergraduate, and I would remind students that the tools that we acquire with philosophical training provide a distinct advantage – in pre-law, pre-med, pre-nursing, pre-pharmacy, pre-business, and really anything. It’s not all about career, of course, but career is how we will be spending much of our time in later life, and so it’s very important to make it count. I would add: do not get overwhelmed thinking too far ahead about how everything is going to unfold post-graduation, but do make sure to take on finite goals at each step of the way – research projects, student orgs, volunteer opportunities, internships, student jobs – where each of these will open up additional and unforeseen possibilities if there is full immersion.
Holism and Contextualism in Restructuring Prototractatus

Amy Evans

In this paper, I will build on the work of Michael Kremer in arguing that the Tractatus (TLP) is itself a transitionary work where Wittgenstein is actively developing the contextualist and holist elements characteristic of his later views.\(^{14,15}\) I will focus on remarks concerning the 3’s from pages 103-121 of MS 104\(^{16}\). The remarks in these pages are worded almost identically to their Tractarian counterparts, but what is perhaps most significant about them is their focus on names and objects and how one ought to understand sense and reference. It is the goal of this paper to show that these remarks at the end of MS 104 give one good reason to accept that Wittgenstein had come to develop holist and contextualist attitudes towards the end of his work on TLP, that were significant enough to warrant a major restructuring of TLP. This will be shown first by characterizing aspects of the anti-realist view as established by Hidé Ishiguro in her 1969 seminal work, “Use and Reference of Names” before going on to show that the prominent aspects of this view are emphasized in the last pages of MS 104.

Anti-Realist View Broadly

The anti-realist view, in its broadest characterization, is the view that rejects the idea that TLP says one can determine the reference of a name independent of its use in a proposition.\(^{17}\) This is to say anti-realists reject the idea that a name has meaning in virtue of ostensively identifying an object to which it refers, rather names get their meaning in virtue of their

\(^{14}\) Michael Kremer argues that looking at the differences from PT to TLP show a shift in Wittgenstein’s thinking towards holist and contextualist views in his article “Contextualism and Holism in the Early Wittgenstein: From Prototractatus to Tractatus.

\(^{15}\) All translations of Tractatus are from the Pears and McGuinness translation unless otherwise specified. Moreover, numbered remarks are included within the text of this paper and as such will not be referred to in footnotes as that would be redundant.

\(^{16}\) All translations of MS 104 are from David Stern.

\(^{17}\) In this paper, “name”, is utilized as it is utilized by Ishiguro, which is to say that a name is sign that refers.
relationship to the rest of language, i.e., in the context of propositions. This is because propositions have a sense such that when one grasps the sense of a proposition, they simultaneously grasp the referent of each sign within the proposition. As such, they cannot be further defined and are primitive signs. An implication of this view is that while one might think that they could identify the referent of a name outside its context within a proposition, this is only because they have an idea of the propositions in which the name can occur, in which case the name becomes a constant and the other components of the proposition are variables (something we’ll return to later). Another consequence of this view is that if two signs have exactly the same use, they then have exactly the same referent. Looking at the issue from the other way, in terms of an object that has the same logical form as another object (and therefore, the same use), then leads one to conclude that the names on this view are actually “dummy-names” such that one knows what states of affairs such an object would figure in, but not that it really figures into these states of affairs. As such, saying “a is f” is equivalent to saying, “there is something that is f” and that “a” may be replaced by “b” or “c” or any other sign, so long as the use of the sign is consistent. Here, I’ve sketched the most important points and implications of the anti-realist view. In my next section, I will show that the remarks in the last eighteen pages of MS 104 are selected in such a way that they emphasize important concepts of the anti-realist view and are more suggestive of a reading where context determines the reference of a name, rather than ostensive definition.

**Anti-Realism, Holism, and Contextualism in the pp. 103-121 of MS 104**

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18 Ishiguro, 24-5.
19 Ishiguro, 28-9.
20 Ishiguro, 25.
21 Ishiguro, 44-46.
Some of the first remarks Wittgenstein begins revising in these pages of MS 104 are remarks from the 3.1’s.\textsuperscript{22} I will argue that the meaning of the 3.1’s changed significantly from \textit{Prototractatus} (PT) to TLP such that names are intended to only be given meaning within the context of a proposition rather than in virtue of an ostensive relationship to an object.\textsuperscript{23} I will focus on the replacement of remark 3.14, which in PT read, “In a sentential sign the simple signs correspond to the objects of reality.” In TLP, there is no occurrence a remark with this same sentiment and instead, 3.14 says, “What constitutes a propositional sign is that in its elements (the words) stand in a determinate relation to one another.” The change in the content of remark 3.14 in PT and remark 3.14 in TLP is significant because the remark in PT emphasizes the relationship to an object, whereas the remark in TLP emphasizes the relationship between the words within the propositional sign. Moreover, it’s the relation of these signs that constitutes the propositional sign, a thought that is elaborated on in the 3.14s in TLP which emphasize that it is not a simple combination of words that convey a sense, but their arrangement itself which is articulate. It is in light of these remarks within the 3.14s of TLP and the 3.1s of PT that one can see how the train of thought from the 3.1s to the 3.2s differs from PT to TLP. In PT, “sense” is mentioned briefly in 3.13, but becomes much more important in the 3.2’s.\textsuperscript{24} As such, when following the order of the PT, one understands a sentential sign as made up of names that refer to objects of reality before reaching remarks about what features are essential within a proposition for sense. This contrasts with the 3.1s in TLP, where sense features more prominently and is

\textsuperscript{22} Remarks 3.1, 3.11, 3.12 are revised on p. 103 of MS 104. Only the first remark on page 103 was included in PT and the others on this page constitute revisions of the earlier material (See section on Dating pp. 103-121).

\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Prototractatus} consists of remarks from the first 103 pages of MS 104 that were restructured by Von Wright, McGuinness and Nyberg in 1971. However, in keeping with my use of David Stern’s translation of MS 104, all translations of remarks from PT will be from David Stern and were accessed using the University of Iowa \textit{Tractatus} map.

\textsuperscript{24} The 3.2’s of PT focus on sense of a proposition, with it the sequence containing the Fregean context principle and other remarks about the sense of a proposition.
marked off as something that arises from names within the context of a proposition. Thus, when one transitions to the 3.2s in TLP, where the relationship between objects and names is defined, one recognizes that these names do not have sense by themselves and that their relationship to an object is not to be understood as an object of reality (as in PT), but as something that is being described. Hence, 3.203’s “A name means an object. The object is its meaning,” arises only when one understands what is being described within the context of a proposition.\textsuperscript{25,26}

Moreover, this line of thought is epitomized in the conclusion of the 3.2’s ending with 3.262, which says, “What signs fail to express, their application shows. What signs slur over, their application shows clearly.” Kremer has pointed out that this remark comments on both primitive and defined signs such that the “decisive factor” does not lie in a name’s reference to an object but in its use.\textsuperscript{27} This dovetails nicely with Ishiguro’s analysis of the following remark, where she takes elucidations to be evidence that one grasps the meaning of a name when one grasps its use within a proposition.\textsuperscript{28} At this point in TLP, one can see a train of thought that lends itself well to an anti-realist interpretation. The 3.1s serve to acquaint one with the idea that propositions express a sense that is over and above a mere combination of names which do not have sense by themselves. These ideas, in turn, shape the ideas of the 3.2s such that when a name is linked to its referent, it is not to be understood as an ostensive link to an object, but instead as denoting what is described by the proposition in which it occurs. This progression sets one up to accept the next remark: that “Only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have meaning.”\textsuperscript{29} In PT, the line of thought does not proceed like this, with the relationship

\textsuperscript{25} The 3.1’s of TLP discuss the capability of propositions to express a thought and mark them off as different from “blends of words” (3.141).
\textsuperscript{26} Revisions of 3.2, 3.02, 3.21, 3.201, 3.25, and 3.251 are located on pp. 104-105 of MS 104.
\textsuperscript{27} Kremer, 100-101.
\textsuperscript{28} Ishiguro, 28-9.
\textsuperscript{29} TLP 3.3: The Fregean Context Principle
between names and objects occurring much earlier, before remarks about the arrangements of names within these propositions. Denoting this relationship earlier colors these later remarks, where the meanings of names arise from something in the world as opposed to how they figure into propositions. Moreover, we should take evidence of this transition from the last pages of MS 104. In these final pages, Wittgenstein revises the main premises of the early 3’s (3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and remarks that comment on these premises), which may indicate that he was revising the overall line of thought that these remarks follow, something we have shown changes considerably from PT to TLP to be in favor of a more anti-realist reading.

I will now turn towards new remarks that Wittgenstein develops in the last pages of MS 104, which correspond to remarks that comment on 3.3, the Fregean context principle, to show that Wittgenstein developed holist and contextualist ideas in these pages. Ishiguro points out that one only thinks they have an idea of what a name refers to because they have knowledge about the types of propositions in which it can occur. She takes this from remark 3.312, a remark that Wittgenstein develops within a sequence of remarks in MS 104 and continues to develop in TLP. The remarks in MS 104 first assert that an expression on its own is a presupposition of all the propositions in which it occurs, before then going on to develop the idea of a propositional variable. Remark 3.313 states, “An expression is thus presented by a variable whose values are the propositions containing the expression. (In the limiting case the variable becomes a constant, the expression a proposition.) I call such a variable a ‘propositional variable’.” This is then followed by remark 3.314, which amounts to a restatement of the Fregean context principle, “An

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30 Ishiguro, 24-25.
31 Remarks 3.311, 3.312, 3.313, and 3.314 are a new line of thought written into p. 108 in MS 104.
32 In this paper, I use “sign”, “symbol” and “expression” as they are used by Kremer. This is to say that a “sign” is a perceivable, auxiliary device that has no meaning or use connected to it. “Symbol” and “Expression” are terms that are relatively interchangeable and are signs that are united with their use such that they have a meaning.
expression has meaning only in a proposition. All variables can be construed as propositional variables. (Including variable names.)” The meaning of an expression depends on the propositions in which it figures. The parenthetical in 3.314 is important here, as it specifically includes that names are themselves propositional variables from which we can infer that the value of their referents can be determined only within the context of a proposition. The remarks in the 3.31’s get more involved in TLP, with 3.316 remarking, “What values the propositional variable can assume is determined. The determination of the values is the variable.” Followed by 3.317 which remarks, “The determination of the values of the propositional variable is done by indicating the propositions whose common mark the variable is. The determination is a description of these propositions. The description will therefore deal only with symbols not with their meaning. And only this is essential to the determination, that it is only a description of symbols and asserts nothing about what is symbolized.” We can take 3.316 and 3.317 as saying this: in taking all the propositions in which a propositional variable occurs, one completely describes the use of the propositional variable, but this description does not denote an object. This interpretation is given additional credence in that these remarks lead up to the 3.32’s which, as Kremer has noted, focus on the arbitrariness of signs which then, through use, become non-arbitrary, with 3.326 summarizing, “In order to recognize the symbol in the sign we must consider the significant use.” To summarize Kremer, when we consistently use signs, we bring meaning to them, whereas outside of its use there is no reason why a particular sign would symbolize what it symbolizes. Connecting this back to 3.316 and 3.317, taking the use of a

33 The translation of this remark is taken from the Ogden-Ramsey translation as I believe Ogden and Ramsey’s use of “symbolized” is better in this context as opposed to Pear and McGuinness’s “signified” this is in virtue of Kremer’s use of the word “symbol” as a sign with its meaning as opposed to “sign” which is just a perceivable linguistic device that does not have a meaning simpliciter.
34 Remarks 3.32, 3.321, 3.322, 3.323 are also written into MS 104 from pp. 104-105.
propositional variable describes the use of the propositional variable, but this does not denote anything outside of its use—an object or otherwise. The remarks in the 3.31’s and the 3.32’s are first sketched out in MS 104, with their content not being traceable to any of Wittgenstein’s other writings. This suggests that by the time Wittgenstein had begun revising and editing PT, he decided that he needed this extra content for the final TLP. The focus of this extra content specifically characterizes the relationship between signs and their use, with use being capable of transforming the sign into a symbol, but that this transformation ultimately only says something about the symbol and not anything about what is symbolized, i.e. an object. Thus, Wittgenstein’s decision to add this extra content gives us reason to believe that his views had begun to shift towards holism and contextualism.

**Conclusion and Notes on Dating pp. 103-121**

In this section, I will briefly include some information about the timeline of the composition of PT and the relevance of this information regarding taking TLP as a transitionary work. In “Contextualism and Holism in the Early Wittgenstein: From Prototratatus to Tractatus”, Kremer takes Brian McGuinness’s timeline of PT as a jumping off point. McGuinness takes PT to be developed in three stages over almost three years, which Kremer takes to be a reason that Wittgenstein’s thought could have shifted significantly over this period of time and that the changes from PT to TLP might track this change. His article, of course, goes on to highlight several instances where PT seems to be saying something quite different from TLP and that TLP is often saying something much more contextualistic and holistic. This

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35 This timeline is established in Brian McGuinness’s article, “Some Pre-Tractatus Manuscripts”. It is of course, also important to note that dating the composition of the Tractatus is a tricky matter and McGuinness’s timeline has been disputed by some scholars, notably Jinho Kang in his 2005 article, “On the Composition of the Prototratatus”.

36 Kremer, 89-90.
paper is quite sympathetic with Kremer’s view. This paper, though, is specifically interested in a section of material that is outside of PT, namely the last eighteen pages of MS 104. McGuinness’s timeline does not say much about these pages, except it contains new material that “does not draw on previous material that we know of…these additional remarks appear in MS 104 in exactly the form they take in the surviving typescripts of Tractatus, which, though based on other sources too, must have drawn on this manuscript at a late if not final stage, so that we may safely say that we have here the final stage in composition of that work.”37 As such, I draw on McGuinness’s determination that these last pages of MS 104 constitute a final stage of writing and revision prior to TLP. In the above section, I have shown that the revised remarks in the last eighteen pages of MS 104 have significant implications for how one perceives the line of thought from the 3.1s leading up to the Fregean context principle such that the line of thought becomes one that establishes the importance of the proposition as the unit of sense before providing information on names and objects, such that one should not take the relationship between the two to be one as simple as denoting. Second, I hope to have shown that the new content in the last remarks of MS 104 indicates that symbols are given meaning in virtue of their use rather than in virtue of saying something about an object. These ideas suggest that Wittgenstein had already begun shifting his thinking towards holism and contextualism. This is to agree with Kremer’s assertion that TLP is itself a transitionary work, but it is also to assert that one can see evidence of Wittgenstein’s change in thinking in MS 104 itself, with its plus signs marking areas of revision that we have examined here and its new content indicative of a decisively contextual and holist standpoint.

37 McGuinness, 46-47.
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Intellectual Intuition: A Definite Kind of the Non-Sensible?

Tobías García Vega

A central thesis in Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*, is that there is a distinct rule-governed structure to human cognition. After the *Transcendental Aesthetic* establishes cognition as a dyadic process, consisting in ‘sensibility’ and ‘understanding’, Kant abbreviates that view using the term ‘sensible intuition’. However, the fact that humans have sensible intuition does not belie the possibility of other modes of cognition. Kant understands one such possibility as a subject whose cognitive apparatus unites both the sensibility and the understanding into one: an ‘intellectual intuition’. For Kant, that greater, non-human, mode of cognition is God’s by necessity. This paper demonstrates that by positing intellectual intuition, Kant contradicts the overall epistemological project of the First Critique insofar as it intends to delimit the boundaries of human reason. As a result, Kant can no longer posit that God’s intuition must be an intellectual one without engaging in transcendent metaphysics.

First, I offer a few key Kantian definitions. Kant considers ‘sensibility’ to be a passive human capacity for the direct reception of objects made possible through our sensory modalities. By the ‘understanding’, Kant means a more generative faculty, i.e., the seat of what we call ‘thinking’ required for the production of knowledge. Both sensibility and the understanding correspond to two modes of representing and organizing directly received sensory experience intuition and concept. Intuitions are unique and immediate representations of objects via the sensibility. Concepts allow the intellect to create abstract representations to generate more complex thought.

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38 A19/B33
The term ‘sensible intuition’ is a summary of how humans cognize. Kant notes, “Sensible intuition is either pure intuition (space and time) or empirical intuition of that which, through sensation, is immediately represented as real in space and time”\(^{39}\). Humans stand in a direct relation to objects but only insofar as our representations objects are made possible by our sensibility. Therefore, what makes our intuition sensible is the fact that sensible intuition depends on an external cause, both for its existence and for its content, delimiting human cognition a basis in either pure or empirical intuition.

‘Cognition’ is contrasted with ‘thought’, the extension of our concepts past the realm of experience, guided by strict non-contradiction. Following Leech\(^{40}\), I argue the notion of “cognition” in Kant can be interpreted epistemically. Objects of thought are not themselves required to conform to our sensibility while objects of cognition are. Correspondingly, Leech notes that thought is the locus of “logical possibility” while cognition is the locus of “real possibility”. Kant notes,

If we do not begin with experience, or proceed in accordance with laws of the empirical connection of appearances, then we are only making a vain display of wanting to discover or research the existence of any thing. (B274)

In the remarks preceding this passage, Kant makes clear that something is logically possible if it is not contradictory in principle and that real possibility concerns something that is both logically possible and could be the object of direct experience.

However, to cognize objects it is “not necessary for us to limit the kind of intuition in space and time to the sensibility of human beings”\(^{41}\). In accordance with Kant’s transcendental project, we may assert that our relation to objects is mediated by sensation and in turn watermarks human

\(^{39}\) B147
\(^{40}\) Leech 2014
\(^{41}\) B72
thought. Here Kant argues that we cannot prove whether all subjects with intuitions necessarily have sensible intuition like ourselves. Therefore, it remains a live possibility that there exist subjects in the universe with forms of intuition distinct from our own. Even if as Kant notes “it may well be that all finite thinking beings must necessarily agree with human beings in this regard”\textsuperscript{42}, this says nothing of an infinite thinking being. Uncaused, independent, and original in its intuition of objects, Kant argues that God’s intuition, were he to exist, must be intellectual. These claims are, however, “only an illustration of our aesthetic theory and not as a ground of its proof”\textsuperscript{43} since, as it appears to Kant, there can be no rational proof of God’s existence and therefore no rational proof of the existence of an intellectual intuition.

The debate over what Kant meant by ‘intellectual intuition’ is far from settled\textsuperscript{44}. At times, Kant seems to mean a non-sensible intuition, indeterminate in its exact character\textsuperscript{45}. Elsewhere, Kant describes it as an intuition that is capable of generating objects via perception; a being whose sensibility and understanding comprise a single generative faculty. Gram (1981) separates the term into three distinct phenomena while Gardner (1999) and Leech (2014) unite them all under one coherent picture. Despite these various interpretations, what remains in the Critique is a mode of intuition distinct from our own sensible intuition.

Kant’s phenomenal-noumenal distinction plays a crucial role in this discussion. Phenomena, as “appearances to the extent that as objects they are thought in accordance with the unity of the categories”\textsuperscript{46}, are the objects of sensible intuition. On the other hand, noumena are “things that are merely objects of the understanding and that, nevertheless, can be given to an

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{44} Gram 1981, Leech 2014
\textsuperscript{45} B149
\textsuperscript{46} A249
intuition, although not to sensible intuition”\textsuperscript{47}. Kant claims we can characterize noumena positively and negatively. Negatively, noumena in the minimal sense are things only insofar as they are “not an object of our sensible intuition”\textsuperscript{48}. Positively, noumena are “object[s] of non-sensible intuition”\textsuperscript{49}. To make this claim “assume[s] a special kind of intuition, namely intellectual intuition, which, however, is not our own, and the possibility of which we cannot understand”\textsuperscript{50}. We can never be certain that noumena, in the robust sense, exist but Kant insists that they would be objects for a subject with intellectual intuition.

One of the driving claims behind transcendental idealism is that we can never have knowledge that transcends the limits of possible experience. Since we have sensible intuition, our knowledge, and more generally our cognition, is limited to the domain of spatio-temporality. But Kant nevertheless suggests that we may have knowledge of that which transcends all possible experience insofar as it is guided by the principle of non-contradiction. If non-contradiction is the only guiding principle for thought that can extend past empirical experience, then there is no rational proof whether the various kinds of non-sensible intuitions that are logically possible are in fact intellectual or take some other form. Kant’s work to bring epistemology to an anthropocentric standpoint prevents any such claim since we, limited by sensible intuition, cannot arrive at a definitive form of cognition that has noumena as its object of intuition.

What is in question is how we can know positive noumena are the object of an intellectual intuition; the ‘knowability’ of the unknowable. Intellectual intuition is not ‘really possible’, but at least logically possible since it is not contradictory (Leech 2014). The problem, however, is that there is no adjudicating principle between non-sensible forms of intuition as long as they satisfy

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{48} B307
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.
the requirement of non-contradiction. If all that is required for a concept to be logically possible is
that it be non-contradictory, there are any number of competing ways to posit such an idea.
Therefore, by Kant’s admission, since there can be no rational proof of God’s existence, and we
lack all possible empirical intuition of God\(^51\), our representations of God can only ever be non-
contradictory. But then there is seemingly an endless number of logically possible characterizations of God.

From the anthropocentric standpoint, Kant is not at liberty to give a determinate account of
how a specific non-sensible intuition must think or cognize objects\(^52\). There is no principled way
to move from the minimal notion of a non-sensible intuition to an intellectual one. Rather than
only require us to think of things that are past the boundaries of our possible knowledge, it requires
us to suspend the very way in which we intuit objects. Since Kant lacks a proof securing his claims
that a non-sensible intuition is more than merely indeterminate and instead takes the form of
intellectual intuition, he fails to attribute such a faculty to God with any rational justificatory
reason. Kant’s famous quotation where he admits that he “had to deny knowledge in order to make
room for faith”\(^53\) as a veiled concession that the divide cannot be bridged with anything other than
transcendent metaphysical claims. Kant lacks proof with apodictic certainty of God’s existence
but beyond that, he also lacks a resolution to the knowable-yet-unknowable divide. Generally
speaking, there is no proof Kant can offer that bridges the gap from negative- to positive-noumena,
non-sensible with intellectual intuition, and boundaries of knowledge that are unknowable yet
clearly demarcated.

\(^{51}\) As Kant argues in the Antinomies of Pure Reason
\(^{52}\) Kant makes a claim self-consciously to the same effect in B72
\(^{53}\) Bxxx
Knowledge of God’s constitution as an intellectual intuition is unavailable to Kantian anthropocentric epistemology. Not only has Kant conceded that we cannot have cognitions or knowledge of God, God’s existence, positive noumena, or intellectual intuition, but he must also concede that no knowledge that God would be a being with intellectual intuition is available to us. The reason is more than the fact that the cognitions involved in the claim are, empirically speaking, empty. The problem is deeper, as there is also no possible rational proof of the concepts involved. So, any unification of these concepts into a compound is subject to the same criticisms. Therefore, the compound claim that God, if God were to exist, would have intellectual intuition is itself unknowable. Such ‘unknowability’ impacts the individual concepts involved in making the claim. The official Kantian position regarding such notions is generally presented as a through line that noumena are unavailable to us as knowledge. The aim of this essay was to demonstrate that intellectual intuition is equally unknowable.

An objection could be made that God, as a being with intellectual intuition, is one of the various ways which we reason from faith as Kant argues in the Canon of Pure Reason. Although there is no rational proof, (e.g. of God’s existence, of our free-will, of the world having a supreme cause) we are compelled by practical reason to act “as if” God were a being with intellectual intuition, having noumenal reality as its object. But this objection requires that we not only accept Kant’s detailing of the positive use of reason presented in the Canon, but that we also allow him to presume a positive determinate non-sensible intuition in order to secure positive noumena in his metaphysics and epistemology preceding the Canon. Both of which are questionable positions in their own right.

Another possible Kantian response is that intellectual intuition is purely in the realm of the conceivable. However, this claim has no impact on the Kantian position since all Kant intends to
demonstrate, they say, is *not* that we can have knowledge of God as a being with intellectual intuition, the claim is instead that it is possible to have knowledge of the necessity that God has intellectual intuition. Our sensible intuition is therefore not a necessary mode of intuition as it is not impossible to think of a nonhuman form of intuition. Kant’s real concern is avoiding dogmatically asserting that all intuitions are sensible. This objection is supported by Kant’s discussion of the objects of non-sensible intuition,

> But it is not yet a genuine cognition if I merely indicate what the intuition of the object is *not*, without being able to say what is then contained in it; for then I have not represented the possibility of an object for my pure concept of the understanding at all, since I cannot give any intuition that would correspond to it, but could only say that ours is not valid for it. (B149)

Therefore, Kant does not overstep any boundaries by saying we have a *cognition* of a non-sensible intuition because that was never the claim. We all but make that claim regarding the objects of a non-sensible intuition because, characterized negatively and according to the principle of non-contradiction, “it is not yet a genuine cognition”; i.e., this is almost, but not yet, a transcendent metaphysical claim. Gardner reflects this train of thought when initially describing a nonhuman form of sensibility:

> …we can form the idea of a way of sensing that employs something else in place of space and time; although we can form no contentful or definite idea of what this could be, there can be no justification for declaring non-human kinds of sensible intuition impossible… (Gardner 1999, p. 70)

However, such interpretations forget that Kant breaks his own rule and gives a definite answer as to what a nonhuman form of sensibility would be: intellectual intuition.

The problem still stands, since Kant characterizes the positive sense of noumena as requiring a hypothetical intellectual intuition that would intuit such an object. Though the objection made is correct insofar as we may never have a cognition of noumena in the positive sense, this does no harm to the argument sustained in this paper. If Kant recognizes he is unjustified in saying
that the negative sense of noumena entails the positive sense of noumena, then the same must be
said of non-sensible and intellectual intuition. Precautions are taken in the case of noumena since
we know them positively only as the object of an intellectual intuition, but this is predicated on a
dogmatic assertion that reason is allowed to make the inference from an indeterminate non-sensible
intuition to a definite intellectual intuition.

When extending the categories past all possible experience, our only guide is the principle
of non-contradiction. Non-sensible intuition is therefore thinkable in too many ways. There then
exists no principle demonstrating that non-sensible intuition and intellectual intuition are
necessarily different sides of the same coin. If Kant is right regarding noumena in the negative
sense, we can know one side. But we only know this side, any number of non-human intuitions
can take the other. We have thereby reached the upper limits of what transcendental idealism can
prove. Turning over the coin so that we may determine which kind of non-sensible intuition lies
underneath is, in its entirety, no more than transcendent metaphysical speculation.
Works Cited


Blake’s Reading Recommendations

Do No Harm: Stories of Life, Death, and Brain Surgery, Henry Marsh (2014)

In *Do No Harm*, Henry Marsh, a retired British neurosurgeon, takes the reader through some of his most defining moments of his career. He recalls great successes, pulling off remarkable surgeries few other people on the planet are capable of. Marsh also shares the tragedies of his past, including unexpected deaths of patients, and attempting to balance his personal life with the rigorous demands of his career. *Do No Harm* hits a target audience far beyond those just interested in medicine. Marsh delves into religion, ethics, politics, and even metaphysics. His unique perspective as an individual who spent his entire career editing the minds of others through surgical procedures, forces the reader to consider the direct impact and importance of philosophy in the modern world.

Atomic Habits, James Clear (2018)

As a college student, I am always looking for ways to be more productive. There are endless distractions present on a college campus, and amid a pandemic, it can be difficult to build good habits and stave off bad ones. In *Atomic Habits*, James Clear offers a refreshing take on the science of habit building and presents the reader with his own quantifiable methods for building them. Clear lays out simple framework, built on top of established neuroscience, that can be implemented into daily life to improve productivity and health. Individuals with an interest in improving quality of life, neuroscience, or stoicism, would enjoy this read.
Can There Be Meaning Without God?

Maria F. Carriel

Regarding the question of “What is the meaning of life?”, philosophers tend to give out two answers: either there is meaning in life or there is no meaning at all. Humans seem to instinctively care about meaning, constantly looking out for it in the universe, wondering whether their lives are significant at all. Miguel de Unamuno argued once that a world with no meaning is completely unbearable. Michael Ruse, a methodological naturalist philosopher seems to disagree. For Ruse, humans are no more than survival machines. We are contingent end products of evolution. Ruse’s outlook on meaning goes as follows: without Christianity, God, afterlife or objective ethics, there is no meaning. All we do have is existence today. Opposing Ruse, Michael Peterson, a theistic philosopher, proposes a sacred reality that is good and purposive. If the question of the meaning of life is analog to the question of the purpose of life, then this question seems to depend on the existence of God. The common view, if God is in the picture, is that he created us with a purpose in mind. If there is no God, then it seems impossible to argue for objective meaning, in the sense of a purpose to our existence. By contrasting Ruse’s naturalistic view and Peterson’s theistic view of meaning, we might be able to get a clearer idea on whether God is necessary for meaning to exist.

Michael Ruse is interested in why humans believe in God or gods. Ruse holds that religious beliefs about a divine being are false due to his naturalist ontological commitments. Furthermore, he posits that there are no objective religious facts that can make religious beliefs true. There is no such transcendent being people call “God”. Despite this, Ruse is interested in knowing why people truly believe. He offers a couple of suggestions: (1). religion gives people a sense of belonging, (2). it could be a matter of mistaken perceptions or (3). it is a selected feature of evolution. The last is the most interesting of the alternatives, as due to his naturalist commitments, he needs to concede that religion has stayed amongst us for so long due to it having some function that selection picks up and improves. Religion appears to play a useful biological function, as so much to do with religion does seem molded to fit biology. This is true independently from whether religion itself is actually true. Some authors have provided a natural explanation for religion,
arguing for its falsehood. Dawkins, for example, states that “when a child is young, for good Darwinian reasons, it would be valuable if the child believed everything it’s told”. Therefore, if, as a kid, you are told to “Believe in the great juju in the sky,” you should believe it. Then these religious codes are passed down through generations, like a virus. Ruse considers that all of this could be true, but it does not follow that religion is false. Ruse’s argument against religion relies on Darwinian evolution and its relation to ethics. The non-directedness of Darwinian evolution makes it possible for different end points regarding morality. This is problematic when one wants to claim objectivity in ethics. From a Darwinian perspective, Christianity seems like a good religion but so does Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, etc. If there are objective ethics, then each of these religions retelling of morality can’t all be true! Granted, in ethics, an evolutionary explanation does not show that there is no objective truth in ethics, but it does establish that it is quite unlikely that there is. Therefore, if not religion, what else could we use to guide us through life? Evolutionism? Well, evolutionism is no better in the end than Christianity. Evolution as a mechanism does not allow us to have humans at the top (it is done by mere courtesy), nor does it guide us to moral conduct either. Therefore, if Christianity and any other substitutes are out of the picture, what is left for us to do? Ruse posits that we have to realize what we are faced with: without Christianity, no God, afterlife or objective ethics, there is nothing or there is something you cannot know or hope for. All that the evolutionist philosopher is trying to do is offer a clear picture of the world as best as they can. But the evolutionist picture does not contain hope, meaning or value. When faced with this problem, Ruse considers that the best course of action is to accept this reality. As John Stuart Mill once said, “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied that a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.” Even if religion can provide us with a positive view of meaning, Ruse thinks we should not be fooled by it. There is no meaning, and we should not search for ways to keep on lying to us on that matter. Fear of the unknown, of the meaningless, should not be an excuse to deny it.

Michael Peterson expresses that, as humans, we have a deep longing to make sense of life and the world. Meaning and purpose seem to have always been tied to religion but, nowadays, science has also decided to have a say on it. Both Ruse and Peterson agree that science, due to how it operates, cannot
provide answers on questions of purpose or meaning. For someone like Ruse though, this implies that there is no meaning at all. For Peterson, in order to have a complete view of reality (and meaning), both fields, theology and science, need to be taken into account. Peterson argues that the meaningful world in which science operates makes better sense under theistic assumptions than under naturalistic assumptions. After all, the intellectual strength of any worldview is based on its ability to offer a coherent, credible interpretation of all the relevant data, not just an airtight chain of evidence. For naturalism, nature is the fundamental reality with no intrinsic value nor purpose. Rationality, morality, and personhood are nothing but products of the evolutionary process and should not be assigned any ultimate significance. Peterson holds that physical nature as ultimate reality is not sufficient to generate an explanation of positive meaning, something which humans seem to intrinsically care for. He considers that Ruse holds a reductionist approach when saying that the appearance of humans is either the result of evolution or God – but not both. Scientific naturalism commits many reductionistic fallacies: reducing reality to the material and reducing teleological explanation to mechanical explanation. Nature has no purpose and empirical science can’t discern purpose in how nature operates. Humans? Product of chance. Universe existing? Again, purely by chance. If we look (with a reductionist lens) for meaning in the elemental components out of which everything is made, then no meaning can be found. Therefore, the meaning of the universe must be explained by something outside it, something that makes it likely to be brought about. Therefore, Peterson believes in evolutionary theism, which both accepts and interprets evolutionary facts as revealing something of how God made the world to work. He sees God as guiding evolution to make us both religious as well as moral creatures. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise for a theist that there are cultural as well as biological aspects to religion. As an epistemological realist, he thinks we can reasonably assess theological claims on their explanatory merits and that this is a philosophical rather than scientific activity. For Peterson, basic theism can explain key features of life and the world better than naturalism does and Christian theology adds to the greater explanatory power of theism. For theism, God is the basis for making sense of existence and the rational structure of the universe and the existence of finite rational moral beings within. Reality then rather than depending on “pure chance”, depends on the nature and purposes of God.
The doctrine of creation holds that there is value to both the physical universe and human history. Additionally, eschatology affirms that God is working to redeem and transform humanity and material creation. Due to this, our future holds an unimaginably wonderful destiny for finite reality. Peterson affirms that Christianity and theism can explain the reality in which science operates better than naturalism. Naturalism proposes a story with no meaning on it, for Peterson, theism tells the full story. A theistic universe intrinsically possesses meaning because it is created and guided by God, a purposive agent. Antony Flew purposes that “A supremely intelligent and powerful being behind the universe was required to make sense of the intelligible and purposive dimensions of the world revealed by reflection on science.” Due to the ultimate origin of the universe lying beyond science’s reach, Flew concluded that there must be a God. For theism, the most fundamental reality is an intelligent personal agent who has purposes and intentions. An intelligible fine-tuned universe, in which consciousness, rationality, morality and personhood all fit together, becomes meaningful in light of a God who has a consciousness, rationality and moral goodness and is himself a personal agent. We can admire God’s relational, self-giving nature in his free choice to create a finite world in which there are personal beings that could join him in fellowship. Theologically, our world is a meaningful world. A world invested with significance and developing within the scope of divine purpose, a world that progresses, an evolutionary world.

I consider the main point shared by these two views is that science is not able to answer questions about meaning. Religion, though, is able to provide an answer: God is the sole provider of meaning. The true point of disagreement here is the importance the two authors give to the conceptual resources that either science or theism have to offer. As Ruse employs science as his sole source to explain reality, then it is only logical that science’s impossibility to answer questions of meaning implies that there is no meaning at all. As Peterson can combine scientific explanations with a theological framework, he is able to provide a positive value account of meaning. I do consider that, due to Ruse’s methodological and metaphysical naturalist commitments, his argument is sound. If there is no God or even a supernatural force that can account for meaning, then meaning does not exist. What type of meaning is Ruse referring to though? It seems that regarding meaning, naturalists have two important features to consider: the extent to which
human mind constitutes meaning and whether there actually are conditions of meaning that do not vary amongst humans. For a naturalist like Ruse, it seems that two options are available: the subjectivist view and the objectivist view.

The subjectivist view holds that meaning is relative to the subject. It depends on individual’s desires, ends and choices. Meaning of life varies, depending on each one’s variable mental states. It appears to be straightforward to account for what is meaningful in terms of what people find meaningful or what people want out of life. To me, subjectivism seems a plausible positive value view of meaning. It is reasonable to think that a person’s life is significant insofar as they are true to themselves or their deepest nature. Meaning as a function of satisfying desires held by an individual is an idea that makes sense to me. Even though subjectivism has significant objections to it (i.e. there seem to be things that most of us see as valuable, e.g., morality), I think that under this view, it is completely possible to have meaning (subjective meaning) without God in the picture (as meaning would solely depend on each one of us).

The objectivist view holds that there are some standards for meaning that do not vary amongst humans. Meaning is constituted (at least in part) by something physically independent of the mind, and we can have correct or incorrect beliefs on what is actually meaningful. After all, there seem to be certain inherently worthwhile conditions that make things meaningful. Morality, for example, seems to be meaningful regardless of what individuals think of it or whether they practice moral behavior. I consider that one of the strongest objectivist views on morality is utilitarianism. In utilitarianism, the more one benefits others, the more meaningful one’s life is. I know utilitarianism might be in tension with certain principles of morality (e.g. Is it truly better to kill 100 people to save a 500?), but it is certainly an account that does not depend on God at all. Meaning then is objectively defined as that that brings about the greatest amount of good. The only problem I have with this view, is that I don’t see where the obligation of bringing about the greater amount of good comes from. If you ask a utilitarian, “Why is it meaningful to bring about the greater amount of good,” they could just reply, “Because it is.” But I consider that if you ask either the theist or the subjectivist, they could provide you an answer that does not leave any explanatory remainder. For a
subjectivist, something is meaningful due to it satisfying individual desires and aspirations. For a theist, one’s existence is more significant the better one fulfills a purpose God has assigned to them.

Additionally, I agree with Peterson in that in order to explain the universe, we have to look outside of it. But I don’t believe that this necessarily entails that what is outside it is the theistic God. Naturalists, for example, point out that an impersonal, karmic-like force of nature conceivably could distribute penalties and rewards in the way a retributive personal judge (like the theistic God) would. Theists describe God as an all-knowing, omnipotent, all-good, personal being. Both views have problems though, as if God were like us (a personal being, for example) the more reason we have for thinking we don’t actually need him. But if we think that for God to be the sole source of meaning, he must be unlike us, we face the following issue: if he is unlike us, as proposed by the supernaturalist view, then how are we supposed to achieve meaning? How would we be able to understand what purpose he has for us?

In conclusion, I consider that there can be solid arguments in favor of a positive value view of meaning that do not include the theistic God. I will say though that it is easier to argue for meaning being subjective with no God in the picture rather than meaning being objective. As objectivity is independent of an individual’s perception, emotions, or imagination, then, by definition, objective meaning needs to come about by “something” outside ourselves. But this does not necessarily entail that this “something” has to be the theistic God.
References


In his Republic, Plato writes Socrates’ character as a determined seeker and lover of truth who endures arduous elenctic examination in attempts to derive bare-boned explanations for the nature of the good, the soul, and justice. Through strenuous mental exercise and argumentation, Socrates (through Plato’s writings) progresses towards this goal by establishing multiple accounts of powers and desires that rule the souls of each human. For example, Plato argues that some humans are ruled by necessary and non-necessary appetitive desires such as money, food, drink, and sex can only opine by exercising the cognitive power of eikasia or ‘perceptual thought.’ Socrates goes further in depth about those who opine and the nature of opinions through developing the sight-seers and craft-lovers argument; he argues that sight-seers and craft-lovers, who are a majority of humans, do not possess the knowledge they claim to have because they confuse the likeness of properties to their Forms. In other words, sight-seers inform their beliefs through the visual world, in which they cannot truly discern the difference between what a property F is and what it is not—their distorted accounts of properties may lead to contradiction and impair a sight-seer’s ability to distinguish between F and its opposite, which limits their epistemic powers to mere opinion. But how easy is it to even create an account of a property F that can apply to F and its opposite? To do so seems like a difficult riddle-challenge, yet if most of us tend to sit in the land between knowledge and ignorance, it ought to seem like an intuitive and simple task.

54 All translations of Republic are taken from Reeves (2004).
55 Swanson (2019) p. 8-10, 23
56 476c-479b8
In this paper, I will provide cases to show that if I were to exercise the psychological power of *eikasia* to formulate accounts of beauty, justice, and being double, the accounts of these properties would be no more themselves than their opposites. I will further show that the accounts of these properties contradict themselves due to solely formulating them through perceptual features of reality which are respectively: the perceptible effect of a cause (to define beauty), the practice of a positive action (to define justice), and the spatial extension of an object (to define being double). Next, I will provide a potential objection to Plato’s argument that money lovers and food-drink-sex lovers, or essentially vicious people, are always in a dream-like state; there seems to be a case that actively vicious people might be just as awake as those who know and practice virtue. Finally, I will attempt to defend Plato from this objection by claiming that vicious people cannot distinguish what is good for them in their dream-like state and what is actually good for them.

I will first define beauty in a way in which its definition will be sometimes true and sometimes not, based on a perceptual thought framework. In Plato’s words, my definition will explain something that is no more beautiful than not beautiful.\(^{57}\) Considering the property of beauty through *eikasia*, I would define it as for all x, x has beauty if and only if x creates a visually pleasing, euphonious, or mentally satisfying effect on those who perceive it.\(^{58}\)

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57 Swanson (2019) p. 24; 479a
58 Before developing this particular definition, I had considered defining the property of beauty by using the word ‘aesthetic,’ as humans appear to have an appetitive desire to perceive things that are aesthetically pleasing. Yet I realized that the term ‘aesthetic’ necessitates the property of beauty within its own definition, which would thus result in me begging the question. I do not plan to beg the question in my paper, so this prompted me to abandon that notion and find another definition that is formulated through *eikasia*. 

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This account of the property of beauty may sometimes support the sufficient condition of beauty, as there are some circumstances in which if an object gives off sensory pleasure and/or mental satisfaction, then it is good and beautiful. For example, let’s refer to how we call a scenic view beautiful. There is beauty in a morning sunrise because it visually pleases the eye of one who wakes up and their view is nothing but fresh green fields and a colorfully bright open sky. Intuitively, we would call this a beautiful view rather than a view of a plain concrete wall that is not visually pleasing. However, there are other circumstances that counteract the necessary condition of beauty, in which an object cannot be beautiful only if it gives off a perceptively pleasurable and satisfying effect to someone. An example of these circumstances would be of a euphonious song that is so perceptively satisfying that some consumers would ignore the extremely problematic and unjust lyrics of the song, while other consumers would grimace listening to it. More specifically, take the song “Pumped Up Kicks” released by the alternative-rock band Foster the People in 2010 has what many consider a very beautifully-sounding rhythm and harmony—yet the lyrics are about a very ugly tale that vividly describes a troubled boy who plans and executes a school shooting. That seems to be the opposite of an account of beauty, but rather horrifying and grotesque. This song was extremely popular back when it was out, and many people thought it was a beautiful and catchy song. However, once consumers began realizing what the lyrics were about, I’ve encountered many people (including myself) who instantly recoiled at the song; the song’s beautiful and upbeat tune produced a mentally dissatisfying state for those who paid attention to the lyrics. Yet, the fact that many innately recoil at the song did not mean that it was not beautiful to them, as it still had some aesthetic qualities which made it so popular. As one can see, an artwork like this song may be pleasing in one respect but displeasing in another, which contradicts the necessary condition of beauty.
Therefore, as the opposite of ‘beauty’ (B) is not beauty (~B), it seems that this property of giving off a perceptively pleasurable and satisfying effect (B) is no more B then ~B. I defined beauty as a property of an **observable effect of a cause**\(^{59}\), in which a subject/object would cause a perceptively pleasurable effect on the perceiver, but effects may be expressed variably in a visual world without considering more intelligible properties, resulting in the contradiction above.

In Book 1 of the *Republic* I, Cephalus defines justice in a way that his account was no more just than unjust.\(^{60}\) Considering this as a perfect example of a casual observation that is merely based on perceptive action, I will now define justice in a way that will also be based on a **positive action** as a perceptive feature of reality. For this case, I argue that justice can be defined as the act of doing unto others as one would have others do unto him/her/them\(^{61}\).

Sometimes, it would indeed be just to only do to others what one wants done to them under the specific circumstances that one wants no harm done to them and only wants good deeds done for them. However, under certain circumstances, one can attack the sufficient condition of this account of justice. Regarding how one wants to be treated, mostly everyone else besides that one person does not want to be treated in the same way that this one person wants.

To further clarify, consider a masochistic person—or one who takes pleasure (be it sexual or general) when physical pain and/or disrespect is inflicted upon them. This person would likely ask and desire that others punch him/her in the face and treat them degradingly. Would it be just for this masochist to punch others (non-masochists) in the face because they would ask for it to

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\(^{59}\) Rather than the cause itself, which is a property of Plato’s Forms.

\(^{60}\) 331b Cephalus defines justice as telling the truth and/or paying debts one has incurred, which can explain accounts of both justice and its opposite. Returning a weapon to a friend may be just under the circumstance that paying the debt incurred does not harm others. Under the circumstance that the friend turned into a reckless madman, however, it obviously seems that returning a weapon to this friend is not a just action, but rather unjust.

\(^{61}\) This is a classic account of the ‘Golden Rule,’ which many truly do accept as their account of justice in this day and age.
be done onto themselves in the first place? Absolutely not! Therefore, while considering how context and other factors outside of perceptual thoughts can seriously modify the truth of an account of a property, the property of treating others the way one wants to be treated is no more justice than it is injustice.

Finally, I will provide a definition for the property of being double whose sufficient condition can be countered by several examples. Now the first observation of an account of being double that came to my mind was the notion that being double is to be ‘multiplied by two.’ However, I instantly identified the potential objection that this is a mathematical account of ‘being double,’ formulated by the cognitive power of dianoia. In order to recognize the inefficiency of purely perceptive thoughts, I must reorient into exercising eikasia. So, perhaps a definition that will account for both the property of being double and its opposite is this: For all \( x \), \( x \) is double if and only if it is twice as large in size, number, or extent than usual. To ground this thought as formulated by eikasia, I am arguing for this definition as solely formulated by spatial extension, which is very perceptual feature of reality.

This definition is sometimes true under circumstances such as appearing twice as larger in size/number/extent defines being double in spatially extended physical objects like a Double Whopper from Burger King compared to a regular sized Whopper. Another example is a Double X-Large Shirt (2XL) that appears to be nearly twice as large as an extra-large shirt. However, under other circumstances, the property of ‘being double’ may be opposite of the property of being twice as large in size/number/extent. For example, consider the account of a double bed. It is not until it couples with another double bed in which as a unit, the two grow in size and number (e.g. to a king-sized bed). But at this point, will not the bed quadruple, as the property of

\[\text{spatial extension}, \] which is very perceptual feature of reality.

62 Swanson (2019) pg. 7, 11
doubleness is already within each bed, although each individual bed is not twice as large in size than usual. Another way to approach this situation is to hypothetically double the number of double-sized beds. In this case, they both grow in size and number, but into one single king-sized bed, which loses the property of being called ‘double’ anymore, but rather it becomes it’s opposite (a single). Simultaneously, a ‘double’-sized king bed may very well be considered the ‘half’ of a single-king sized bed. Rather than being double it is a half of a pair, thus it takes on the property of the opposite of being doubled, while still being twice in number than usual. In this sense, the property of being twice in size, number, and extent provides an account of what it entails to be double as well as what it entails to not be double. Again, this is a situation regarding formulating believes based on perceptual spatially extended objects, that has alluded to contradiction within an opinion about the essence of a property. I have shown through attacking the sufficient condition that the property of being double is no more an account of doubleness than half, when defined in terms of some visual standard.

I have argued that all these cases provide definition of a property that no more defines the property than its opposite. I have argued that this is all through the formulation of beliefs exercised through perceptual thinking which manifests through perceiving a cause’s effects (in contrast to how a Form itself is a cause), actions, and spatial extension. Perhaps the reason why opinions are stuck between knowledge and ignorance vis-à-vis both their ‘clarity’ and ‘opacity’ is because those who opine try to account for Forms without accepting or comprehending Forms, leading to contradictions within the accounts of properties. They ought to consider Plato’s wisdom that while each of the Forms are one thing, ‘they appear all over the place in partnership with actions and bodies, and with one another, each of them appears to be many

\[64 \text{ 478c10}\]
things.” The fact that they ‘appear’ in this way for sight-seers and craft-lovers is probably due to the everyday use of eikasia to form opinions, without looking beyond the perceptual features of our reality.

To reiterate, Plato uses this sight-seers and craft-lovers argument to express his point that the Forms are the only true objects of knowledge, so those who cannot distinguish between Forms and those that are like Forms do not actually possess knowledge, only true or false opinions. Moreover, anyone that can only create true or false opinions do not have a full grasp on reality and are not fully awake to realize what actually is and what is not. But again, he attributes opinion and perceptual thought to those who are ruled by unnecessary appetite, meaning they are bound to their love of food, drink, and sex. Ultimately, Plato is arguing that one’s ruling desire determines how much one can grasp reality, because each category of desire is attributed to epistemic and complete powers. However, when one considers the grand scheme of Plato’s Republic one notices that Plato further attributes goodness to being able to ground oneself in both the visual and intelligible world (something that food-drink-and sex lovers cannot do) and therefore only those that have a full grasp on reality (reason-loving philosophers) can steer a city and humanity from evil. It follows from Plato that vicious people (even after a reorientation of the soul) who only seek money and power to fulfill their appetites, will never be able to ground themselves in both the visible and intelligible world and thus have less sense of reality.

After reflecting about harmful actions from vicious people, I can potentially object to Plato by claiming that deliberately vicious people may have as much of a grasp on reality as philosophers when it comes to identifying and exploiting the unreliable cognition and beliefs of

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65 476a5  
66 Swanson (2019) pg. 5-6  
67 473d
the rest of the appetitive population and are thus able to exert power and injustice upon them. It seems that corruption, scam, and abuse of power happen when vicious people (particularly money-lovers) are aware that others who are also bound to food-drink-sex have accounts of virtues like justice, beauty, and goodness that may lead to harmful contradiction and exposure to injustice, ugliness, and badness. Money-loving vicious people who seek more money can be very much aware of the injustice they cause, but they do not care because they desire money over reason. Rather, they might even use logical means to extract money from unknowing people by prying on their distorted accounts of what is good for them. For example, vicious politicians or dictators might deliberately indoctrinate their own people into falsely believing that their objectively unjust policies are good and just for those people. I would argue that these vicious people have a great sense of reality if they know that other people (their followers) are sightseers themselves and cannot reliably distinguish virtues and the likeness of virtue. Furthermore, vicious people who deliberately exercise vice can be very awake because they realize how they can use the things that are like Forms (but can be rather the opposite) to their advantage. If vicious people are aware that they are only ruled by money, then they have reason and awareness that they must fulfill their appetite, resulting in corruption, fraud, and ultimately injustice.

In response to this objection, I will defend Plato’s argument with the idea that one still cannot awake from this dream-like state if they cannot know what the ultimate good is for themselves. Plato can argue that vicious people have a distorted mode of thinking and thus have false accounts of what is good for them (e.g. they falsely believe money is good for them and will do anything to obtain it). The vicious person does not have a full sense of reality when they think that their appetitive desire produces the most good for them, such as money rather than reason and truth. While vicious people do use reason, they do not use it to seek the truth but
rather to act on deception. Thus, they have no intention on ‘waking up’ from reality but rather to exploit others within their own dream-like state. Additionally, this objection does not address the idea that perhaps Plato is assuming that those who are bound to food/drink/sex are also vicious, even though they do not cause harm to other people.
Works Cited


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Sincerely and with great pride,

Nhat Tran

Editor-in-Chief