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About This Journal

Why “Labyrinth”?

Plato uses the image of a winding labyrinth as a metaphor for the process of philosophical investigation in his dialogue *Euthydemus*. His image expresses his belief that unlike the arts of rhetoric or sophistry – which rely on mere assertion and counter-assertion – philosophy absolutely requires that we retrace our steps in an argument and constantly re-examine our views in order to arrive at knowledge of the true and the good. This is what we as students of philosophy aim to do, and this journal is meant to aid in that process.

Our Purpose

This journal was created with a threefold purpose. First, to provide undergraduate philosophy students with the experience and opportunity of publishing a paper in a philosophical journal. Second, to give an opportunity for students to be involved in peer to peer interaction through the editorial and overall journal creation process. Finally, to showcase the amazing philosophical work that is being done by the undergraduate students at the University of Iowa.
Attention Students:

Please consider submitting a paper for the Fall 2018 issue as the continuation of this journal relies on students like you. All submissions undergo a blind peer review to ensure a fair selection process. For further inquiries, contact Professor Carrie Swanson at carrie-e-swanson@uiowa.edu.
Papers
Addressing Marianismo Within the United States: Latinx and Xicanas

Laura Victoria Villarreal

The importance of recognizing how patriarchy affects different cultures allows for a greater understanding of what oppressed individuals within that specific culture have experienced. There is no justice in referring to the extreme male-dominated experiences of Chicanas/Xicanas (Mexican-American women) as "patriarchal" for that does not even begin to describe the roots of their oppressed experiences. In fact, Latin American culture has allotted for a more appropriate term known as machismo\(^1\), to describe the oppression imposed on Latinas which is rooted in the history and in the creation of the mestiza\(^2\) (Native and European Mix) women. Since I will be focusing on the history of mestizas, I commonly refer to Mexican-American women as Xicana rather than Chicana, to pay homage to the ancestral (indigenous) roots for which almost all Latinas were stripped of. However, I am also going to clarify that it is solely up to the individual Latina\(^3\) or Hispana\(^4\) for which identifying term (Latina, Hispana, Xicana, Latinx, Chicana, etc.) they would like to use to identify themselves with. Much of my inspiration and knowledge about this topic is credited towards Gloria Anzaldúa’s work from *Borderlands La Frontera: The New Mestiza*. Within *Borderlands*, Anzaldúa focuses on the impact of colonialism and migration to create Chicana Feminism, a specific form of feminism that relies

\(^{1}\) Machismo refers to exaggerated masculinity within Latin American culture.
\(^{2}\) The offspring of Indigenous Latin American and European parents. The first mestiza/os were born after the Spain invaded Mexico. It is often thought that Hernan Cortez fathered the first mestizo child of the New Spain.
\(^{3}\) Latina is a reference to women from Latin American countries or descent from Latin American Countries. Includes Brazil rather than Spain.
\(^{4}\) Hispana refers to a female who speaks Spanish and is related to the Hispanic culture through the language rather than having ties to Latin American. Hispanic does not include people of Brazil because the official language of Brazil is Portuguese and not Spanish.
on intersecting identities involving gender, race/ethnicity, class, and sexuality within Mexican-American women. Because complex intersecting identities are involved, I use structural and representation intersectionality from Kimberle Crenshaw’s *Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color*, to unpack the previously internalized acceptance of gender roles created from Machismo, but uncommonly known as Marianismo when applied to Latina women. Finally, I will address the controversial inclusive term “Latinx” and its effectiveness to promote gender neutrality in comparison to “Latin@.” By analyzing the gender-neutral identifying terms within the Spanish language and applying it to understand gender roles forced upon Latina/Xicanas, it becomes apparent that simply using gender-neutral terms is not enough to dismantle Machismo within the Latin American culture present in the United States.

*The Historical Creation of Marianismo*

Marianismo, a term commonly unknown, refers to gender roles imposed onto Xicanas and enforced through Machismo, specifically through practices incorporating Catholicism. Gloria Anzaldúa emphasizes the importance of recognizing Catholicism to be the main enforcement of the oppression of Xicanas. The goddesses praised within the Aztec religion were symbols of fertility, femininity, and strength. The goddess Coatlicue, known as the mother of all goddess/gods and represented as a serpent in indigenous artifacts, was divided into “good” and “bad” through the actions of colonialism, which teaching dictated how women should act and represent herself;
introducing the *mujer mala*\(^5\) (bad women) and the *mujer buena*\(^6\) (good woman). The enforcement of Catholicism through methods involving mass murders, rape, and torture, required indigenous women to unwillingly turn away from their beloved goddess, the indigenous Virgen De Guadalupe (Coatlicue) and to embrace the Catholic Virgin Mary to become a *mujer buena*. By “accepting” to become a good woman, was to also accept the roles of a woman dictated by the colonizer which included forced marriage, sex, servitude, and expected initiative to self-sacrifice oneself for others (fathers, husbands, children). The depiction of the defeat of Coatlicue, can also be interpreted from current Mexican (Estados de Mexico) Flag, in which a golden eagle holds a dead serpent within its beak in front of colors (green, white, and red) representing Mexico’s independence from Spain, Catholicism as holy, and bloodshed.

Gender roles within Mexican households often involve women cooking, cleaning, caring for others, but most commonly, taking responsibility for the actions of others they cannot control. I have witnessed Latina women fear for their safety when they find out their husband is arriving home soon, and there isn’t a plate of warm food waiting for them at the dining table. I have seen young women recently find out that they are pregnant, whether the choice was theirs or not, and still be met with the enraged hand of their fathers for getting pregnant without permission. A woman, very significant to me, recalled that she was grabbed by her hair and dragged over 100 feet on a gravel road by her father because her brother did not complete his chores. Women, especially young girls, are often required to care and tend to their siblings whether they like to or not. The oldest daughters are forced into the “mothering” roles that involve caring for all her

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\(^5\) To be a *mujer mala* means to either maintain full-indigenous lineage or to practice unholy sexual relationships in the eyes of the Spanish Conquistadores. Indigenous people would refer to indigenous women who have relationships with the conquistadores as this as well.

\(^6\) Spaniards referred to good women as those who were pure and did not follow indigenous practices. They were women who followed the teachings of the Bible.
siblings (younger and older), and is often blamed for the mistakes of her siblings but not praised for their accomplishments. Of all the decisions made for and by women, it would only be finalized and enforced by whoever was considered the man of the house, may that be the father, husband, brother, or son. All of these acts of abuse and control (and many more) have been normalized within the Mexican community, however, more Xicanas are speaking out about these incidents but not without consequences.

Structural and Representational Harms of Marianismo

To continue upon the harms of Marinismo, Marianismo persists past colonialism and into the migration of Mestiza (Mexicans) into the United States often for financial purposes. Involved with this migration begins the Xicana identity, for which the offspring of the Mestiza women would acquire another nationality. This is the borderland experience, also known as living within the hyphen in Mexican-American. The women born in the United States and raised by Mexican parents, particularly those who practice Catholicism, experience Machismo and Marianismo differently than those born and raised in Mexico. In the United States, it is becoming more apparent that Machismo and Marianismo are harmful to all individuals, therefore, efforts have been made to dismantle gender (including heterosexual) normative ideas. The difficulty in this lies on the independent/ individualist perspective and within the virgin/whore dichotomy created through the separation of Coatlicue. The structure of most Xicano families thrives on dependency with each other along with reinforcement of religion and is destroyed through

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7 According to Anzaldúa’s beliefs, the Virgin Mary known in (Mexican) Catholicism, is only a portion of Coatlicue. In the removal of the serpent (sexuality) within her, created the Mexican Virgin Mary (Guadalupe) as oppressive and unleashed the good and bad women. Good women are pure and look up to the Virgin Mary. Bad women seek to follow what is left of Coatlicue (Guadalupe, la Chingada, and la Llorona), the impure, indigenous side of the mestiza. “In part, the true identity of all three have been subverted-Guadalupe to make us docile and enduring, la Chingada to make us ashamed of our Indian side, and la Llorona to make us long suffering people. This obscuring has encouraged the virgin/puta (whore) dichotomy (Anzaldúa 2012, 53).
individualism. In order for a Xicana to express the harm they personally experience specifically from Marianismo, they must become individualist, meaning that they must be willing to sacrifice family relationships to potentially receive equality and respect. Instead of asking for forgiveness for their existence, they should embrace their bodies for themselves rather than to fall into the continuous idea that their body solely exists to reproduce, pleasure men, and to work to fulfill the duties of self-sacrifice.

The representation of Latinas in modern media often portrays women to appear as maids, homemakers, and as bodies for the use of men. Latinas are also seen to be submissive and silenced, and are considered bad women if they resist in any way. This common portrayal of Latinas subconsciously teaches younger Xicanas of what they are limited to and how they should act. While the media provides the visuals of this, religious practices in Catholicism state that women are in fact, the property of men, whether that be their father, brother, husband, or son. The influence of Marianismo through Catholicism has recently been address in society with the inclusion of Latinx, a gender-neutral term used to 1. Be inclusive of individuals who identify as Latin@\(^8\)/Hispanic, but do not identify with a single gender or sex assigned at birth. 2. Dismantle the gendered language within Spanish. 3. Ultimately dismantle gender roles enforced on oppressed people within Latin@/Hispanic community (Santana).

**Latinx Inclusion within the United States**

The inclusion of Latinx in academic institutions has caused quite a controversy regarding the language and it’s use. Spanish language rights claim that Latinx is harmful and destructing to the Spanish language, however the use of the ‘x’ at the end of Latinx has two purposes. Its first

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\(^8\) Latin@ is term that includes both Latina and Latino identities.
purpose, as mentioned before, is to remove the gender roles enforced in the Spanish language. The second purpose of the ‘x’ is to represent indigenous roots; many words used within the Native language incorporated ‘x’. To use Latinx is to not only recognize that gender roles are harmful, but to also acknowledge and utilize the indigenous roots of Latin@s.

To further understand Latinx and its usage, we must analyze the demographics of the usage of Latinx, it is currently only used in the United States in very few (often liberal) locations. These locations are primarily college campus, such as the University of Iowa. While the usage of Latinx is beginning to spread, there seems to be difficulty in addressing how effective Latinx is towards Xicana/Latina women. In the Spanish language, if there are multiple Latina women in one area then they are all referred to as Latinas. If a man were to enter that space in which the women already occupy, they would all be referred to as Latinos. This example represents how gendered the Spanish language is, and which gender is clearly favored. By referring to that collective group of individuals, which is mostly comprised of woman, as men, not only disregards the presence of Latinas at that moment, but also silences these women as well. It silences these women from sharing their experiences, from being recognized as a Latina, and causes them to appear inferior to men. The Spanish language, so long as is remains influenced by gender, will continue to disempower women simply because the language only seeks to value and benefit men. Continuous teachings of the Spanish language to replace neutral words with masculine words, promotes masculinity rather than neutrality or femininity, and this is highly representative within Latin American culture. Latinx is a useful and appropriate term to use in local settings where many Latin American individuals are being recognized because it seeks to promote a true sense of neutrality rather than masculinity.
**Latinx: Identifying Gender and Sexuality**

In comparison to other terms used to represent a group of males and females who all identify as Latina/o, there is also the term Latin@. Latin@ incorporates the “@” which fuses “o” and “a” in efforts to be more gender inclusive. This method is one of the first steps to become more gender inclusive within the Spanish language, however, it has been claimed to only provide a solution to a part of the problem. Latin@ partially addresses the gender-identification problem being only limited to men and women, but not other identities within the gender spectrum (androgynous, non-binary, etc.). Latin@, while being gender inclusive, does not directly address gender roles. Overall, Latin@ is not as effective as Latinx when it comes to addressing gender roles and the overall group or individual’s identity.

This is where Latinx appears to be the best option available at the moment to dismantle Marianismo. In order to address gender roles within Latin-American communities, specifically ones applied to Xicanas, then we must state what the gender role of a Xicana consists of. As previous mentioned, a Xicana fits the criteria of a good woman if she is submissive, accepts responsibility for others, inherits the willingness to serve and sacrifice for others, and strives to promote the happiness of the male counterpart by addressing their own needs and desires before her own. Latina (Xicanas) who willing subscribe to being *mujeres buenas* and continue to teach that to the female members within their families in order to obtain certain items may be seen as bargainers with the patriarchy as described by Uma Narayan, but I am on a fence with this[^9]. I strongly believe that Latina women are stuck in a cycle that revolves around being a bargainer with the patriarchy and a dupe of it as well. This cycle stems from the desires of men within the

[^9]: In order to bargain with the patriarchy, it is understood that one must be a dupe of the patriarchy to do so. I question if women facing these circumstances are truly bargaining with the patriarchy or if they may in fact be prisoners of the patriarchy (Narayan, 2002, 422).
family, who require women to work for what is already theirs, and knowing this, the women perpetuate this cycle to their daughters in fear that if their daughters resist, no one will want them as a wife. It may be the fact that I am a Xicana, born in the United States but raised in a Mexican household that I hold both of these views. I truly believe that Latinas, especially those born and raised in the United States as well, hold a certain privilege besides U.S. citizenship, but the history of the Mestizas is what causes us to fall into that continuous cycle of the patriarchy, better known as Machimso.

However, within the Latin Community, sexuality is an important component to gender roles and they cannot be separated. Latinx allows for gender and sexuality to be recognized, for example it allows a female to identify as a woman and within the LGTBQIA+ spectrum, therefore deconstructing traditional gender roles. Gender roles within Marianismo enforce women, in this case Xicanas, to be mujeres buena (good women) by following the gender roles set by teachings established by religions (Catholicism) and often enforced by men. For example, Marianismo requires that a Xicana must identify as heterosexual to be considered a mujer buena. Any Xicana identifying with another sexuality or gender (not aligned with their sex at birth) are considered mujeres malas (bad women), therefore, are often marginalized more often than a heterosexual Xicana/Latina.

Overall, Latina women experience Machismo and Marianismo differently. I focus my argument on Latinx possibly apply to the general population of Latinx individuals, and if not that, then at least Xicanas. I argue that Latinx may be sufficient enough to combat Marianismo in the present moment, but a greater reinforcement of gender neutrality must be incorporated in the Latinx/Hispanic culture to dismantle Marianismo and ultimately Machismo. Spanish language was forced onto the Indigenous people of Latin America, and it is difficult to tell of a time when gender
was not as great of a concern as it is today. Since Latinx has only been utilized in the United States, it is difficult to say how effective it truly is. Women and men and in all areas where Marianismo and Machismo are present, must begin to accept and use gender neutral terminology as well as reclaim our past as Natives, rather than to fall into the traps of the Spanish and other conquistadores. We, the Xicanas, the Mexican-American women, the ones of mixed blood that is often said to be tainted from both sides, the new *Mestizas*, must begin to recognize *nuestra poder*\(^{10}\) to become the catalyst for the changes that we and many other survivors need.

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www.umich.edu/~ac213/student_projects05/cf/issuestheory.html.


\(^{10}\) Our power (feminine).

http://embracingdiversity.us/what-makes-a-latino-hispanic-latinx/.
An Aristotelian Meditation on Classroom Concord

Jason Messerschmitt

Education plays an essential role in Aristotle’s ethics. Moral education takes place throughout childhood and young adulthood, and continues well on into life from thereon. A properly educated individual will not only exhibit the virtues of character, but those of the intellect as well. 11 Politics, too, is central to his understanding of virtue; for human beings, Aristotle tells us, are by nature socio-political animals, and the whole of ethics is indeed nothing more than political science. 12 Socio-political relationships are characterized in his view by a notion of friendship, whereby mutual goods are sought in accord with the communal advantage. 13 Community, education and friendship, then, are writ through Aristotle’s conception of ethics; and it is just to Aristotle’s account of friendship in communities, education communities in particular, that I would like to turn our attention in this short paper.

While Aristotle’s remarks on community friendship in Nicomachean Ethics (hereafter NE) may be comparably brief 14, they comprise a helpful theoretical framework that I take to be applicable to a contemporary analysis of education and its goals. In the following paragraphs I will largely be attempting a suggestive outline for an Aristotelian account of educational community, what the mutual advantage of such a community is, and what actions are befitting it in aiming toward the achievement of such advantage. In service of this aim, I will be drawing on

11 Aristotle’s ethics involves a characteristically nuanced understanding of education. It is not only the habituation of children to good habits, but of adults as well. For a helpful, albeit brief characterization of education in Aristotle’s works see the glossary entry on education in Irwin, 1999.
12 This identification is made in Nicomachean Ethics (hereafter NE) book I, chapter 2.
13 See, for instance, book eight, chapter nine of NE.
14 Aristotle’s discussion of community friendship can be found in book viii, chapter 9.
contemporary work in virtue epistemology in order to aid an explication of the intellectual virtues in education. As such, this project will be largely Aristotelian in spirit only.

“…friendship and justice would seem to be about the same things and to be found in the same people. For in every community there seems to be some sort of justice, and some type of friendship also. [...] And the extent of their community is the extent of their friendship, since it is also the extent of the justice found there.” In the interest of the present analysis, I will be putting to one side the complicated relationship between justice and friendship discussed here, instead focusing on the type of friendship expressed by a community, and what the features of such a friendship are. For our purpose it will suffice to take justice as naming “the open, communal field of the working and practice of virtue,” as Baracchi helpfully identifies it. What we can take from the opening quote of this paragraph is that there is a type or species of friendship peculiar to communities. It is getting clear on what this type of friendship consists in that comprises our present task, as we aim toward an adequate construal of an educational community, its goals, and the conduct proper to its members.

The Aristotelian notion of friendship may be succinctly described as mutually reciprocated goodwill, wherein each member of the friendship unqualifiedly wishes goods for the friend, for their friend’s own sake. In the case of a complete friendship these goods will be unqualifiedly

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15 1159b25-31. All references to NE are to the Irwin translation (1999), unless otherwise noted.
16 I have in mind the account in Baracchi’s Aristotle’s Ethics as First Philosophy, where she attempts to show that while friendship and justice are in some sense coextensive, friendship ultimately exceeds the scope of justice. As she suggestively puts it, “Thus, when affirming that, if human beings were friends, justice (as juridical normativity) would be superfluous, Aristotle is envisioning friendship as the end or destination of politics: as the highest conceivable accomplishment of politics, or even politics’ own self-overcoming.” Claudia Baracchi, Aristotle’s Ethics as First Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 282-286. Quote appears on p. 286.
17 Ibid., 143.
18 See for books xiii and ix of NE. Somewhat unsatisfyingly, perhaps, we will have to avail ourselves of succinct characterizations of some Aristotelian notions. As his philosophy is so densely interrelated, given his architectonic approach, it becomes easy to digress into more fine-grained expositions on these sometimes difficult notions of
This notion will apply just as much to communities as dyadic friendships. Let us turn toward Aristotle’s notion of communal friendship, then.

Communities are firstly characterized by what they have in common, the peculiar commonality of any given group being one of its defining features, for, as Aristotle has it, “The proverb ‘What friends have is common’ is correct, since friendship involves community. But whereas brothers and companions have everything in common, what people have in common in other types of community is limited, more in some communities and less in others…” Further, communities are characterized by different notions of justice, “What is just is also different, since it is not the same for parents toward children as for one brother toward another, and not the same for companions as for fellow citizens, and similarly with other types of friendship.” Finally, importantly related to their political parthood, is mutual advantage, for “…people keep company for some advantage and to supply something contributing to their life. And the political community as well [as the others] seem both to have been originally formed and to endure for advantage…”

So far we have seen that communities are defined by something held in common between its members, the kind of justice peculiar to the nature of the group, the mutual advantage of the group, and by extension, their political parthood. We are nearly in a position to apply these notions to an educational community. First, however, we will be benefited by looking at Aristotle’s notion of concord (homonoia, or “one-mindedness”), as it is importantly related to a group’s mutual advantage; for, as we will presently see, concord is political friendship.

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Aristotle’s. However, I take it that we ought to be on with the task and hand, even where we may find exposition wanting.

19 See 1156b7-15.
20 1159a31-35.
21 1160a1-4.
22 1160a10-13.
Concord, as a feature of friendship, is not (indeed cannot be) the mere sharing of a belief or simple agreement on certain subjects, for both of these could be accomplished by complete strangers, and one important feature of friendship is not only that goodwill is mutually reciprocated, but that the members of a friendship are aware of reciprocated goodwill. Rather, “concord concerns questions for action, and, more exactly, large questions where both or all can get what they want.” But, “…it is not concord when each merely has the same thing in mind, whatever it is. Rather, each must also have the same thing in mind for the same person…” Finally, “Concord, then, is apparently political friendship, as indeed it is said to be; for it is concerned with advantage and with what effects life [as a whole].”

Having made some clarification of the features of communal friendship, we can make some progress toward its characterization. To sum, its features are as follows. It involves a commonly sought mutual advantage that is “close at hand”. It concerns a friendship held between decent, that is, virtuous people, in a community subordinate to the political community at large, and partakes in a justice peculiar to its arrangement. Recalling that we take justice to name “the communal field of the working and practice of virtue,” we may helpfully subsume this into our definition of community friendship. We might also safely construe the immediate mutual advantage sought as some good; for, as we have already seen, friendship is characterized by reciprocated goodwill, the desire of the good for another for their own sake. Community friendship may be characterized, then, as the mutual, virtuous seeking of some common good. Community friendship, then, is

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23 1167a23 and 1156a5.
24 1167a30-31.
25 1167a34-36.
26 1167b2-4.
simply concord (*homonoia*). Where it is advantageous to do so I will simply refer to community friendship as concord.

We are now in a position to turn to education, and educational community, for we now require some exposition on what the common good is that is being sought. For this purposes of this paper, I have in mind a restricted notion of this kind of community, though I think the account can easily be generalized. The community I have in mind is a small group of classmates, say 10-12 adults, who attend the same course over the length of a term, or perhaps many courses over the length of many terms.27

What, then, is the communal good for the educational community? Contemporary work in virtue epistemology can provide us helpful guidance in answering this question. Linda Zagzebski, whose ethics is very much in line with Aristotle’s in many important regards, is especially helpful.28 Zagzebski distinguishes between motivational and success components in the virtues. She takes the motivational component to be an emotional disposition toward acting in order to achieve a desired end.29 The success component of a virtue is simply the notion that in order to have a virtue, one must be reliably successful in bringing about the end at which the motivational component is aimed.30 Reliably bringing out the desired end, then, is a necessary condition for having the relevant virtue. Each agent of the community will satisfy both the motivational and success components of the primary virtue that guides his actions.

27 That it is difficult to imagine educational goals as conceived in this paper to be achievable in large groups may be suggestive of an empirical fact about education, namely that smaller classes are better than larger ones at achieving educational goals. It also nicely accords with Aristotle’s speaking of fellow travelers as a community. In this case our travelers seek something more than simply arriving safely at some destination- see, for instance, 1160a15.
28 Even a superficial glance at her work *Virtues of the Mind* (1996), will, I think, bear this observation out. For a suggestive selection from that work see Sosa, 2008.
30 Ibid.
To what should we ascribe the primary good of the educational community, the good toward which the community is aimed? One suggestion might be *truth*, but this may be too vague, even for the suggestive characterization we are after. To this question we turn again to Zagzebski. For Zagzebski there is but one motivational basis for all of the intellectual virtues, that “they are all based in the motivation for knowledge.”\(^{31}\) I would like to propose, however, that the aim of the educational community must be more than mere knowledge, if we understand knowledge to characterized as an agent’s acquaintance with true propositions. Rather, we want something more robust, and so we draw on a distinction between knowledge and understanding, as one can apparently have instances of the former without having corresponding instances of the latter. The latter will be characterized as an improvement in epistemic standing- why will be made clear in the ensuing discussion.\(^{32}\) In terms of our previous characterization of concord, then, the mutual advantage, or communal good, sought, is improved epistemic standing or, simply, understanding. Tracking our previous characterization, we might say that concord in the educational community is achieved when each community member acts virtuously in accord with the aim of improving the epistemic standing of themselves and the other group members. I will heretofore refer to this characterization as *classroom concord*, for ease of exposition.

Now that we have characterized education’s common goal/good, we can turn to a characterization of the agents’ role in the group. Contemporary work on the intellectual virtues and what kinds of virtuous action accompanies them is helpful in this regard. There are of course many accounts of the intellectual virtues available, and not all of them are in agreement.

\(^{31}\) Ibid., 444. Zagzebski also refers to this more technically as the motivation for “cognitive contact with reality”. I think that for our present purposes it isn’t necessary to extrapolate on the particulars of Zagzebski’s view, but suffice ourselves with the notion that the aim of the intellectual virtues is broadly aimed at improving the agent’s epistemic standing with respect to the world. I follow Lani Watson in this regard- see her essay *Why Should We Educate for Inquisitiveness?* In Baehr, 2016.

\(^{32}\) Again, I follow Watson’s terminology here. See note 21.
Nevertheless, I take it that focusing on some suggestive candidates will suffice for our purposes. I will be considering the virtues, understanding, open-mindedness, insight, and inquisitiveness, in turn.

Wayne D. Riggs, in his insightful essay *Open-mindedness, Insight, and Understanding,* characterizes understanding as a “proper outcome of education.” As a purely superficial capturing of what I take to be a likely uncontroversial report on a common intuition, it is of little help to say simply this. It will be helpful to look briefly at Riggs’ notion of understanding more closely, then; this should not be taken as an endorsement of the view, but merely an illustration of what an account of such a virtue might look like. I take it, however, that *some* account of understanding will be important for an account of the aim of education.

For Riggs, understanding is the “grasping of a (sufficiently accurate) perspectival representation.” Riggs has in view a coherentist epistemology, wherein a network of beliefs are thought to be mutually constitutive of epistemic justification. Or, to borrow a helpful characterization from Bonjour, “…the central claim of coherentism is that the sole basis for epistemic justification is relations among beliefs, rather than between beliefs and something external. More specifically, it is alleged, what justifies beliefs is the way they fit together: the fact that they cohere with each other.” Riggs utilizes the notion of representations and beliefs interchangeably. These representations make up a network which Riggs refers to as a perspective. The mutually reinforcing character of these representations will constitute the coherence of beliefs, or representations, that comprise the content of any given perspective. The perspective will not

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34 Ibid., 19.
only make up the content of the character of our understanding of the world, but will have an effect on our perception of it as well. What it means to grasp a perspective is a more difficult notion for Riggs; he suggests that grasping lies in appropriately cognizing the propositions that encode the relationships between beliefs or representations that comprise the perspective.\textsuperscript{36}

Importantly related to understanding for Riggs are the virtues he calls open-mindedness and insightfulness. Riggs characterizes an open-minded person as someone “willing and (within limits) able to transcend the default cognitive standpoint\textsuperscript{37} in order to take up or take seriously the merits of a distinct cognitive standpoint, is sufficiently sensitive to cues indicating such alternative standpoints, and has a well-calibrated propensity to exercise these abilities.”\textsuperscript{38}

For Riggs, insightfulness is as much involved with perspectives as is open-mindedness. If open-mindedness is the propensity to see beyond one’s own perspective and evaluate others with propriety and sensitivity, insight is a facility with perspectives, an ability to see beyond their superficial characteristics and reveal new interrelations between their constituents or, perhaps, to see new perspectives altogether.\textsuperscript{39} Riggs, summarizing his view, provides us with a compelling case for taking understanding to be the good aimed at in classroom concord:

…open-mindedness and insightfulness form a powerful combination for advancing our understanding. An open-minded person is alert and attuned to the possibility that perspectives not entirely consistent with their own can be epistemically superior. An insightful person is gifted at noticing when apparent

\textsuperscript{37} Riggs takes cognitive standpoints as roughly correlative with his own notion of a perspective (Baehr, 26).
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 29.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 33.
harmony obscures deeper incongruity. Such a person also has the ability to detect subtle patterns and to produce creative hypotheses that allow them to construct accurate and illuminating perspectives – i.e., understanding.

The final virtue we will look at is inquisitiveness. Lani Watson, in her insightful essay Why Should We Educate for Inquisitiveness?, construes inquisitiveness as a tendency to question. More precisely, Watson defines the inquisitive person as “characteristically motivated to engage sincerely in good questioning.” Watson’s definition relies on the Zagzebskian characterization of virtues discussed above, as comprising motivational and success components.

As suggested in the characterization above, inquisitiveness as a virtue is defined by its relation to questioning. As such, the inquisitive person is necessarily a person with a tendency to ask questions. The motivation component, then, will be that one is characterized by his disposition toward question-asking. But inquisitiveness cannot be the mere asking of questions, but must be question asking with the aim of (after Zagzebski) improving one’s epistemic standing, that is, toward the good at which all of the intellectual virtues are aimed. The inquisitive person is characteristically motivated on this view to ask questions in an effort to improve his epistemic standing. Finally, the success component of inquisitiveness is simply that the inquisitive person asks questions that do in fact, by and large, result in the improvement of his epistemic standing—such questions are known as good questions.

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41 Ibid., 40.
42 Ibid., 43.
43 Ibid., 41.
If we take these characterizations of some intellectual virtues, as well as our characterization of concord, we can begin to construe a more concrete picture of what a classroom concord looks like in action. Before we do so, however, it will do us well to return to Aristotle briefly. As we have seen, all communities are part of the political community because they seek some common advantage. Likewise, because all communities will have some notion of justice peculiar to them, the justice in the political community will differ from that in other communities. However, justice in these other communities will have a structure that is similar to that found in certain political arrangements. In discussing political friendships, Aristotle likens the father’s relationship to his son to the relationship of the king to his subjects in an aristocracy: the father is both superior to his child and seeks his benefit just as the king is superior to his subjects and seeks their benefit. I would like to suggest here that the classroom resembles this characterization of aristocratic justice as well, wherein the teacher represents the virtuous aristocrat and the students the subjects whose benefit they seek.

So what kind of behavior will characterize classroom concord? It would seem that each agent in such a community must act in accord with the intellectual virtues in order to improve the epistemic standing of themselves and the other group members. This will mean, given the limited, though hopefully suggestive account above, that each agent must act in an inquisitive manner, open-mindedly and with insight in order to increase his own and the other group members’ understanding. Certainly very few groups will achieve this degree of concord, what we might call after an Aristotelian manner, complete concord. But what strikes me as insightful about this kind of Aristotelian construal is that it can provide a metric or goal for virtuous behavior, even if such

44 Recall that, following Baracchi, we have characterized justice as the communal working and practice of virtue.
45 1161a10-17.
behavior can admit of degrees of success, while often falling short of the ideal. Suffice it to say that, given the above account, each agent should aspire to act in accord with these virtues, tempering his actions and exercising his capacities when necessary.

Take, for instance, the classroom scenario in which there are agents at either extreme of inquisitiveness- the non-inquisitive and, what we will refer to as, for lack of a better word, the nuisance. The former shows no propensity to question-asking in the slightest and sits through the length of the course silent unless called upon. Not only does this cause his own educational pursuit of understanding harm, it also does so that of group and its concord; for in the former they fail to exhibit the virtue entirely, and in the latter they deprive other members of the group some share in understanding that might result in an answer to their questions, should they have asked them.

The nuisance on the other hand exhibits a lot of question asking, but asks exclusively (or nearly so) bad questions, that is questions that result neither in the improvement of his own epistemic standing nor that of other members of the group. The nuisance may also be, though need not always be, concomitant with the failure of open-mindedness- they may question other group members or the teacher merely in order to reinforce his own default cognitive standpoint at the expense of his and the other group members’ own epistemic improvement. Such behavior seems often to be selfishly motivated, and ignorant of the other classmates’ educational goals. As such, it is behavior damaging to classroom concord, to the opposite extreme of the non-inquisitive.

Of course, many groups may be comprised of one or more nuisances or the non-inquisitive, and such groups are so much the worse off, on this account. Something might be said of the teacher in this regard. Some of his responsibility would seem to be to steer the group in some way as to maximize its concord, and, by extension, its virtue. The teacher might try to elicit from the non-inquisitive person questions, and aid where possible in clarifying questions in an instructive
manner in order to improve question-asking ability, and thereby potentially foster inquisitiveness. Likewise for the nuisance, the teacher may temper the exaggerated and poor question asking by limiting the number of subsequent questions. As well as that, they may aid the student in maximizing his questions’ epistemic value, such that the nuisance learns how to ask good questions, rather than poor ones.

In the above I hope to have coupled the Aristotelian notion of concord with a more contemporary account of the intellectual virtues, in order to provide a suggestive indication about what the virtue of an educational community is, namely acting in accord with the aim of improving the understanding of its members. Likewise, I hope to have offered some practical picture of what shape virtuous activity might take amongst the members of a classroom. If this account is as suggestive as I hope it is, then it will have adequately captured some common intuitions about what a good educational community consists in.
Bibliography


Language Beyond the Personal – Charles Taylor’s Fusion of Horizons

Tobías García Vega

In *The Politics of Recognition*, Charles Taylor argues that we ought to move what he calls past the “politics of equal dignity”, which is a supposedly egalitarian political framework that assumes equal value amongst subgroups of individuals, and instead move towards a “politics of difference”. He defines the politics of difference as one that fosters particularity and protects specific liberties to meet the needs of different subgroups of citizens. During this project, Taylor critiques the process of assuming equal value, whether it be of different cultures as a whole or of each individual practice, creation, or tradition within that culture. He critiques the politics of equal dignity by displaying how an assumed Western superiority can arise when theorizing about cultures different from our own. Taylor says that when multiculturalists claim every cultural group deserves equal respect, there exists an implicit a priori value judgement of the equal worth of all cultures. He notes that assumptions of equal worth seem committed to ethnocentricity when the evaluator lacks the necessary criterion to make these judgements, i.e. making value judgements based solely on the evaluator’s own cultural standards is to deem another culture’s products equal only in virtue only of how they resemble the products of the theorist’s local culture. These local cultural works and productions inform the very standards the theorist uses to make these value judgements. Taylor attempts to avoid ethnocentricity through his proposed usage of a fusion of horizons, which is a method that requires real world discussion with members of the culture at hand. The fusion of horizons results in a language of perspicuous contrast, which is the language
theorists ought to utilize when evaluating cultures, since it privileges neither culture’s existing standards that underlie their language. In this essay, I argue that Taylor’s theory behind the revised method, which consists of both the fusion of horizons and the language of perspicuous contrast, ultimately fails to escape the charge of ethnocentricity in two ways. Firstly, by falling victim to the guise of neutrality, that similarly befalls the politics of equal dignity and secondly, it fails to ensure an adequate understanding of the other culture. Therefore, both when actualized and in theory, Taylor’s evaluative method cannot move past mere ethnocentricity since it does not appropriately separate the theorist from their values.

First, to briefly define some key-words. I understand imperialism to mean an imposition of values or standards onto a culture against a backdrop of historical oppression and persisting power dynamics of one culture over the other, often the “West” over the global south. Next, I understand ethnocentricity to mean one’s tendency to subconsciously view cultures or groups of individuals through a perspective solely informed by one’s own. Finally, I understand dialogue to be an extended conversation between two individuals in an attempt to come to an understanding or resolve certain problems. Lastly, it is important to note that in Taylor’s writing that I examine in this essay, he abstracts away from culture and the individual. So, in further discussion of his work, unless explicitly stated, applies on both the individual and cultural level since this is how Taylor understands it to be.

One of Taylor’s most explicit attempts to outline how ethnocentricity can be avoided appears in *Understanding and Ethnocentricity*. Taylor explains that when theorizing about cultures different from our own, the theorist isn’t simply describing the culture at hand. They impact the self-definition of those within the culture since how they are perceived, in part, forms at least this relational component of their identities. Therefore, theorists observing other cultures must take
measures to ensure that the theory created surrounding their subjects represents the subject in a way that is authentic to the subject’s self-conception so as to avoid the harms of misrecognition. Taylor argues that an adequate explanation of human action must make the agents more understandable, or help to grasp the agent’s self-understanding (117), i.e. the outsider must, after theorizing, be cognizant of how a culture’s members can, and do, come to justify its values, why the members of a culture act a certain way, practice particular traditions, or how they view themselves, etc. Taylor anticipates a response from the cultural relativist arguing that we can only ever fully understand a subject in their language or “on their terms”. For the relativist, this gives the subject the authoritative and most authentic account of their practices and beliefs and how they are rationalized. The relativist then asserts that to explain a culture’s way of life and belief system only using one’s own native language, and thus, its values and metrics that underlie the language, the theorist is then definitionally committed to ethnocentrism. For Taylor, the relativist approach forfeits a critical lens inherently available to the theorists in virtue of their being outside of the culture. Taylor argues that there must be a middle ground between these two extremes (of only using the theorists’ language and only using the subject’s) that allows for the use of one’s native language when theorizing about other cultures while still avoiding the charge of ethnocentrism.

Taylor titles the resultant evaluative language: the language of perspicuous contrast (126). To Taylor, the language of contrast privileges neither the subject’s values nor those of the observer. It does so, by appealing to universal values that permeate all languages and by including the relevant meaning within the vocabulary of the subject necessary to authentically capture the subject’s perspective; “If he admires sophisticated people, then understanding him requires that I be able to apply this concept of sophisticated in the sense it has for him” (Taylor 119). Rather than rely on what the theorist alone understands sophisticated to mean, the language of perspicuous
contrast takes the subject’s meaning of the word into account when theorizing about the subject(s) themselves. The language of contrast takes components from both languages, forming a modified and unbiased language that offers a vantage point for the theorist into the subject’s understanding of themselves and their culture. A language of contrast is essential because if theorizers are to rely on the language of the subject, the ability to notice and combat ideological slants or simply false accounts of actions may be lost. Taylor explicitly anticipates a subject that is “ideological”, or blinded by the hidden ideals of religion, their economic or political system, etc. thus causing confusion that only outside the theorist sees. However, Taylor warns against complete exclusion of the language of the subject from pure fear of possible importing new or apparent ideology into the theory. For Taylor, a language of perspicuous allows for theorizers to take these confusions into account while describing a culture without falling also victim to them. He concludes that since the language of perspicuous contrast does not impose one’s values onto the other and is melds both languages it is therefore superior to the evaluative languages used by cultural relativists that restrict themselves to utilizing the language of the subject.

Apart from obvious issues with this assertion by Taylor, that we as the collective West are the only ones capable of seeing through ideology, this claim in fact subverts the end-goal of pure neutrality if the theorist begins with the assumption that they are the ones to liberate the other through the language of contrast. Although at face value the language of perspicuous contrast seems to solve issues of subconscious ethnocentricity, it only perpetuates cultural imperialism. This failure to reach an egalitarian procedure is made evident when we attend to the attitudes adopted by the politics of equal dignity that Taylor himself rejects. Taylor describes the politics of equal dignity as underpinned by a metaphysical assumption of equal human capability while its goal is to protect this human capacity (41). Often times, however, these politics exceed mere
protection and assert that one must maintain that how an individual, or culture, has made use of this capacity deserves respect since it (the culture’s output) is of equal merit to that of any other, i.e. that all individuals or cultures command the same respect in virtue of what they have actually accomplished instead of simply in virtue of their equal ability to accomplish. The politics of dignity then purports to be blind to any differences between individuals or cultures and instead promotes a set of normative principles to be used as guides to our conduct. Taylor argues that the normative guides to conduct of a difference-blind liberalism suppose themselves to be a set of neutral principles but upon analysis of just who holds the requisite power to create and enforce the normative principles reveals them as impositions made by one hegemonic culture on another subordinate culture.

I argue that a language of perspicuous contrast is susceptible to these same charges of imperialism. From a language of contrast, neutrality is assumed to arise by definition, but this neutrality is never actualized. We see this because although the language of contrast is characterized as a transformative vantage point for the theorist to understand the subject, in actuality it does nothing to prevent the theorist from ultimately defaulting back to and reaffirming their own cultural standards. In a language of contrast, the use of the word “sophisticated” from earlier, for example, does not prioritize either what the term means for subject or for the theorist, it presents them as two different options on equal grounds. However, this speaks only for the language itself and crucially, not for the theorist who utilizes it. There is no moral imperative to definitively prevent the theorist from imposing their values on the other. If the two definitions are merely presented as options, often they are options at odds with one another, one must ultimately be chosen over the other. Both worldviews coexist in the theory behind the language of contrast but, when operationalized for its purpose of making value judgements, one set of standards must
be imposed on the other and thus the guise of neutrality falls. Like the advocates for the politics of equal dignity, Taylor is too quick in assuming his framework is, or can ever be, truly neutral.

Moving to the *Politics of Recognition*, Taylor outlines a key distinction to be made when evaluating the artistic products of a different culture. The distinction is between the presumption that every culture and their products are of equal worth, and a principled judgement that, after dialogue and reflection, affirms their equal worth. Taylor argues that within the former is contained a reliance on one’s own values as the correct metric. Furthermore, that imposing a presumption of equal worth onto the other culture is pure condescension by the theorizer. He argues that these critics lack the metrics to evaluate art from cultures different from their own and therefore any attempt to make an evaluation based on this lack of criteria is ethnocentric since the evaluative metrics used are a recapitulation of the observer’s values. In order to properly evaluate art from varying cultures, Taylor urges us to use what he calls the fusion of horizons where, rather than presuppose equal worth, we instead enter into dialogues with those from within the culture, with a hypothesis of equal worth to be affirmed or denied.

The fusion of horizons outlines the necessary and sufficient conditions to amplify the theorist’s language allowing them to avoid ethnocentricity, yet ultimately, Taylor does not achieve this goal. Emphasis is placed on the actual dialogue between the cultural outsider, the theorist, and the one within the culture. Through dialogue between the two, the theorist learns new vocabulary and the underlying values of the other’s culture that come with their language. For Taylor, these new words and phrases are the exact criteria necessary to avoid a closed minded ethnocentric analysis of the other and move to an honest and fair evaluation of a culture’s artistic products. But can a theorist avoid ultimately recapitulating their values and instead come to understand another culture through a fusion of horizons of language alone? There seems to be something lacking in
Taylor’s account of an adequate understanding when he confines his method of understanding to linguistic enhancement.

Thomas Nagel, in his paper *What Is It Like to Be a Bat?* offers a thought experiment that can help unpack how Taylor is too quick to assume that his account of an understanding of the other is sufficient, whether it be on an individual or a cultural level. A theorist can devote themselves to making bats more understandable, but the theorist will never be able to capture and understand the qualitative lived experience, of a bat with language alone. Nagel argues that some in the philosophy of mind the importance of the qualitative lived experience, or feeling, of being a certain conscious thing, which he argues is essential to understanding consciousness.

There is a solid metaphysical barrier to being able to grasp the qualia of another individual, let alone of a different species. The lived experience of a bat is just as metaphysically inaccessible as the qualitative lived experience of another human. In this way, Nagel’s argument illuminates the discussion of the fusion of horizons since from additions to the theorizing language alone, the theorist can never know what it’s like to live as a member of a society or culture that they do not belong to despite augmentations to their language. A full and truly fair understanding of bats, like the experience of belonging to a culture alien to the theorist, must include a grasp of what it is to be a member of that group, cultural or otherwise. Nagel’s argument is strictly analogous, at best it is a distant analogy, but it serves to illustrate that a theorist still lacks a key component to a full understanding of the other – namely what it is to be of the subgroup in question.

Like the human and the bat as they pertain to conscious experience, we are ultimately inseparable from our lived cultural experiences since we cannot adequately imagine it (with language alone) any other way. No amount of dialogue or enhancement to our vocabulary can actually express to the theorist what it’s like to exist in a culture that holds those certain values
underlying the subject’s language. Furthermore, theorists can act as if their values are not being enforced on another and that they are being egalitarian and fair in their judgements, but it is an illusion to think one can genuinely suspend the entirety of one’s values and fairly adopt the others’ through the mere modification of one’s language. Thus, any evaluation of a culture or its artistic products predicated on this limited understanding never fully escapes the charge of ethnocentricity.

As Taylor argues in his discussion of ethnocentricity and cultural evaluations, a theorist can take measures to avoid ethnocentricity by enhancing the evaluative metrics that underlie their language through dialogue with those belonging to the other culture. This may be a step in the right direction but, as I have argued, it cannot result in a theorist who is neutral to both their local values and to those of the subject. Thus, Taylor ultimately fails in providing a framework that prevents a cultural theorist from recapitulating their cultural standards and imposing them onto another.

Bibliography


Haecceities as Truthmakers in the Presentist Theory of Time

Mikayla Huston

In this analysis, I will show that the Markosian argument against haecceities properties as a solution to the problem of truthmakers for singular propositions that arises in the Presentist theory is weak. I will begin by clarifying the main theory from which this problem arises, that is, Presentism, and then some terminology that will be used often throughout my argument. I will then present and respond to Markosian’s arguments against haecceities as truthmakers for all types of singular propositions. Finally, I will argue for and begin to develop a new conception of haecceities, which is more consistent with our intuitive understanding of what an “essence” of an object or being really is, and I will go on to briefly discuss how this new understanding of haecceities is more cohesive with the presentist theory of time.

Presentism

Presentism is a theory of time, whose thesis is that only the moment which is the present one, and its present properties and relations, exist. This means that the past, the future, and all properties and relations of past and future moments, do not exist.

Truthmakers

There are several important objections that the Presentist has to answer in order for the theory to be adequately plausible. One of these is the truthmaker problem. A truthmaker is what it
sounds like; it is something that makes something true. Because that is still a murky sense of the concept, another way of putting it is that a truthmaker is what we look to in order to verify that some claim is true. For a claim, or proposition, such as “Yunus lives in Milan,” what we look for to verify that this is true is Yunus himself, living in Milan. Although talk of truthmakers makes it sound like every claim has (or does not have) one truthmaker that verifies its truth value, the singularity of a truthmaker is not important. For the claim “Yunus lives in Milan,” we can think of “Yunus living in Milan” as being the one necessary truthmaker, but, really, there is more than one piece. There is Yunus himself, alive, there is Milan, a real city, etc. The point is, there may be more truthmakers which work together to make a claim true.

**Singular Propositions**

It is important to stop here to explain that so far, the claims which need truthmakers we have used are singular propositions. Singular propositions are propositions that are about a certain individual. These are in contrast to general propositions, such as “some people are American,” and particularized propositions, which, like singular propositions, have an individual, but refer to that individual indirectly, such as, “the student is a woman.” The proposition “Yunus lives in Milan” is singular, because it refers directly to an individual and the proposition is *about* that individual.

**The Truthmaker Problem for Singular Propositions**

Specifically, the problem which arises from Presentism is about truthmakers for singular propositions which are in the non-present (past or future). If we take another singular proposition, but this time, it is in the past-tense, where can we find its truthmaker? It seems obvious that its truthmaker will be found in the past, but Presentism does not allow for the existence of past objects.
If we take a proposition such as, “Yunus, who has died, lived in Istanbul,” and we want to verify its truth with a truthmaker, we have to look for Yunus living in Istanbul in the past. If we take Presentism to be true, and its consequence that past objects, properties, and relations no longer exist, than it is impossible for us to locate the truthmaker we need. Does this make it the case that the singular proposition, “Yunus lived in Istanbul” false? For anyone who knew Yunus and knew that he lived in Istanbul, this would not sit well.

**Haecceities**

In the theory of Haecceitism, there are properties called Haecceities. These properties refer to someone or something’s “individual essence,” and are often given the suffix “-ness.” For the above example then, we would adopt the haecceity “Yunusness.” Representations of these properties exist (or have existed) in order for the property to exist, and the representations are sufficient and necessary for the haecceities. “Yunus” is the representation of “Yunusness,” and the existence of Yunus is necessary and sufficient for there to be a property of “Yunusness,” that is to say, Yunus’ existence is what is necessary to bring “Yunusness” into existence, and Yunus’ existence was sufficient to bring “Yunusness” into existence. For the purposes of this paper, it should be mentioned that while some believe that in order for haecceity like “Yunusness” to exist, there must always be a “Yunus” in existence, others believe only that a representation of the haecceity must have existed at some point in time. So, for some, “Yunus” having existed at some point, is enough for the haecceity “Yunusness,” and “Yunusness” does not cease to exist when “Yunus” does.
Haecceities as Truthmakers for Singular Propositions

In “A Defense of Presentism,” Ned Markosian analyzes possible solutions to the problem of truthmakers for singular propositions in Presentism. One of the possible solutions he considers, but denies as a real solution, appeals to Haecceities to solve the problem and allow truthmakers for singular propositions in the past-tense to exist, as Haecceities properties themselves. This works in the following way: we have the singular proposition “Yunus was an engineer,” and it is in the past tense, because Yunus no longer exists. If we take there to be haecceities, the relevant haecceity for this singular proposition is “Yunusness.” “Yunusness” will include everything relevant to the essence of Yunus himself, including the fact that Yunus was an engineer. Assuming that haecceities exist past the existence of their representations, the truthmaker for the proposition “Yunus was an engineer” need not be Yunus himself, but can be “Yunusness.” This leaves a presentist without the problem of being incapable of finding truthmakers for singular propositions set in the past, because all singular propositions, if they are true, will be accompanied by an individual who instantiated a haecceity that exists forever.

Markosian Arguments

1. In his paper, Markosian offers four problems that come with using haecceities as truthmakers for singular propositions in Presentism. The first problem is that haecceities in the as understood in the way I’ve just explained them may allow Presentists to identify truthmakers for singular propositions set in the past, but the Presentist still cannot identify truthmakers for singular propositions set in the future, since no haecceity can exist before it is instantiated by its representative.
2. The second problem is one which I have briefly mentioned already. In order for haecceities to work as truthmakers for singular propositions about the past, one must commit to the claim that haecceities still exist after their representatives cease to exist, and this requirement, for Markosian, is a heavy ontological commitment.

3. The third problem is that in the way that haecceities work to solve the problem, it doesn’t seem to be the case that haecceities can consistently form different singular propositions strictly about their entities. For example, if the proposition “there was a unique x that exemplified Yunusness and that was an engineer” is adopted, the problem is that this does not seem to fit the description of a singular proposition. It isn’t clear that the proposition is directly about Yunus, which is a requirement of a singular proposition. To further illustrate the problem, suppose that Yunus was also Mikayla’s best friend, and take the property of “being Mikayla’s best friend” as a placeholder for “Yunusness” in the above example. Now, consider the proposition “there was a unique x that was Mikayla’s best friend and was an engineer.” This proposition does not even seem to refer uniquely to Yunus in any way, even if the x is meant to be Yunus by the declarant or author of the proposition. Markosian says that if the second proposition is not about Yunus, then neither is the first, and if the first proposition is not about Yunus, then the haecceity does not count as a truthmaker.

4. Finally, Markosian combines the second and third problems to create a dilemma. He says that either “there was a unique x that exemplified Yunusness and that was an engineer” is a singular proposition about Yunus, or it is not.

If it is not a singular proposition about Yunus, then the haecceity “Yunusness” still cannot give us a singular proposition about Yunus, and it will not work as a truthmaker for other singular propositions about Yunus either, whether they are set in the past, present, or future.
If it is a singular proposition about Yunus, then “Yunusness” must have something special about it. That is to say, when we use “Yunusness” in the above way in a singular proposition, it is therefore a singular proposition about Yunus. For “Yunusness” to be able to bring that situation about is different than the proposition “there was a unique x that was Mikayla’s best friend and was an engineer,” which cannot tell us something about Yunus directly, because the property of “being Mikayla’s best friend” clearly has nothing about it that makes it refer uniquely to Yunus thus rendering the proposition a singular one about Yunus.

Responses to Markosian Arguments

1. The first problem, about haecceities being unable to serve as truthmakers for singular propositions set in the future, I think is not actually a problem for the Presentist. Intuitively, there seems to be something very wrong with denying that there is a truthmaker for “Yunus was an engineer,” especially for anyone who knew Yunus and knew that he was an engineer.

But the same sort of discomfort stemming from a contradiction with our intuition is not brought about if the Presentist were to say that there is no truthmaker for the singular proposition “Mikayla will be president.” In other words, it does not feel as strange to claim that we cannot verify via truthmaker the proposition “Mikayla will be president” as it does to claim that we cannot verify the proposition that “Yunus was an engineer.”

The response to Markosian’s claim that a presentist is unable to pin down a truthmaker for future-set propositions is simply agreement. Presentist may not be able to verify future-set propositions with a truthmaker, but they have no reason to either. It is enough for a Presentist to agree that there are truthmakers for singular propositions about the past and present but not about the future, because the past and present have been or are being experienced. The future, on the
other hand, has not and is not being experienced and has not. The Presentist can continue to deny that anything exists besides the present, but admit that truthmakers exist for both the past and present, but not the future. In this way, Presentism is stronger and more plausible, but does not lose anything essential to its thesis.

2. The second problem is the most pressing for proponents of haecceities as a solution to the truthmakers issue. Markosian and others find it too much of an ontological commitment to allow that haecceities exist even when their representations do not. (When Yunus dies, will the haecceity he brought into existence live on?) Markosian says that in order for us to understand “Yunusness” as identical to Yunus, Yunus must be a constituent of Yunus, and that in that case it’s implausible for “Yunusness” to exist without Yunus in existence. I argue that Markosian’s mistake here is in assuming that “Yunusness” is identical to Yunus. The property “Yunusness” does not need Yunus as a constituent, because although Yunus in some way did the work of bringing “Yunusness” into existence by existing himself, “Yunusness” is its own entity, and can continue to exist without Yunus to represent it. “Yunusness” as a property is not identical to Yunus. The difference between Yunus and “Yunusness” is that Yunus has the property of being a human, and “Yunusness,” while it entails that Yunus is a human, also has its own property of being a property. “Yunusness” can entail every piece of information that makes up the essence of Yunus, but since it is a property, it is separate from Yunus after it is brought into existence. This is not to say it isn’t connected to Yunus, only that it is its own entity that can exist independently after being brought into existence by Yunus. I discuss more about how a haecceity should be understood not as identical to its instantiator, but as a definition of its instantiator, later.

3. The third problem is, the proposition “there was a unique x that exemplified Yunusness and that was an engineer” being unable to directly refer to Yunus and therefore not fulfilling the
description of a singular proposition about Yunus, is not really a problem either. There is no need for a new proposition like this when we use a haecceity as a truthmaker for a singular proposition set in the past. “Yunusness” itself serves as the truthmaker for the proposition “Yunus was an engineer.” “Yunusness,” as I have discussed, can exist independently of Yunus after Yunus has ceased to exist. We can say that “Yunusness” is the truthmaker for “Yunus was an engineer,” and using the proposition “there was a unique x that exemplified Yunusness” as a truthmaker for “Yunus was an engineer” just isn’t necessary. We have no need for a singular proposition about Yunus in order to solve the truthmaker problem, for “Yunus was an engineer” because we can find the truthmaker in “Yunusness” which already entails everything about Yunus, while also existing independently of Yunus.

4. This means that in the fourth problem, there is no dilemma, because again, we have no need for a singular proposition about Yunus to be a truthmaker for the proposition “Yunus was an engineer.” “Yunusness” itself does the work of the truthmaker. However, there is still the Markosian worry about whether haecceities have something special about them that allows a proposition like “there was a unique x that exemplified Yunusness and that was an engineer” to be about Yunus, even though “there was a unique x that was Mikayla’s best friend and was an engineer,” cannot. Markosian is right to wonder about this. My response is that of course a haecceity property like “Yunusness” has way more weight and power than a lower level property like “being Mikayla’s best friend.” Haecceities properties adopt everything there is about their representation when they come into existence, so of course they have more to say than other, more ordinary properties.

While I maintain that is not identical to Yunus, “Yunusness” still entails all of Yunus’s properties, and because we understand it as a property itself whose beginning depended on Yunus,
we can infer that when it is used in a proposition, depending on the context, it may refer directly to Yunus and serve as a singular proposition. In other words, the haecceity entails everything about Yunus, and depended on Yunus in order to exist at all, so when it is used in a proposition, the only intelligent way of understanding it is as something that is in fact about Yunus.

A New Idea About Haecceities

The departure of my understanding of haecceities from other conceptions, such as the one of Duns Scotus, the inventor of the term, is found in my argument that haecceities should not be understood strictly as properties of being identical to their instantiator. For Scotus, a haecceity is the property of being identical with the entity by which it was instantiated, and it can only be held by that entity. This view is further developed with Scotus’ claim that the nature or essence of an object or being and the object or being itself, in order to be identical, are inseparable. But given these characteristics of haecceities argued for by Scotus and Rosenkrantz, it seems wrong to claim this conception of a haecceity as a synonym for “thisness” as we use and understand the word.

“Yunusness” is not immediately or obviously understood as the property of being identical to Yunus and as a property that is inseparable from Yunus. “Thisness” or the “essence” of a being should instead be understood more like an entailing of everything essential about that being, like a naturally existing set of qualities and characteristics that determine Yunus’ core nature. It would contain every property, event, relation, etc. about its instantiator, as long as the property, event, or relation were essential to Yunus being Yunus. If we could take the haecceity and examine it thoroughly, we would find this set of essential components.

Kit Fine argues for a way of understanding essential properties, in which essential properties are characterized definitionally, i.e., the essential properties of an object are whichever
properties would be included in that object’s definition. This characterization of essential properties is more allowing than the popular modal characterization, which requires that an essential property be necessarily held by its object, i.e., the object cannot lack the property. The definitional characterization is more allowing than the modal characterization, because the definition of Yunus, for example, would entail every property about Yunus at the time he is being defined, and not just every property that Yunus cannot lack. This is consistent with the Presentist theory of time insofar as Yunus’ definition contains all and only presently held or previously experienced properties, events, or relations. To be clear, what would be included in the definition at the present moment should strictly be called “properties of properties previously experienced” which might be, for example, Yunus’ property of having previously been 1.6 meters tall when he was younger. These properties, although they refer to the past, were previously experienced by a presently existing man. Just because they were experienced prior to the present moment does not discount their exemplification by Yunus, and because they are in this way allowed in the definition of Yunus, and thus essential properties of Yunus, they are part of Yunus’ essence, or haecceity.

There are still certain essential properties, such as the property of being a human that Yunus could not lack. But understanding Yunus’ essence is only important for the presentist as it concerns his present definition. Accidental properties as they are understood in the modal characterization can be included in Yunus’ definition as essential. To make this clearer, assume that Yunus now lives in Milan, but previously lived in Istanbul. Yunus’ present definition will include the property of having previously resided in Istanbul, because that is an essential previously experienced event by the present Yunus. But under the modal characterization of essential properties, the property of Yunus having previously lived in Istanbul would be accidental. By adopting the definitional

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characterization of essential properties, we find every single detail about Yunus in his present definition, i.e., his essence. His essence is his haecceity, “Yunusness” and can account for every singular proposition about Yunus set in the present or past. In this understanding of a haecceity, the haecceity is not the property of being identical to its instantiator. We would not say that the definition of a chair is the property of being identical to a chair. If asked what the definition of a chair is, we would describe the properties that make up what it is to be a chair. Once we understand the “essence” of a being or object definitionally, we see that it is simply a set of essential properties. For Yunus, we can understand his haecceity “Yunusness” as his definition, and we can understand his definition as a set of his essential properties. For the presentist, this set of properties would be sort of like an abstract, naturally existing dossier on Yunus, and all of his present and past experiences, relations, and properties. This conception of a haecceity is not only more intuitive in general, since it allows more properties to be classified as essential under the presentist account, but it is also generally more cohesive with presentism, since it allows for past-experienced events, relations, or properties to be captured in a present object or being’s essence. This also circles back to haecceities adequately performing as truthmakers for propositions set in the past through a presentist lens, since it entails everything about Yunus up to the present moment, including details of the past.

In this paper, I have discussed and clarified the problem of truthmakers for singular propositions which arises in the Presentist theory of time. I then clarified the notion of haecceities as properties as they are classically understand and how they can be truthmakers for singular propositions set in the past. I went on to outline Ned Markosian’s four problems with the haecceity solution the truthmaker problem, and responded to each, specifically departing from the popular view that a haecceity is the property of being identical to its instantiator. I introduced a
modification to the conception of haecceities using the definitional characterization of essential properties in order to show that the “essence” or haecceity of an object is not the property of being identical to that object. Through all of this I have defended the use of haecceities as a Presentist-compatible solution to the problem, and modified the conception of haecceities in a way that is both more intuitive to our notion of an “essence” and also more cohesive with the presentist theory of time.
Bibliography


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I would also like to encourage those interested in submitting a paper to either this journal or the undergraduate colloquium to contact Professor Carrie Swanson (carrie-e-swanson@uiowa.edu). You need not be a philosophy major or minor to submit papers to the board for review.

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Annie Ringelestein